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"LABOR'S DIVIDED RANKS": PRIVILEGE AND THE
UNITED FRONT IDEOLOGY
Marion Craint & Ken Mathenytt
INTRODUCTION
The American workforce, once a relatively homogenous group by
race, ethnicity, and gender, has grown increasingly diverse.' As the
workforce has diversified, workplace disputes, once framed in terms of
class conflict and considered the province of labor unions, have been
eclipsed by identity-based claims raising issues relating to race, ethnic-
ity, gender, sexual orientation, or disability. Antidiscrimination laws
reify and reinforce gender, ethnic, race, sexual orientation, and disa-
bility consciousness in workers, and academics, civil rights lawyers, and
progressive social change movements have enthusiastically taken up
these causes. 2 Meanwhile, the labor movement has fallen into public
disfavor, as indicated by the corresponding drop in union density.3
Increasingly, the lines of identity politics divide the workforce more
than issues of class unite it.
American labor law, however, remains steadfast in the face of
these changes, behaving as if class consciousness and class solidarity
were the only relevant forms of collective worker protest and assuming
t Paul Eaton Professor of Law, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
School of Law. B.S. 1980, Cornell University; J.D. 1983, UCLA School of Law. I am grate-
ful for the research support provided by the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
School of Law. I thank Michael Fischl, Wythe Holt, and Molly McUsic for their insightful
comments on earlier versions of this paper. Karen Champion, Catherine Dyar, Debbie
Edney, and Scott Holmes provided invaluable research assistance.
1-t" Senior Attorney, Social Security Administration. BA. 1977, West Virginia Wesleyan
College; M.A. 1979, West University University; J.D. 1989, West University College of Law.
The opinions I express in this Article are my own and do not represent the views of the
Social Security Administration or the federal government.
1 See CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE?: THE REJUVENATION OF THE AMERICAN
LABOR MOVEMENT 38 (1993) (describing a long-term trend of increasing workforce partici-
pation by women and minorities).
2 See Molly S. McUsic & Michael Selmi, Postmodern Unions: Identity Politics in the Work-
place 82 IowA L. REV. 1339, 1339-40 (1997).
3 See RobertJ. LaLonde & Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard Times for Unions: Another Look at
the Significance ofEmployer Ilegalities, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 953, 953 (1991) (pointing out that
union density fell from 35% in 1953 to 12% by 1989); Paul C. Weiler, Hard Times for Unions:
Challenging Times for Scholars, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1017 (1991) (explaining that private-
sector union density is expected to drop below 10% by the year 2000). See generally PAUL C.
WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAw 9-10
(1990) (explaining underlying causes of the rise in union density in the 1950s and its
subsequent decline in the 1970s and 1980s).
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a class-based unity among employees that does not always exist. The
National Labor Relations Act 4 (NLRA) addresses itself only to the pre-
sumed class conflict among employers and employees, ignoring and
downplaying conflicts among employees themselves. The NLRA as-
sumes that workers doing the same type of work at a common worksite
share common class and economic interests. Consequently, the
NLRA establishes a representational structure in which a single
union-a "united front"-represents all workers in that unit and
speaks with a single voice on their behalf. This united front ideology,
enshrined in labor law through the exclusivity and majority-rule doc-
trines, obscures significant material conflicts of interest within the
working class. When conflicts along identity lines have surfaced, ad-
herents to the united front ideology have portrayed them as under-
mining the economic interests of the working class, particularly its
unionized segment, and swept them back under the rug.
American unionists have enthusiastically embraced the united
front ideology because they fear that acknowledging divisions within
the working class would assist employers in their efforts to undermine
working class solidarity by pitting one group of workers against an-
other. To the contrary, by suppressing identity issues in labor union-
ism, unionists enhance employers' ability to divide the workforce. By
allying itself with disempowered groups of workers inadequately rep-
resented by labor unions working within the confines of majority rule,
an employer can send the message that labor unions represent only
the more powerful race- and gender-privileged workers, while the em-
ployer champions outsider-employees' interests.
In this Article, we argue that labor law's preoccupation with em-
ployer-employee conflict stems from an essentialist vision of the race-
and sex-privileged worker who is economically exploited only within
the dimension of class. 5 The united front ideology ignores the race
4 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
5 We focus primarily upon conflicts of interest arising out of gender privilege, with
some attention to conflicts arising out of racial privilege. In a companion article, we dis-
cuss in more detail conflicts of interest arising out of racial privilege, and the organizing
opportunities that these conflicts might present or deny to unions. See Marion Grain &
Ken Matheny, Making Rhetoric Reality Labor, Race and Class (1998) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with authors).
More theoretical and empirical work should be done with regard to other axes along
which privilege functions, including heterosexual and able-bodied privilege. Division
within labor's ranks exists along these axes as well. For example, the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act (ADA) requires the employer to make reasonable accommodation to an em-
ployee's known disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b) (5) (A) (Supp. II 1996). Often,
such accommodation conflicts with the rights of able-bodied employees established in the
labor contract. Compare Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir.
1996) (holding that, in the context of a disabled worker's ADA action against his employer
and union, "the ADA does not'require disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacri-
ficing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees"), cert. de-
1999] 1543
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
and gender specificity of class consciousness, masking the diverse ways
in which people experience class consciousness and undertake class
protest. This impoverished understanding of class consciousness cir-
cumscribes union-organizing efforts and shapes other union strategies
in ways that limit labor's constituency. The image of a white, male,
manufacturing-based working class shapes union praxis and public
perception of the labor movement, excluding and alienating those
who now collectively comprise the majority of the U.S. workforce: wo-
men, racial and ethnic minorities, and service workers. In short, sup-
pressing identity-based conflicts of interest among sectors of the
working class not only directly disadvantages the most economically
marginalized workers, it undermines organized labor's ability to re-
spond to employer efforts to exacerbate these divisions and prevents
labor unions from mobilizing a larger portion of the working class.
Once thought necessary to preserve solidarity in a relatively ho-
mogeneous workforce unified by its common economic concerns but
potentially divided by individual economic interests, the exclusivity
and majority-rule doctrines have outlived their usefulness. Denying
the divisions within the working class through the united front ideol-
ogy has proven to be more insidiously divisive than confronting them.
The ideals of universality and solidarity, while important, have not
risen to the challenge of mobilizing a diverse workforce. In this Arti-
cle, we seek to explain how and why the dream of worker solidarity
has been frustrated, and to describe the roles that employers, labor
unions, and more-privileged workers have played in the process.6
nied, 520 U.S. 1146 (1997), with Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 896 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (holding that seniority rights of workers under a collective bargaining agreement do
not automatically defeat an employee's request for accommodation under the ADA and
requiring the court to make an individual determination in each case), vacated and reh 'g en
banc granted, 124 F.3d 1302 (1997), op. reinstated in part on reh'g, 156 F.3d 1284, 1303, 1306
(1998) (declining to rule on whether a per se or a balancing approach is more appropriate
and remanding for a determination of whether the proposed accommodation actually con-
flicted with the seniority system). See generally Robert A. Dubault, The ADA and the NLRA:
Balancing Individual and Collective Rights, 70 IND. LJ. 1271 (1995) (discussing potential con-
flicts between the ADA and the NLRA). These conflicts create a dilemma for unions: Who
is their primary constituency, and what is their proper role? See generally Mary K.
O'Melveny, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Collective Bargaining Agreements: Reasonable
Accommodations or Irreconcilable Conflicts?, 82 Ky. LJ. 219 (199--1994) (arguing that labor
unions, as vocal supporters of the ADA, see the potential of the ADA to help them obtain
improved working conditions for the growing number of disabled workers and that they
will probably cooperate fully in helping disabled workers function effectively on the job).
But seeEckles, 94 F.3d at 1043 (involving a disabled employee's complaint naming the union
as defendant in its capacity as representative of the majority of workers).
6 Because some may view any focus on labor's intemal discord as divisive of solidarity
and disloyal to the goals of the labor movement, we want to make clear at the outset that
this Article critiques labor law and labor unionism from the left. We do not seek to place
blame on unions or organized workers, but to explore how the structure of the labor mar-
ket, the operation of race- and gender-privilege, the dynamics of the relation between or-
C5
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We begin in Part I with the synopsis of a case, EEOC v. Mitsubishi
Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc.,7 which illustrates the fragmenting
of workers' class, race, and gender interests, paying particular atten-
tion to the impact of the legally coerced united front on worker soli-
darity along gender lines. In Part II, we outline the labor law
principles of majority rule and exclusivity which undergird the united
front ideology and the origin of those principles. Part III discusses
how privilege has shaped the labor market and labor unionism, and
explores the ramifications on class solidarity of ignoring gender and
racial consciousness. Part IV analyzes the role that gender exploita-
tion has played in constructing the experience of class in the United
States and explains why the workforce remains divided along gender
lines. Part V argues for a fundamental rethinking of the united front
ideology, and the majority-rule and exclusivity doctrines. We return
to the Mitsubishi case to illustrate our arguments. We conclude that
recognizing and institutionalizing identity-based divisions within the
working class would facilitate organizing and coalition-building
among groups of workers, ultimately redounding to the benefit of the
entire working class.
I
THE PROBLEM ILLUSTRATED: EEOC v M/TSUBISuHI.MOTOR
AAAZA CT-URAG OF AMERCA, INC.
Mitsubishi illustrates the divisions within labor's ranks along gen-
der and, to a lesser degree, racial lines. It also illustrates the ways in
which unions and employers typically respond to these divisions
within the framework of existing law.
ganized labor and employers, and the labor laws have functioned both to keep less-
privileged workers on the economic periphery and to undermine union power.
The perception of the working class as a monolithic whole has contributed to an all-
or-nothing vision of labor law partisanship; one is either for or against labor, and no mid-
dle ground exists from which a constructive critique can be levelled. See THoMAS GEOGHE-
GAN, WHICH SIDE ARE You ON? TRYING To BE FOR LABOR WHEN IT'S FLAT ON ITS BACK
(1991). Thus, as William Gould observed in a preface to his critique of the labor move-
ment's treatment of black workers, "[o]ne must repeat the litany of good deeds done [by
labor] . . . to avoid being [seen] ... as a stalking horse for management interests." WIL-
LuAm B. GouLD, BACK WORKERS IN WHrrE UNIONS: JOB DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNrrED
STATES 16 (1977). The senior author has elsewhere sung the praises of unions as past,
present, and potential future advocates for women and people of color, and continues to
endorse labor unionism as a vehicle for social change for outsider groups. See Marion
Grain, Confronting the Structural Character of Working Women's Economic Subordination: Collective
Action vs. Individual Rights Strategies, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, Spring 1994, at 26 [hereinafter
Crain, Confronting the Structural Character]; Marion Grain, Feminism, Labor, and Power, 65 S.
CAL. L. Rxv. 1819 (1992) [hereinafter Grain, Feminism, Labor, and Power].
7 990 F. Supp. 1059 (C.D. I1. 1998).
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A. The Claim
On April 9, 1996, the EEOC filed what is thought to be the largest
class-action sexual harassment suit ever on behalf of female
autoworkers against their employer, Mitsubishi Motors. The EEOC
investigation disclosed that "as many as 500 of the 893 women in the
plant" had suffered sexual harassment.8 The women autoworkers al-
leged misogynist conduct in the plant by both male autoworkers and
supervisors, including physically abusing women (e.g., slapping wo-
men on the buttocks, touching their breasts and crotches), pinning
sexually obscene signs to the backs of unknowing women, placing ob-
scene graffiti on the fenders of cars coming down the assembly line
and obscene pop-ups which appeared unexpectedly in the cars when
women were assembling them, wrapping automotive parts in porno-
graphic newspapers, assaulting women with factory equipment (e.g.,
placing hoses, wrenches, and air guns between women's legs), playing
pranks on women (e.g., dousing the seats of cars that women must sit
on with butane, making obscene motions with bananas, placing plastic
penises in buckets of tools), sabotaging women's work (which some-
times led to injuries), circulating pornographic photos of production-
line workers and male managers having sex with women who did not
work at the plant during a private party, posting lists on the walls rank-
ing the women in the plant by their estimated breast sizes, and abus-
ing women verbally (e.g., referring to women as "sluts," "whores," and
8 Kim Moody, Sexual Harassment at Mitsubishi: Where Was the Union 2, LAB. NoTEs, June
1996, at 1. The case captured national media attention not only because of its size (the
plaintiff class originally was estimated to number 800 women, including all those who had
been employed during the relevant time frame), but also because Mitsubishi pursued the
unusual course of resisting the EEOC investigation. See John Nichols, Fighting the Legal
Battle Against Sexual Harassment, CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Apr. 29, 1996, at 1C (inter-
viewing Sarah Siskind, the private attorney handling the case that spawned the EEOC in-
vestigation). Mitsubishi emphatically denied the EEOC's charges and launched an
aggressive legal counterattack in the private lawsuit filed against it. See Rochelle Sharpe,
Fighting Back. A Mitsubishi U.S. Unit Is Taking a Hard Line in Harassment Battle, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 22, 1996, at Al. Company lawyers requested the plaintiffs' gynecological and psycho-
logical records, as well as information about their living arrangements, which Mitsubishi
argued were relevant to proving a pattern of promiscuous behavior by individual plaintiffs.
See id. Mitsubishi also initiated a public relations pressure campaign: it "financed a protest
... by... 2500 employees outside the EEOC offices in Chicago, shutting down production
at the [Illinois] plant, [and] provid[ed] everyone who went a full day's pay, a free lunch,
and free round-trip transportation on chartered buses." Kirsten Downey Grimsley et al.,
Fear on the Line at Mitsubishi: Women Recount Allegations of Sexual Harassment at Auto Plant,
WASH. Posr, Apr. 29, 1996, at Al. Finally, the case also raised speculation about whether
the Japanese-managed company promoted sexist attitudes endemic to Japanese culture
within its American workforce. See Nichols, supra, at 1C.
1546 [Vol. 84:1542
"LABOR'S DIVDED RANKS"
"bitches," referring to them by their breast size numbers, and asking
them about their sexual habits and preferences).9
Some workers also contemporaneously filed racial harassment
suits against the company. The allegations of racial harassment in-
cluded verbal abuse (i.e., calling African American employees "nig-
gers"), crude drawings of Ku Klux Klan figures on the lockers of
African American workers, and racialized sexual harassment.' 0 Subse-
quently, twenty-one African American workers filed a racial-discrimi-
nation and harassment suit, naming both Mitsubishi and United Auto
Workers Local 2488 as defendants."
B. The Company's Response
Mitsubishi initially responded to the EEOC suit by mobilizing its
employees in a public-relations campaign directed against the EEOC.
Management characterized the sexual harassment charges as "charac-
ter criticism[s] of the highest magnitude," and urged employees to
express publicly their concern "that the lawsuit could damage car sales
and cost them theirjobs."' 2 A significant number of workers came to
the company's defense by attending a company-financed rally at
EEOC offices in Chicago, collecting over $2000 to finance the place-
ment of ads in local newspapers, writing letters to the editor attacking
their female coworkers and charging that women avoided the reper-
cussions of poor work performance because managers feared sexual
harassment charges, and calling their congressional representatives
on phone banks established at the plant.13 Harassment at the plant
increased as worker anger mounted, with one woman receiving a
death threat.14
9 See Grimsley et al., supra note 8, at Al; see also Nichols, supra note 8, at 1 C; MacNeill
LehrerNews Hour (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 26, 1996) (transcript No. 5515, on file with
authors).
10 See Grimsley et al., supra note 8, at Al.
11 See African American Mitsubishi Workers File Suit Alleging Harassment, Discrimination,
1999 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 63, at A-8 (Apr. 2, 1999).
12 Sharpe, supra note 8, at Al (internal quotation marks omitted). Some commenta-
tors have suggested that Mitsubishi's public relations response to the EEOC suit deliber-
ately sought to undermine union solidarity by dividing the workforce along gender lines.
See Sexual Harassment: Mitsubishi Employees Converge on EEOC Office; Union Questions Firm's
Response, 1996 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 78, at D-8 (Apr. 23, 1996). By making the EEOC
and the litigation scapegoats for its slumping sales, the company could use the EEOC suit
to divert attention from a looming problem: "Chrysler's agreement to sell Mitsubishi prod-
ucts through its dealerships expire[d] in 1999," and Chrysler had indicated that it would
not renew the agreement. Moody, supra note 8, at 14. Anticipating major cutbacks in the
near future, the company could have been playing upon fears of job loss to divide the
workforce and thereby undermine the union's solidarity and power to resist the cutbacks.
See id.
13 See Sharpe, supra note 8, at Al.
14 See Robyn Meredith, Few at Mitsubishi Are Silent over Accusations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,
1996, at A20.
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In its defense, Mitsubishi argued that the labor agreement barred
sexual harassment claims because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their
remedies under the agreement itself.15 The company also argued that
it "took reasonable and prompt steps" to redress the alleged harass-
ment as soon as it became aware of the harassment's existence and
that it should not be held responsible for worker actions of which it
had no notice.' 6
Subsequently, Mitsubishi sought to boost its credibility in the
public eye 17 by hiring former Labor Secretary Lynn Martin as a con-
sultant and asking her to revamp the company's sexual harassment
policy.18 Martin ultimately recommended that the company institute
comprehensive training for all employees. In addition, she recom-
mended the immediate reopening of previously unfruitful discussions
with the union on including an Equal Application Agreement in the
labor contract, rather than waiting for the next collective bargaining
contract negotiations. An Equal Application Agreement would estab-
lish a joint labor-management committee and require action within
forty-eight hours after receiving a complaint of racial or sexual dis-
crimination or harassment. 19
Two years later, Mitsubishi settled the lawsuit by paying over $34
million to the more than 350 women in the EEOC class action: "[T] he
largest class of claimants ever to be compensated in an EEOC-initiated
... sexual harassment suit and the largest cash amount to be paid to
resolve such a dispute." 20
C. The Union's Role
United Autoworkers Union, Local 2488, represents the male and
female autoworkers at the Normal, Illinois plant. Local 2488 was not a
named defendant in Mitsubishi, and it was joined in the consent de-
cree voluntarily so that it might assist in implementing the decree's
terms.21 Nevertheless, its response to the harassment played a pivotal
15 See Mitsubishi Asks Judge to Dismiss Suit Filed by EEOC Alleging Sex Harassment, 1996
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 122, at A-10, A-11 (June 25, 1996).
16 Id.
17 See Meredith, supra note 14, at A20.
18 See Former Secretary of Labor Martin To Review Mitsubishi's Workplace Policies, 1996 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 94, at A-18 (May 15, 1996).
19 See Mitsubishi, Lynn Martin, Announce Plan To Reform Workplace, 1996 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 137, at A-21 (July 17, 1996). Martin subsequently produced a comprehensive
set of recommendations for internal reform intended to convert Mitsubishi Motors into a
model workplace. See Lynn Martin Unveils 34-Point Plan for Making Mitsubishi Model Work-
place, 1997 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at AA-1 (Feb. 13, 1997).
20 Mitsubishi Settles EEOC Suit for $34 Million; Agency Says Class, Amount Largest Ever,
1998 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 113, at AA-1 (June 12, 1998).
21 See Consent Decree Between EEOC, Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, and United
Auto Workers, 1998 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 113, at E-6 (June 12, 1998) [hereinafter
Consent Decree]. An attorney for the women who filed the private lawsuit said that she con-
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role in the filing of the EEOC lawsuit. Although most union contracts
at other big U.S. automakers contain an Equal Application Agree-
ment, the Mitsubishi-UAW contract did not.22 According to Local
2488 officials, the union proposed the Equal Application Agreement
during bargaining negotiations, but Mitsubishi refused it, and the
union did not pursue the issue further.23 In fact, the labor contract in
force at the time of the suit lacked any specific provisions dealing with
sexual harassment whatsoever. Instead the union encouraged workers
and managers to solve problems without involving the union.24
Although the UAW and Local 2488 officially condemn sexual har-
assment, Local 2488 officers refused to proceed with formal griev-
ances on complaints brought by women members involving member-
on-member harassment and even some supervisor-on-member harass-
ment. Washington Post reporters investigating the lawsuit discovered
that Local 2488's civil rights committee (which is charged with ad-
dressing sexual and racial discrimination and harassment issues) re-
ceived sexual harassment complaints from numerous women over the
preceding four years, but that Local 2488 officers instructed the com-
mittee not to investigate the cases or pursue them further.25 Appeals
by women to the International UAW yielded no further action,
notwithstanding its public condemnation of sexual harassment in the
workplace. 26
Instead, current and former presidents of Local 2488 tried to
handle member-on-member harassment complaints informally by
talking to the harasser or attempting a "reconciliation." Union lead-
ers took these courses of action to prevent the company from disci-
plining the harassers, but Local 2488 kept no records of these
attempts, and its officers admitted that they did not always succeed.27
sidered adding the union as a defendant, but decided against it because, she said, "'we
didn't want to make two enemies.'" Rochelle Sharpe, Divided Ranks: Women at Mitsubishi
Say Union Fell Short on Sexual Harassmen4 WALL ST. J., July 10, 1996, at Al (quoting the
attorney).
22 See Kirsten Downey Grimsley & Frank Swoboda, Women Say Union Local Ignored Har-
assment: UAWLeaders at Mitsubishi Plant Reportedly Failed To Act on Complaints, WASH. Posr,
June 8, 1996, at Cl; Moody, supra note 8, at 14; Sharpe, supra note 21, at Al.
23 See Moody, supra note 8, at 14.
24 See Sharpe, supra note 21, at Al. The lack of an anti-sexual harassment clause in a
union contract is not unusual. Although 87% of the collective bargaining agreements in a
recent BNA survey contained clauses prohibiting "discrimination on the basis of race,
color, creed, sex, national origin, or age," another survey by BNA found that only 57% of
the contracts contained a policy explicitly dealing with sexual harassment. BNA, BAsic
PATrERNS IN UNION CoNrAcrs 127-28 (14th ed. 1995); EmployerBargaining Objectives, 1996,
1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 188, Special Supp. at 7 (Sept. 28, 1995).
25 See Grimsley & Swoboda, supra note 22, at C1. Because the civil rights committee
had no formal authority in the union structure-only the union's bargaining committee
was authorized to deal with management-most complaints stalled there. See id.
26 See Sharpe, supra note 21, at Al.
27 See Grimsley et al., supra note 8, at Al; Moody, supra note 8, at 14.
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In eight years, the union filed only six harassment grievances with Mit-
subishi on behalf of women, all of which involved allegations of quid
pro quo harassment perpetrated by supervisors who threatened job
loss in order to obtain sexual favors.28 Even after the union filed
charges with the EEOC and the EEOC began investigating the inci-
dents, neither the International UAW nor Local 2488 made any fur-
ther effort to address the problem of sexual harassment. 29 Ironically,
the first formal grievance which Local 2488 filed in a hostile work en-
vironment peer-on-peer harassment case was brought on behalf of an
alleged harasser, whom the company had discharged following the fil-
ing of the EEOC charges.30
Several women interviewed by Washington Post reporters con-
firmed that the union's formal complaint system did not effectively
redress sexual harassment claims; some believed that they would face
retaliation from both their coworkers and the company if they pur-
sued formal complaints. 31 Indeed, Local 2488 officials themselves did
not model decorum in the workplace: during the EEOC investiga-
tion, Mitsubishi instructed Local 2488 Vice President Donald Shelby
to remove pictures of women taken from the Sports Illustrated swimsuit
issue which he had posted near his workbench. 32 Some workers de-
scribed the union as permeated by a sexual atmosphere, telling tales
of post-shift tailgate parties held in the company parking lot after local
bars closed down at which female strippers were a main attraction.33
Furthermore, when Mitsubishi organized a protest by its workers
against the EEOC in the wake of the EEOC investigation, Local 2488
remained "neutral," telling members that "they were free to attend
the protest" at EEOC offices. 34 Then, two days before the company-
organized demonstration, the International UAW intervened; United
Auto Workers President Stephen Yokich publicly chastised Mitsubishi
for refusing to cooperate in the EEOC investigation and reaffirmed
the International's official policy condemning sexual harassment of
28 See Moody, supra note 8, at 14; Sharpe, supra note 21, at Al.
29 See Moody, supra note 8, at 14. The union treated complaints of racial harassment
similarly. The union encouraged employees who complained about the placement of Klu
Klux Klan recruitment materials in the men's restroom not to break rank with their "broth-
ers and sisters" in the union. See Grimsley & Swoboda, supra note 22, at Cl; Sharpe, supra
note 21, at Al.
30 See Sharpe, supra note 21, at Al.
31 See Grimsley & Swoboda, supra note 22, at C1.
32 See Meredith, supra note 14, at A20.
33 See Grimsley & Swoboda, supra note 22, at Cl.
34 Brenda Warner Rotzoll & Lynn Sweet, Workers Stand Up for Mitsubishi: 3, 000 Protest
Sex Harassment Charges by Feds, CHi. SuN-TimEs, Apr. 23, 1996, at 1; see also'Drew Fetherston,
Pride and Shame: Harassment Case at Mitsubishi Plant Shakes Heartland, NEwSDAY, May 6, 1996,
at A3 (reporting that Union Local head Chick Kearney described the Local's position on
the protest as "neutral").
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workers.35 Two months later, the International UAW announced that
its Civil Rights Department would intensively train Local 2488 officials
on dealing with sexual and racial discrimination and harassment. It
also recommended that the International UAW and Mitsubishi jointly
sponsor a sexual harassment awareness program for the entire Mitsub-
ishi workforce.3 6 A Mitsubishi spokesperson characterized the UAW's
proposal as "redundant," because employees at Mitsubishi had already
begun participating in company-sponsored sexual harassment train-
ing sessions which the company had initiated two months previously.3 7
Ultimately, the union played almost no role in the resolution of
the problem. The consent decree established a three-person panel
charged with monitoring and reviewing Mitsubishi's implementation
of the nonmonetary terms of the decree. Those terms include new
sexual harassment policies requiring Mitsubishi to investigate all sex-
ual harassment complaints within three weeks and to prepare a writ-
ten finding and a remediation proposal for each complaint within
seven days of completing the investigation.38 Significantly, no union
official sits on that panel or participates in the decree-monitoring
process.3 9
D. The Intervention of Nonlabor Groups
Angered by the company's resistance to the EEOC investigation
and the union's failure to respond adequately to harassment com-
plaints, civil rights and feminist organizations entered the fray on be-
half of the wronged women workers. The National Organization for
Women, the National Rainbow Coalition, and Operation PUSH
launched consumer boycotts and pickets of Mitsubishi in the United
States, and a parallelJapanese group known as the Equal Opportunity
Network brought pressure to bear on Mitsubishi in Japan.40 The
threat of a consumer boycott against its products induced Mitsubishi
35 See Moody, supra note 8, at 14; UAWPresident Stephen P. Yokich Comments on Mitsubishi
EEOC Case and Blasts Mitsubishi for Planned Demonstration, PR NEwswiRE, Apr. 21,1996, avail-
able in LEXIS, Allnewsplus File.
36 See Autoworkers Announces Initiatives on Harassment Training at Mitsubishi, 1996 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 125, at A-18 to -19 (June 28, 1996).
37 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
38 See Consent Decree, supra note 21, at E-10.
39 See id. at E-11. The panel consists of an employer appointee, an EEOC appointee,
and a neutral appointee agreed upon by both parties.
40 See U.S., Japanese Groups Say They Will Widen Mitsubishi Protest to Other Firms, 1996
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 125, at A-5 (June 28, 1996); Women and Minority Groups An-
nounce National Boycott of Mitsubishi Products, 1996 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 90, at A-13
(May 9, 1996).
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officials to meet directly with feminist and civil rights leaders in the
United States and in Japan.41
E. What's Going On Here?
The dynamics in this case are not unique. A recent survey of hos-
tile work environment cases arising in union settings found that most
unions discourage their female members from formally acting
through their unions to combat sexual harassment by male cowork-
ers.42 The frustrated victims often turn to private lawyers or feminist
groups for redress (the National Organization for Women's Legal De-
fense Fund has represented the plaintiffs in several key cases), suing
both their employers and their unions.43
Alternatively, the victim complains directly to the employer, caus-
ing the employer to take disciplinary action against the harasser.44
The union then often files a grievance on behalf of the harasser pro-
testing the discipline, and the victim becomes the key witness for the
employer.45 Thus, the common scenario finds the female victim of
discrimination or harassment pitted against her union and her co-
worker harasser(s), and represented by a nonlabor group, by the
41 See Civil Rights Groups Will Expand Their Boycott Against Mitsubishi, 1996 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 109, at A-12 (June 6, 1996).
42 See Marion Crain, Women, Labor Unions, and Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harass-
ment: The Untold Stoy, 4 Tax. J. WOMEN & L. 9, 14 (1995).
43 See, e.g., Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 879 (D. Minn. 1993)
(explaining that the union's conflict of interest in representing its members rendered the
grievance procedure in the collective bargaining agreement ineffective to address sexual
harassment complaints brought by one union member against another and characterizing
the union's and the employers' efforts to address sexual harassment complaints as "half-
hearted"); Judge Refuses To Dismiss Union from Hostile Wo* Environment Case, 1998 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 235, at A-11 (Dec. 8, 1998) (describing rationale for union's potential
liability in perpetuating racially and sexually hostile work environment: union acquiesces
in employer's discriminatory practices when it is involved in selecting and managing the
workforce at the job site and fails to respond adequately to harassment complaints); Sex
Discrimination: Eveleth Ordered To Pay 16 Female Miners $221,500 in Damages, Fines for Harass-
ment, 1996 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 226, at A-2 (Nov. 22, 1996) (describing award en-
tered against Eveleth Mines and the United Steelworkers in class action sex discrimination
and hostile work environment sexual harassment case).
Nonlabor groups' intervention on behalf of workers is not unique to sexual harass-
ment cases. A recent issue of Labor Notes reported that the NAACP is investigating com-
plaints by black drivers of the United Parcel Service (UPS) in Oakland, California that the
UPS denied them delivery routes in safe neighborhoods in violation of seniority guarantees
in the collective bargaining agreement; the drivers claim that Teamsters Local 70 ignored
their complaints. NewsWatch, LAB. NoTEs,Jan. 1997, at 4. Similarly, in Eckles v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996), a disabled worker, whose allies included as amici
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Lambda, and various disability
rights advocates, argued "that contractual rights gained under collective bargaining agree-
ments must give way to [individual employees'] federal[ ... civil rights." Id. at 1046 n.8,
1042-43.
44 See Grain, supra note 42, at 12, 34-35.
45 See id. at 11.
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EEOC, or by the employer itself (depending on whether the scenario
is in the context of Title VII litigation or of a grievance which the
union filed on behalf of a discharged harasser under a collective bar-
gaining agreement). We next turn to an analysis of the role that labor
law-as distinguished from union strategy-plays in constructing this
scenario.
II
LABOR LAW AND TE UNITED FRONT IDEOLOGY
A central objective of the NLRA is to further labor peace by con-
taining the conflict between capital owners and workers. 46 By confer-
ring upon workers the right to organize and to act collectively, and by
requiring employers to bargain with the labor organization represent-
ing a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit, lawmakers
sought to channel labor unrest into bargaining and arbitration on a
worksite basis. Ultimately, Congress hoped to avoid the violent na-
tionwide strikes which seriously interfered with the flow of interstate
commerce. 47 Accordingly, the NLRA addresses the inequality of
power that exists between employer and worker, rather than between
union and worker or between groups of workers. In an effort to in-
crease union power within the workplace, the NLRA enforces a
"united front" on labor's side of the bargaining table: once a union
obtains majority status in a bargaining unit, it becomes the exclusive,
collective voice of the workers.48 This section examines the origins
and centrality of the united front ideology in American labor law.
A. The Role of Class in Labor Law
In light of its goal of restraining and channeling class conflict, the
NLRA codifies the recognition of classes. In doing so, it attempts to
separate those parties with antithetical material interests so that capi-
tal owners sit on one side of the bargaining table and labor on the
other.49 The NLRA confers privileges and benefits primarily on "er-
46 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994) (describing the deleterious effect that labor unrest has
on interstate commerce and declaring a policy intent to mitigate this damage by protecting
labor's right to bargain collectively).
47 See National Labor Relations Act §§ 1, 8(a) (5), 9(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 158(a) (5),
159(a) (1994); Archibald Cox, The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HItv. L. REv. 1401,
1407-08 (1958) (detailing the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act).
48 See Roger B. Jacobs, The Duty of Fair Representation: Minorities, Dissidents and Exclusive
Representation, 59 B.U. L. REv. 857, 858 (1979).
49 See David Abraham, Individual Autonomy and Collective Empowerment in Labor Law:
Union Membership Resignations and Strikebreaking in the New Economy, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1268,
1293 (1988) ("'The legal substance of labor law,' as Sinzheimer pointed out, 'lies in the
recognition of classes by the law.' Once those classes are recognized, the law establishes
certain norms, which 'attempt to temper the employer's power to command.'" (quoting
Orro KA-N-FREuND, LAouR LAw AND POLTCS IN THE WEIMAR REPUBuC 79, 81 (Roy Lewis
1999] 1553
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ployees." 50 The NLRA defines the term "employee" broadly, but ex-
cludes employers and those acting directly or indirectly in the
interests of an employer, including supervisors.51 Although the
Supreme Court has struggled with the problem of middle-level man-
agers, who arguably possess some of the features of each of the adver-
saries, it ultimately categorized managers as more akin to capital
owners than to rank-and-file workers. The Court reasoned that man-
agers not only act in the employer's interest, thereby posing a risk of
divided loyalties, but they also occupy sufficiently powerful positions
in the economic hierarchy that they do not need the NLRA's
protection.52
Leaving the policing of the precise boundary between capital
owners and labor to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and
the courts, the NLRA proceeds to codify the antagonistic nature of the
relationship. Section 8(a) (2) of the NLRA prohibits employer domi-
nation or assistance of a labor organization.53 Originally aimed at
&Jon Clark eds. &Jon Clark trans., 1981) (quoting 1 HuGo SINZHEIMER, The Background of
Labour Law, in LABOUR LAW AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 72 (Otto Kahn-Freund & Thilo
Ramm eds., 1976) (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
Capital-owners vehemently opposed the Act, fearing that it would encourage and pro-
mote class conflict and labor activism and potentially "Sovietize" the country. See Karl E.
Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness,
1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265, 285-89 & n.74 (1978).
50 N.L.R.A. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
51 See N.L.R.A. §§ 2(2)-(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)-(3) (1994). The employer's need for
front-line representatives in its dealings with employees creates the chief rationale for the
exclusion of supervisors; Congress considered it vital that supervisors' loyalties were not
divided between employer and union. See Marion Crain, Building Solidarity Through Expan-
sion of NLRA Coverage: A Blueprint for Worker Empowermen 74 MINN. L. REV. 953, 972-73
(1990).
52 See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 28-84 (1974) (finding that manage-
rial employees were implicitly excluded from coverage under the NLRA because they oc-
cupy a higher rung than supervisors in the workplace hierarchy). A few years later, the
Court sought to harmonize the exclusion of managerial employees with the NLRA's ex-
plicit inclusion of professional employees, explaining that the risk of divided loyalties
would be too great to tolerate if the law permitted managerial employees to organize
against the employer while simultaneously shaping and implementing its policies. See
NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 689-90 (1980) (holding that faculty members who
possess great authority in academic matters are managerial employees outside the NLRA's
purview, notwithstanding the NLRA's explicit inclusion of professional employees). Subse-
quently, the Court excluded confidential employees-those who assist or act in a confiden-
tial relation to persons exercising managerial functions in the field of labor relations-on
the divided loyalties rationale. See NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership
Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 180-81 (1981) (explaining that "the labor-nexus test" which defines
the "narrow group" excluded as confidential employees is justified in that "'management
should not be required to handle labor relations matters through employees who are rep-
resented by the union.., and who in the normal performance of their duties may obtain
advance information of the [clompany's position with regard to contract negotiations, the
disposition of grievances, and other labor relations matters'" (alterations in original) (cita-
tions omitted) (quoting Hoover Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1321, 1323 (1944))).
53 N.L.R.A. § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994).
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eradicating the "company union," a company-controlled entity which
employers institute to pacify employees and stave off union-organizing
efforts, the NLRB has since applied section 8 (a) (2) to block more sup-
posedly innocuous participatory management schemes which employ-
ers design to increase productivity as well as to forestall worker
dissatisfaction. 54 Furthermore, section 2(5) of the statute defines the
term "labor organization" as one that deals with the employer on
"grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment,
or conditions of work."55 Together, sections 2(5) and 8(a) (2) pro-
hibit labor and employers from coming together in a nonadversarial
posture, and focus labor's attention on the centrality of its conflict
with capital; in effect, these sections define and constitute labor orga-
nizations by reference to their antagonistic relationship with
employers. 56
The NLRA cements the adversarial model by mandating a united
front on labor's side of the table: it obligates the employer to bargain
with the duly certified, labor organization representing a majority of its
employees (in an appropriate unit). Conversely, it prohibits the em-
ployer from bargaining with nonmajority unions where a majority
union exists. 57 These twin requirements, respectively dubbed the ma-
jority-rule doctrine and the exclusivity doctrine, together guarantee
majority unions a monopolistic status as the employees' representative
in a particular workplace. A duty of fair representation, which the
54 See Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148, 1157 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding the
Board's decision that cooperative action committees violated section 8(a) (2) of the NLRA
because they functioned in a "representational capacity" and were dominated by the em-
ployer, but observing that "in many [other] cases, the interests of the employer and em-
ployee are not mutually exclusive").
Some argue that an employer can use such company-dominated forums, despite their
cooperative appearance, to indoctrinate employees in anti-union views and displace the
union as the employees' representative. See, e.g., Anna S. Rominger, Rethinking the Para-
digm: Can the Wagner Act and Labor-Management Cooperation Coexist?, 8 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 159,
175-76 (1996). Others maintain that room still exists for productive labor-management
cooperation efforts. See genera/y Jon Blumenthal, Note, Remedying Electromation, Inc. v.
NLRB and Its Progeny: The Future of Employee Participation Programs, KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y,
Winter 1996, at 193 (discussing legislative attempts to overrule Electromation).
55 N.L.R.A. § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1994).
56 See generally Marion Crain, Images of Power in Labor Law: A Feminist Deconstruction, 33
B.C. L. REv. 481, 505-09 (1992) (describing sections 2(5) and 8(a) (2) as constituting the
adversarial relation between labor and employers).
57 See N.LR.A. §§ 8(a)(5), 9(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a) (1994). In other
words, by winning an election, a union gains the right and shoulders the obligation of
bargaining on behalf of all the workers in the unit, whether or not they voted for the union
and whether or not they become union members. See N.L.RA. § 9(c), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)
(1994). While the NLRA does not preclude unions from representing less than a majority
of employees, the NLRB has long held that an employer's refusal to bargain with a repre-
sentative of less than a majority is not an unfair labor practice. See Alan Hyde et al., After
Smyrna: Rights and Powers of Unions That Represent Less than a Majority, 45 RUTGERS L. Rzv.
637, 644 & n.23, 645 (1993).
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Supreme Court imposes in an effort to deter discrimination by major-
ity unions against minority interests within unions, mediates the ma-
jority-rule and exclusivity doctrines. 58 Because both doctrines are vital
to the legally coerced united front, we next undertake a fuller discus-
sion of them.
B. The Majority-Rule and Exclusivity Doctrines
1. Origins
Although the concepts of majority rule and exclusive representa-
tion appeared in some state laws as early as 1880, the doctrine of ma-
jority rule gained significance in American labor relations between
1890 and 1925, when railroad unions adopted it in an effort to elimi-
nate jurisdictional disputes and intervention rivalries.59 Congress
then adopted the doctrines of majority rule and exclusive representa-
tion in the Wagner Act.60
The Wagner Act prohibits an employer from bargaining with in-
dividual employees once a majority of workers has selected a represen-
tative. Congress permitted a narrow exception to this rule: individual
employees or groups of employees may address their grievances to the
employer if the union can be present and the adjustments do not con-
tradict the labor contract.6 ' Moreover, if the employer and the exclu-
sive representative of the majority enter into a collective agreement,
that agreement supersedes all prior contracts between the employer
58 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967) (stating that the duty of fair representa-
tion which an exclusive bargaining agent owes to those employees which it represents "in-
cludes a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostility or
discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion [in collective bargaining and in enforc-
ing the labor contract] with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary
conduct").
59 See Herbert Schreiber, The Origin of the Majority Rule and the Simultaneous Development
of Institutions To Protect the Minority: A Chapter in Early American Labor Law, 25 RUTGERS L.
REv. 237, 238-40 (1971). Although majority rule has deep roots in American labor law, the
doctrine has not been adopted in labor laws outside of North America. See Hyde et al.,
supra note 57, at 641 n.14; infra note 359 & accompanying text.
60 The Wagner Act was the original piece of federal labor legislation that formed the
foundation of the NLRA. See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449
(1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1994)). The Wagner Act and its
subsequent amendments, Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61
Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1994)), and Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat.
519 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-187 (1994)), are collectively referred to as
the National Labor Relations Act.
61 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). The employer must bargain only with the exclusive repre-
sentative. The interests of individual workers are submerged in the collective interests of
workers in the unit. See Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 684 (1944)
(holding that employer bargaining with individual employees is "subversive of the mode of
collective bargaining which the statute has ordained").
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and individual employees. 62 Furthermore, once the majority selects
an exclusive representative, employees may not engage in concerted
activity, even if "otherwise protected by law, unless approved by the
majority representative. '63 Finally, the exclusive representative can,
and usually does, exercise complete control over any grievance system
that a collective bargaining agreement creates. 64
The Wagner Act's proponent, Senator Wagner, considered ma-
jority rule indispensable to achievement of the Wagner Act's goals.65
Wagner viewed unions as "organic groups unified by solidarity inter-
ests and norms. '66 He assumed that the preferences of individual em-
ployees inherently would align with the group's interest or would
become so aligned through the force of law, or through formal or
"informal inculcation of norms" and sanctions for behavior that devi-
ated from those norms.67 Further, Wagner expressed concern that, in
the absence of majority rule, employers would "interfere with the
practical effectuation of [employees' right to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing] by bargaining with in-
dividuals or minority groups in their own behalf."68 Senator Wagner
justified the corollary to majority rule-exclusivity-with an efficiency
rationale, commenting that "it is practically impossible to apply two or
more sets of agreements to one unit of workers at the same time" and
that "collective bargaining can be really effective only when workers
62 SeeJ.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337 (1944) ("Individual contracts ... may
not be availed of to defeat or delay the procedures prescribed by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act [for) collective bargaining.").
63 Schreiber, supra note 59, at 238 & n.6.
64 See Clyde W. Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement:
What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 255-56 (1977) (observing that,
while the NLRA does not give unions exclusive authority in presenting and settling griev-
ances, collective bargaining agreements usually grant this power to unions).
65 See Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol and Work-
place Cooperation, 106 HAzv. L. REv. 1379, 1452-53 (1993) (contrasting Wagner's organic
vision of unions with President Franklin Roosevelt's "purely associational... conception of
unionization").
66 Id. Barenberg explains that Wagner felt that only autonomous (noncompany) un-
ions with majority support and exclusive representative status could offer adequate "or-
ganic solidarity and collective empowerment" Id. at 1453 n.317, 1496.
67 Id. at 1454-55.
68 Labor Disputes Act: Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the House Comm. on Labor, 74th Cong.
16 (1935) [hereinafter Labor Disputes Act] (statement of Senator Robert F. Wagner), re-
printed in 5 NLRB, LGIsLATrvE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELAT ONS Acr, 1935, at
2473, 2490 (1949) [hereinafter LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY]; see also Kenneth M. Casebeer, Holder
of the Pen: An Interview with Leon Keyserling on Drafting the Wagner Act, 42 U. MiAun L. Rv.
285, 331-32 (1987) ("It was a natural part of Senator Wagner's political thinking that unless
you had majority nile, you had nothing. Without majority rule, you just had the division of
labor within itself that management could foster and exacerbate.").
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are sufficiently solidified in their interests to make one agreement cov-
ering all." 69
Union advocates and economists joined Wagner in arguing that
the exclusivity doctrine was indispensable to the Act's success: employ-
ees must present a united front to the employer, or they would com-
pete among themselves and thus undermine one another's efforts.70
From labor's perspective, "any variation in individual employment
terms is a potential threat"; unanimous employee cooperation "is es-
sential to a union's control of bargaining and contract formation with
an employer."71 Unions feared that an employer could undermine
union support by rewarding individual workers who defect from the
union because this scheme would send the message that the union is
ineffectual and that conditions might be more favorable without it.72
Not surprisingly, employers strongly opposed the majority-rule
provision of the Wagner Act. In testimony before the seventy-fourth
Congress, employer representatives repeatedly argued that majority
rule would trample individual workers' rights.73 The House Report
69 LaborDisputes Act, supra note 68, reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 68, at
2473, 2490. The House Report was adamant in its position that one contract must cover all
of the workers in the unit. The Report stated:
There cannot be two or more basic agreements applicable to workers in a
given unit .... If the employer should fail to give equally advantageous
terms to nonmembers of the labor organization negotiating the agreement,
there would immediately result a marked increase in the membership of
that labor organization. On the other hand, if better terms were given to
nonmembers, this would give rise to bitterness and strife, and a wholly un-
workable arrangement whereby men performing comparable duties were
paid according to different scales of wages and hours.
H.R1 REP. No. 74-972, at 18 (1935), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATWE HISTORY, supra note 68, at
2956, 2974.
Even if one contract must cover all employees, it does not follow that only one repre-
sentative may exist. An employer could, for example, bargain simultaneously with two or
more representatives and make the resulting contract applicable to all the workers. The
Report considered this possibility, but rejected it on the grounds that "the agreement prob-
ably would not command the assent of the majority and hence would not have the stability
which is one of the chief advantages of collective bargaining." Id. Even if multiple repre-
sentatives were to bargain for one contract which would apply to all workers, a majority of
the representatives would still have to assent to the overall agreement, and thus the result
would be the same from the worker's viewpoint; meanwhile, the employer would benefit
from the added "'dissention and rivalry'" among multiple worker representatives. Id. at
2975 (quoting In re Houde Eng'g Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. 35, 40 (1934)).
70 See George Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Individ-
ual Workers: Should Exclusivity Be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. Rv. 897, 926 (1975) (questioning
the united front assumption).
71 Richard R Carlson, The Origin and Future of Exclusive Representation in American Labor
Law, 30 DuQ. L. REv. 779, 788 (1992) (emphasis omitted).
72 See id.
73 For example, Walter Gordon Merritt of the League for Industrial Rights (an em-
ployers' organization) compared majority rule to fascism: "I think this majority rule comes
pretty nearly to the idea with which Mr. Mussolini originally started, in effect if you got a
bare plurality the other party is rooted out. It would be almost like saying our Senate must
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responded by observing that, because the collective bargaining agree-
ment applied to all the workers, minority groups gained "all the ad-
vantages of united action."74 The Report also observed that section
9 (a) of the Act preserved the right of individuals and groups of work-
ers to present grievances to their employers.75 It further argued that
agreements favoring the majority over the minority are impossible be-
cause section 8(3) forbade any discrimination based on union mem-
bership.76 Finally, in response to charges that majority rule would
establish the closed shop, the Report contended that negotiations be-
tween the representative and the employer could settle this issue.77
Senator Wagner was probably correct in his view that those who
opposed majority rule in their testimony before Congress did so pri-
marily because they opposed collective bargaining itself. At the very
least, they opposed collective bargaining with an independent union
that the employer did not control.78 Nonetheless, the employer repre-
sentatives identified a central problem that has plagued labor law:
protecting the interests of minority groups in a legal regime based on
majority rule.
Although women and people of color now comprise significant
minorities in the labor movement, the white and male majority con-
tinues to dominate labor unions.79 As institutions legally obligated to
be made up exclusively of Democrats." National Labor Relations Bd.: Hearings on S. 1958
Before the Senate Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 74th Cong. 319 (1935) [hereinafter Hearings],
reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 68, at 1705. Mr. Merritt favored proportional
representation. See id. Employers' biggest fear was that majority rule and exclusive repre-
sentation would lead to the closed shop. See, e.g., Hearings, supra, at 795 (statement of L.H.
Sessions, Muskegon Employers Association), reprinted in 4 LEGiSLATIvE HISTORY, supra note
68, at 2181 ("If this bill were to be enacted into law, the unfortunate employee who hap-
pened to be working in some plant... which was controlled by the American Federation
of Labor ... would find himself in the position where he must either join the union or
seek work in some other plant.").
74 H.R. REP. No. 74-972, at 19, reprinted in 6 LEGIsLATIvE HSTORY, supra note 68, at
2975.
75 See id.
76 See id. (discussing section 8(3) as amended at section 8(a) (3)).
77 See id.
78 See LaborDisputes Act; supra note 68, at 17 (statement of Robert F. Wagner), reprinted
in 5 LEGISLA=rW HISTORY, supra note 68, at 2491. Supporters of majority rule repeatedly
cited In re Houde Engineering Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. 35 (1934), during the legislative hearings. See
id. In In re Houde Engineering Corp., the UAW had prevailed in the union election, but the
employer persisted in bargaining with the company-dominated minority union as well. See
In re Houde Engg Corp., 1 N.L.RB. at 35. The Board required the employer to bargain
exclusively with the UAW, the independent majority union, ruling that bargaining with the
minority union undermined the majority union's ability to represent the workers. See id. at
40.
79 As of 1997, 39% of labor union members were female. See AFL-CIO Urges Affiliates
To Spend More, Recruit Women for New Organizing Programs, 1997 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
33, at C-1 (Feb. 19, 1997). As of 1995, blacks were 15.5% of union members. See Louis
Uchitelle, Black Labor Leaders Want Greater Voice/AFL-CIO Election Seen As Opportunity To Make
Their Cas S.F. CHRON., July 17, 1995, at AS. In 1998, Latinos comprised approximately
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secure the best deal possible for the majority of their members, local
unions have incentives to seek benefits for the white, male majority,
sometimes at the expense of women and people of color. When un-
ions have done so, the ensuing tension sometimes has led to
litigation.80
2. Restriction of Collective Action by Dissident Minorities
In Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organiza-
tion,81 the Court delineated the parameters of the majority-rule and
exclusivity doctrines. It established that the interest of a minority
group within a bargaining unit in avoiding injuries wrought by race
discrimination was subordinate to the overriding goal of class solidar-
ity. In this case, black workers who were dissatisfied with their union's
efforts to address the employer's racial discrimination picketed the
employer's department store and distributed leaflets that urged con-
sumers to boycott the store until it ceased discriminating against mi-
norities. 82 The employer fired two of the workers.83 The NLRB and
the Court then faced the question of whether the picketing was con-
certed activity protected by section 7 of the NLRA.8 4
8.3% of union members. SeeJos6 La Luz & Paula Finn, Getting Serious About Inclusion: A
Comprehensive Approach, in A NEw LABOR MOVEMENT FOR THE Nmv CENTuRY 171, 172 (Greg-
ory Mantsios ed., 1998).
80 See, e.g., Woods v. Graphic Communications, 925 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 1991)
(describing how union opposed disciplinary action against white members who were guilty
of racial harassment); Farmer v. ARA Servs., Inc., 660 F.2d 1096, 1103 (6th Cir. 1981)
(reporting district court's finding that union negotiated agreements that perpetuated ef-
fects of past discrimination and refused to pursue grievances of female employees); Jones
v. Cassens Transp., 617 F. Supp. 869, 878-79 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (finding that union worked
to save jobs of male employees during a lay-off at the expense ofjobs of female employees),
rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. Jones v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 299, 838 F.2d 856
(6th Cir. 1988); Seep v. Commercial Motor Freight, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1097, 1105 (S.D.
Ohio 1983) (finding that the union excluded female-dominated clerical bargaining unit
from National Master Freight Agreement and permitted its male members to cross picket
line formed by unionized female clerical employees protesting sexual discrimination by
employer); Union Found Liable for Sex Bias After It Failed To Represent Woman, 1995 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 186, at A-6 (Sept. 26, 1995) (reporting that a union official failed to pro-
cess a female worker's sexual harassment grievance-which included rape by a male union
member--"in deference to the perceived desires of [the local's) male membership" (alter-
ation in original)).
81 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
82 See id. at 55-56. The black workers peacefully picketed on their own time. See Em-
porium & W. Addition Community Org., 192 N.L.R.B. 173, 181 (1971).
83 See 420 U.S. at 56.
84 If the black workers' concerted activity was protected under section 7, their dis-
charges would be unlawful under the NLRA. If it was not a protected activity, the dis-
charges would be lawful under the NLRA (unless otherwise illegal under some separate
statutory scheme).
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The Board, over the vigorous dissents of two of its members,8 5
adopted the trial examiner's conclusion that the NLRA did not pro-
tect the picketing and that the workers' protest was, in effect, an at-
tempt to circumvent the exclusive representative and to bargain
directly with the employer.8 6 The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed the Board's determination, finding that the legisla-
tive priority of ending race discrimination, as expressed in Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,87 dictated that authorities give special
latitude to collective action aimed at eliminating an employer's racial
discrimination.88 The court's decision forced the exclusive-represen-
tation doctrine to yield in this context.89
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Court of Appeals and
agreed with the Board.90 Although no evidence existed that the pro-
test caused any actual harm to the union-indeed, the union officially
stated that the employer did discriminate against minorities-the
Court concluded that permitting separate protest and bargaining by a
dissident minority would ultimately undermine the union's power.9 '
While acknowledging the importance of the national labor policy
against race discrimination, the Court rejected the argument that the
policy justified separate protest and bargaining by the dissident em-
ployees. 9 2 Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, advanced the
united front rationale in support of the Court's ruling. He explained
that allowing minority employees to bargain separately with employers
could fragment and weaken unions, which would adversely affect their
ability to combat discrimination in the long run.98
As Professor Iglesias has demonstrated, although the Court paid
lip service to the idea that the NLRA must be interpreted in light of
85 See 192 N.L.RB. at 173, 177 (Jenkins and Brown, Members, dissenting in separate
opinions).
86 See id. at 185-86.
87 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
88 See Western Addition Community Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917, 928 & n.33 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
89 See i&.
90 See Emporium Capwell, Inc. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 60-
61, 70 (1975).
91 See id. at 66. The union and the black workers did not disagree on the underlying
fact that the employer practiced race discrimination. See 192 N.L.R.B. at 180. Rather, they
disagreed over the means to combat the alleged discrimination. The union wanted to ad-
dress racial discrimination on a case-by-case basis, while the black workers insisted that,
because racial discrimination constitutes an injury to all minority employees, the union
should address it collectively, not individually. See id. at 181. The union did not, however,
oppose the black workers' picketing or distribution of leaflets. See id. at 182.
92 See 420 U.S. at 66-68.
93 See id. at 67-70. According to Justice Marshall, the union "has a legitimate interest
in presenting a united front on [race discrimination] as on other issues and in not seeing
its strength dissipated and its stature denigrated by subgroups within the unit separately
pursuing what they see as separate interests." Id. at 70.
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Title VII's nondiscrimination policy, the Court's ruling accomplished
just the opposite.9 4 The Emporium Capwell decision fragmented the
doctrinal areas of race discrimination and class exploitation; it treated
the two statutes as if they were independent of one another, thus en-
suring that the substantive rights created by Title VII could not be
enforced through the procedural mechanisms of the NLRA.95 Conse-
quently, Emporium Capwell significantly curtails the ability of women
and minorities to act collectively to oppose gender and race discrimi-
nation in a unionized workplace.9 6
C. The Duty of Fair Representation
To mitigate the majority-rule and exclusivity doctrines, the
Supreme Court has imposed a duty of fair representation upon un-
ions.97 The duty of fair representation (DFR) places a union in a fidu-
ciary-like relationship with the workers it serves as bargaining agent,
both in the negotiation of the labor contract and in its administra-
tion.9 8 The Court first articulated the DFR in Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville Railroad Co.,99 a Railway Labor Act case involving racial dis-
crimination by a union. In Steele, the union negotiated an agreement
designed to give the most desirable jobs only to whites.10 0 The Court
ruled that the DFR obligated a union chosen to represent a group of
94 See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Structures of Subordination: Women of Color at the Intersection of
Title VII and the NLRA. NOT! 28 H v. C.R.-G.L. L. REv. 395, 424 (1993).
95 See id.
96 Title VII confers rights on individuals who must turn to the courts to enforce them.
As the protesters in Emporium Capwell apparently realized, discrimination is a group injury
that group action best remedies. See supra note 91. Rigid adherence to the doctrines of
majority rule and exclusive representation makes it difficult for collective worker action to
be used to combat discrimination when race- and gender-privileged workers dominate the
labor movement. See Iglesias, supra note 94, at 429. Ironically, because section 7 of the
NLRA would protect collective employee action to oppose discrimination when there is no
exclusive representative, women and minorities in nonunionized workplaces enjoy greater
freedom to engage in concerted activity to oppose discrimination than women and minori-
ties in unionized workplaces. See, e.g., NLRB v. Downslope Indus., 676 F.2d 1114, 1119 (6th
Cir. 1982) (finding that employer violated section 8(a) (1) of the NLRA by discharging
nonunionized female employees who refused to work in protest of plant manager's sexual
harassment of employees).
97 See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
98 See MichaelJ. Goldberg, The Duty of Fair Representation: What the Courts Do in Fact 34
BuFF. L. REv. 89, 91 (1985).
99 323 U.S. at 204 ("[T]he statute.., does require the union, in collective bargaining
and in making contracts with the carrier, to represent non-union or minority union mem-
bers... without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith.").
100 See id. at 195-97. Without informing the black employees whom it was supposed to
represent, the union sought to amend the existing labor contract to exclude all black fire-
men from employment. See id. at 195. The union and employer essentially agreed that
only whites could fill the most desirable jobs. See id. The appellant was one of four black
firemen whom the employer replaced with a white worker and forced to accept a less
remunerative job. See id. at 196.
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employees to represent all of the employees, not just the majority.1°1
This duty, the Court explained, requires the exclusive representative
to act without hostile discrimination against any of its constituents. 10 2
Imposition of such a duty was necessary, the Court reasoned, if it
was to uphold the Railway Labor Act as constitutional. 10 3 The Court
noted that the Act deprives minority members of the ability to choose
a representative of their own or to bargain individually with their em-
ployer.10 4 Further, Congress conferred on the bargaining representa-
tive "powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both
to create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents."'1 5 Con-
ferring such power upon the bargaining representative without impos-
ing any corresponding duty toward its members would thus raise
significant constitutional questions.10 6 The Court has since extended
the duty to the NLRA context as wel. 10 7
1. The Nature and Scope of the DFR
In Vaca v. Sipes, s0 8 the Supreme Court established the standard
for assessing whether a union's grievance-handling procedure violates
the DFR. The Court required that the plaintiff-employee prove that
the union's grievance handling was "perfunctory."'1 9 Lower courts
have interpreted "perfunctory" to mean something more than mere
negligence: the plaintiff must prove "actual bad faith or arbitrary con-
duct."110 Courts have also required proof that the union's poor per-
formance affected the arbitrator's decision."' Under this standard,
courts afford minimal scrutiny to a union's performance in grievance
handling and arbitration." 2 Unions have "considerable discretion to
control the grievance and arbitration procedure," and employees are
101 See id. at 200.
102. See id. at 203.
103 See id. at 203-04.
104 See id. at 200.
105 Id. at 202.
106 See id. at 204.
107 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177-83 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 330, 337 (1953). A union's violation of its DFR gives rise to both a common law claim
actionable in court and an unfair labor practice claim. See Local Union No. 12, United
Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312, 319 (1964), enforced, Local Union No. 12, United Rub-
ber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181,
185-86 (1962), enforcement denied, NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963)
(refusing to reach issue of whether any invidious discrimination by a union against a mem-
ber is an unfair labor practice).
108 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
109 Id. at 191.
110 E.g., Hagans v. Budd Co., 597 F. Supp. 89, 96 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (quoting Riley v.
Letter Carriers Local No. 380, 668 F.2d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 1981)).
111 See, e.g., id.
112 For example, plaintiff-grievant failed to show a breach of the DFR based on the fact
that he was not present at the meeting where the union decided that his grievance would
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"subject to the union's nonarbitrary discretionary power to settle or
even abandon a grievance, even if it can be later demonstrated that
the employee's claim was meritorious."' 13 A widely acclaimed study
showed that plaintiffs rarely prevail in DFR actions. 114 The courts'
hands-off approach increases the potential that the interests of nu-
merical minorities within unions will remain unrepresented.
Many commentators have noted that the DFR is extraordinarily
vague. Several have observed that the union's status as exclusive rep-
resentative should at least require the union to adhere to the constitu-
tional requirements of due process and equal protection; they argue
that a labor union should have at least the same duty to the employees
it represents as a legislature owes to the citizens it represents. 115
Others have borrowed the more specific due process standards man-
dated by the Constitution for administrative agencies 1 6 or have sug-
gested imposing minimal procedural safeguards derived from more
general due process standards. 117 Alternatively, the labor law might
not proceed to arbitration, and he may not even have received notice of the meeting. See
Freeman v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 609 F.2d 1123, 1126-27 (5th Cir. 1980).
1"3 Id. at 1126 (quoting Turner v. Air Transp. Dispatchers' Ass'n, 468 F.2d 297, 299
(5th Cir. 1972)).
114 See Goldberg, supra note 98, at 96 (reviewing the DFR opinions published from
1977 to 1983 and finding that plaintiffs won in less than five percent of the cases).
115 See Archibald Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 ViLi- L. REv. 151, 167 (1957)
(discussing the origin of the DFR and its usefulness as a tool for resolving conflicts of
interest within a collective bargaining unit); see also Michael C. Harper & Ira C. Lupu, Fair
Representation As Equal Protection, 98 H_ v. L. REv. 1211 (1985) (arguing that the standards
generated by the norm of equal protection comprehensively address all DFR issues).
Harper and Lupu believe that a model of "principled democracy" should be used to judge
a union's compliance with the DFR. Id. at 1224 (internal quotation marks omitted). Princi-
pled democracy requires decisionmakers to "regard all persons on whose behalf they are
authorized to act as having equal and positive value." Id. This "principle of equal respect7
forbids a decisionmaker from treating some persons as "inherently more worthy than
others." Id. Using the principle of equal respect, a court can determine if a union has
violated its DFR by inquiring whether a union's action has a "principled justification" or if
the union's action was motivated by "unequal respect for some employees." Id. at 1232.
116 See Lea S. VanderVelde, A FairProcess Model for the Union's Fair Representation Duty, 67
MiNN. L. REXV. 1079, 1085 (1983). VanderVelde's model would require "[a] union to take
whatever steps are necessary to determine the merits of a grievance before abandoning it."
Id. at 1156. If the union decides that the grievance is "clearly meritorious," it must pursue
the grievance even if the majority of employees pressure it to abandon the grievance. Id. at
1156-57 (internal quotation marks omitted). If the union decides that the grievance is only
"arguably meritorious" and it has given the grievant the opportunity to make her case, the
union may decide not to pursue the grievance. Id. at 1157. Courts should limit review of
the union's handling of the grievance, in all but extreme cases, to whether the union
followed the correct procedures in determining the merits of the grievance. See id. Thus,
in the vast majority of cases courts should not second guess the union's determination of
the grievance's merit. See id.
117 See Ross E. Cheit, Competing Models of Fair Representation: The Perfunctory Processing
Cases, 24 B.C. L. REv. 1, 3 (1982) (arguing that courts should use principles of due process
to determine if the union's grievance handling violates the DFR). Under this model, the
union must provide minimal procedural safeguards to all grievants. See id. at 29. These
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look to tort concepts of reasonableness for guidance and evaluate a
union's actions in light of what other unions do under similar
circumstances "1
Nevertheless, most agree that courts should defer in some signifi-
cant way to the judgment of the union as exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative, particularly when the union acts in its capacity as
representative of the unit as a whole." 9 Some commentators take the
position that, except in clear cases of invidious discrimination, courts
should not review a union's actions as exclusive representative be-
cause no intelligible standards exist by which courts could determine
distributive or procedural fairness.120 Because no overarching theory
of fairness exists, these commentators argue that when a court finds
that a union's negotiations violate the DFR, the court merely substi-
tutes its judgment for the judgment of the exclusive representative
chosen by the majority of the unit's employees. 121
All of these critiques assume the continuation of a legally coerced
united front. These commentators focus on whether the union's in-
ternal processes fairly determine the interest of the majority of its
members. They do not address the more fundamental question of
safeguards include the right to be heard and the right in every case for a reasoned decision
by the union. See id.
118 See id. at 23-24. In this model, determining a union's reasonableness depends on
many factors, "including the past practice of the union, the practice of other unions and
the specific facts of the case." Id. at 24. Both intentional and negligent behavior may
violate the DFR. See id. at 23-24.
119 See, e.g., Martin H. Malin, The Supreme Court and the Duty of Fair Representation, 27
HARv. CR-C.L. L. REv. 127, 183 (1992) (suggesting that courts should first distinguish
whether the union was acting primarily as the collective bargaining representative of the
unit as a whole or primarily as an advocate for the individual grievant). In Malin's analysis,
a union handling a grievance acts primarily as collective bargaining representative of the
unit as a whole when the union uses the grievance system as a way of clarifying the con-
tract. See id. at 169. For example, a grievance that might affect how the employer calcu-
lates seniority would implicate the union's role as representative of the whole unit. See id.
at 172. When the union acts primarily as representative of the entire unit, courts should
afford significant deference to its judgments, and should find the union to have violated
the DFR only if its actions were irrational. See id. at 183-84. If, however, the union acts
primarily as an advocate for the individual grievant, courts should accord less deference to
its decisions, and should hold it to a duty of reasonable care. See id. at 184. Malin states:
[I]f a court finds that the union has not exercised reasonable care, it
should hold the union liable for a DFR breach. As a remedy it should re-
mand the matter to the grievance procedure to enable the parties to pro-
ceed to arbitration. If the grievance has already been arbitrated, the court
should vacate the award and remand for a new hearing before a different
arbitrator.
Id. at 185.
120 See Mayer G. Freed et al., Unions, Fairness, and the Conundrums of Collective Choice 56
S. CAL. L. REv. 461, 463 (1983). For a spirited reply, see Alan Hyde, CanJudges Identify Fair
Bargaining Procedures7: A Comment on Freed, Polsby & Spitzer, Unions, Fairness, and the Co-
nundrums of Collective Choice, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 415 (1984).
121 See Freed et al., supra note 120, at 473.
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whether legally imposed class-based solidarity is either economically
rational or morally just. They accept the premise that the primary,
overarching conflict that supersedes all others is between employers
and workers, and they assume that the benefits of providing workers a
united front in this battle outweigh the detriments of suppressing
other, less important and less fundamental conflicts of interest within
the working class.
2. The DFR, Privilege, and Exploitation
The duty-of-fair-representation doctrine provides a rich case
study of the judicial promise of workplace representation for minority
workers imposed upon a relatively privileged group: white- and male-
dominated unions. In exchange for this judicial imposition, courts
have allowed the suppression of the interests of the less-privileged
within the working class. 122 The DFR is a by-product of exclusivity;
therefore, without exclusivity, workers can freely choose their own
representatives rather than run the risk of being submerged within a
majority-run union that does not represent their interests. Absent ex-
clusive representation, conflicts between workers and their represent-
atives would occur less often and raise fewer substantial issues, and the
importance of the DFR would decrease.123
To what extent do conflicts of interest within the working class
exceed the remedial abilities of the DFR and necessitate separate rep-
resentation? The concepts of privilege and exploitation play the key
role in this analysis. Even if the more-privileged sectors of the working
class dominate the less-privileged sectors, a single representative can
serve on behalf of both in the contest against capital as long as the
interests of the two groups do not conflict in a material way, and the
more-privileged group does not benefit from oppressing the less-privi-
leged group. If dynamics within the working class actually meet these
conditions, commentators properly focus on reforming internal
union democracy and on strengthening the DFR doctrine. If, how-
ever, the more-privileged group actually exploits the less-privileged
group, and the two groups possess antagonistic economic interests,
the law should allow separate representation to facilitate compromise
between the competing interests. We turn next to these issues.
122 See BarbaraJ. Flagg, Changing the Rules: Some Preliminary Thoughts on Doctrinal Reform,
Indeterminacy, and Whiteness, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 250, 252 (1996) (observing that
legal doctrine-particularly that which purports to redistribute power or wealth-reflects
the perspective of the promises "made by the privileged to the disadvantaged members of
society" and "expresses the substance of the promises the privileged are willing to make,
and ostensibly to keep").
123 See Schatzki, supra note 70, at 903. Indeed, some have observed that nonmajority
unions would likely not owe a duty of fair representation to their members at all. See Hyde
et al., supra note 57, at 651 n.42.
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III
PRIVILEGE AND THE DIVIDED LABOR MARKET
If privilege within the working class creates the opportunity for
intraclass exploitation, one must unravel what, exactly, the concept of
privilege encompasses. Privilege within the working class assumes two
forms, both of which have economic consequences: privilege race or
gender confers (white and male workers are privileged relative to peo-
ple of color and women), and privilege union organization confers
(the organized are privileged relative to the unorganized). Histori-
cally, these two forms of privilege overlapped, so that organized work-
ers disproportionately consisted of white, male workers, while the
unorganized disproportionately included people of color and women.
A. Privilege Conferred by Race or Gender
Privilege develops when law and social custom systematically con-
fer benefits and advantage on the dominant group in a social hierar-
chy.12 4 The characteristics of privileged groups define societal norms;
because the privileged benefit from societal norms, they can ignore
the very existence of such norms, and their privilege becomes invis-
ible to them. 2 5 Racial (white) privilege derives from white suprem-
124 See Stephanie M. Wildman, Privilege in the Workplace: The Missing Element in Antidis-
crimination Law, in PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA
25, 29 (Stephanie M. Wildman ed., 1996) [hereinafter PRIVILEGE REVEALED]; Stephanie M.
Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Making Systems of Privilege sible, in PRIVILEGE REVEALED,
supra, at 7, 13.
125 See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 957 (1993) ("The most striking
characteristic of whites' consciousness of whiteness is that most of the time we don't have
any. I call this the transparency phenomenon: the tendency of whites not to think about
whiteness, or about norms, behaviors, experiences, or perspectives that are white-spe-
cific."); Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Women, in Practice and Theory: A Response to Catha-
rine MacKinnon, 5 YALEJ.L. & FEmNisM 217, 220 (1993) ("A crucial part of the privilege of a
dominant group is the ability to see itself as normal and neutral. This quality of being
'normal' makes whiteness... invisible as air to white people, while it is visible or offensively
obvious to people defined outside the circle of whiteness."); Jean S. Phinney, Stages of Eth-
nic Identity Development in Minority Group Adolescents, 9 J. EARLY ADOLESCENCE 34, 41 (1989)
(reporting that white subjects in study of racial identification did not think of themselves as
having an ethnicity other than "American"); Wildman & Davis, supra note 124, at 13-14. In
effect, having the luxury to ignore the benefits that whiteness, maleness, or heterosexuality
confer demonstrates the power of privilege-only dominant groups have this luxury. See
Marlee Kline, Women's Oppression and Racism: Critique of the "Feminist Standpoint", in RACE,
CLASS, GENDER: BONDS AND BARMEps 39, 51 (Jesse Vorst et al. eds., 1991); Robert W. Terry,
The Negative Impact on White Values, in ImpAcrS OF RACISM ON WHrrE AMERICANs 119, 120
(Benjamin P. Bowser & Raymond G. Hunt eds., 1981) ("To be white in America is not to have
to think about it. Except for hard-core racial supremacists, the meaning of being white is
having the choice of attending to or ignoring one's own whiteness.").
As a group's power and privilege grow relative to other groups, its members feel freer
to ignore their own advantage; on the other hand, those who lack privilege must "deny
their identity in order to survive." Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness As Property, 106 HARV. L. REv.
1707, 1744 (1993). If they fail to do so, the dominant group will likely feel threatened. See
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acy;126 gender and sexual orientation privilege (male, heterosexual)
stems from gender hierarchy.127 Both systems confer material advan-
tage, in the form of higher wages and fringe benefits, on members of
the privileged groups, whose ability to conform to societal norms of
education, job performance, attractiveness, and other significant
measures of workplace worthiness gives them an economic advantage
in the market.128
Over time, privilege holders come to see their economically privi-
leged position as an entitlement, a "right" which they may resort to
violence to protect. 29 For example, the "right" to occupy high-waged
positions in the workplace hierarchy corresponds to racial and gender
privilege.'30 The privilege holders acquire a proprietary attitude to-
ward such jobs, and will defend them with occupational turf-guarding
strategies which include violence. 131 These race- and gender-segre-
gated occupational enclaves in turn reinforce the aspect(s) of identity,
which is the basis for their segregation; thus, certain occupations be-
come "male" or "white," and the characteristics of the privilege hold-
ers shape the standard of performance attached to those jobs. 132
Society views the economic privilege that flows from holding such rel-
atively privileged positions in the workplace hierarchy as "earned" and
achieved.' 33 Likewise, society views the lack of privilege as deserved
and justified. 34 For example, blacks are viewed as slow, lazy, igno-
Janet E. Helms, Toward a Model of White Racial Identity Development in BLACK AND WHITE
RACIAL IDENTTY. THEORY, RESEARCH AND PRACnCE 49, 50 (Janet E. Helms ed., 1990) (find-
ing that racism is correlated with a lack of a sense of positive white identity and suggesting
that the absence of a positive white identity may cause whites to feel threatened by the
presence or assertion of racial consciousness in or by nonwhite groups).
126 See Wildman & Davis, supra note 124, at 17.
127 See id.
128 See id. at 29.
129 See Margalynne Armstrong, Privilege in Residential Housing, in PRIVILEGE REVEALED,
supra note 124, at 43, 49.
130 Occupational segregation by race or sex, and the corresponding effect on wages
are well documented. See, e.g., TERESA ARNOTr & JULE A. MAgrrA~i, RACE, GENDER, AND
WoRK A MULTICULTURAL ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 316-17
(1991) (concluding that workplaces remain segregated by race, ethnicity, and gender, with
members of disempowered groups consistently assignedjobs with lower pay, fewer benefits,
and more dangerous working conditions).
131 See Grain, supra note 42, at 16-17, 18-22 (describing dynamics of sexual harassment
in male-dominated, high-waged occupations); supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text
(describing reaction of male workers at Mitsubishi to the EEOC litigation).
132 See Cameron Lynne Macdonald & Carmen Sirianni, The Serice Society and the Chang-
ing Experience of Work in WORKING IN THE SERVICE SociErY 1, 14-15 (Cameron Lynne Mac-
donald & Carmen Sirianni eds., 1996) (describing how personal characteristics of workers
in occupationally segregated sectors determine who employers consider desirable, or even
eligible, to fill the jobs, who will desire the jobs, how the jobs are performed, what expecta-
tions customers and management will have of workers in those jobs, and the strategies
workers will use to adapt to, resist, or embrace aspects of the jobs).
133 Armstrong, supra note 129, at 51-52.
134 See id. at 52-53.
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rant, lascivious, and violent, while whites are seen as industrious, virtu-
ous, and law-abiding.'3 5 The dominant culture then further imposes
its values upon workers through the evaluation of their perform-
ance.136 In short, presumptions of worth attach to the status of being
white and to being male. 137
Further, whiteness and maleness yield "psychological" wages
which depend upon the continued presence and suppression of those
beneath them in the social and economic hierarchy. 13 Racial privi-
lege imposes a limit or "floor" on how far down the hierarchy a white
worker can fall; he will never become black.'3 9 As David Roediger has
explained, "status and privileges conferred by race could be used to
make up for alienating and exploitative class relationships."' 40 Thus,
suppressing those beneath them in the occupational hierarchy allows
relatively privileged workers to accept their positions in the class hier-
archy without losing self-esteem; privileged workers define themselves
as not unorganized but organized, not black but white, not female but
male, and thereby escape the bottom of the class hierarchy.141 In this
way, the privilege of being white or male possesses value independent
of the direct market-wage advantage attached to it; privilege becomes
a form of property that translates into material gains through an en-
hanced perception of the quality of work performance. 42
135 See LAN F. HANEY LopEz, WHITE BY LAw: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 10, 28
(1996); see also Janet E. Helms & Ralph E. Piper, Implications of Racial Identity Theory for
Vocational Psychology, 44J. VocATIONA. BEHAv. 124, 134 (1994) (discussing studies in which
high levels of racial stereotyping were found to be inherent in white managers' attitudes
toward black workers).
136 See id.
137 See LopEz, supra note 135, at 199.
138 See W.E.B. Du Bois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION 700-01 (photo. reprint 1976) (1935)
(describing public deference blacks accorded whites, and preferential treatment for whites
in employment, in the courts, and in schooling).
139 SeeANDR.v HACKER, Two NATIONS 29-30, 217 (1992).
140 DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS 13 (1991).
141 See LoPEz, supra note 135, at 200-01; see also DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BorroM OF
THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM at v (1992) (suggesting that even the poorest whites
gain self-esteem by gazing down societal hieiarchies towards blacks).
142 See LOPEz, supra note 135, at 29; Harris, supra note 125, at 1758-61. See generally
GEORGE LIPsITz, THE POSSESSIVE INvEsTmENT IN WHrrENss: How WHrr PEOPLE PROFIT
FROM IDENTITY PoLrncs (1998) (arguing that society encourages whites to invest in "white-
ness" and to reap its cash benefits). At the same time, lack of privilege becomes a handicap
which confers a relative disadvantage upon the un-privileged. Ellis Cose has elaborated on
the specific ways in which lack of racial privilege disadvantages upper- and middle-class
blacks by identifying a "dozen demons" that occupy their time and energy-thus confer-
ring a relative advantage upon the race-privileged because they do not face a struggle to
"fit in" (to display speech, manners, dress and educational pedigree typical of a class-privi-
leged white), exclusion from private clubs, internalized expectations of failure resulting
from having one's professional competence constantly questioned, blocked employment
opportunities, tokenism, presumptions of failure by employers, coping fatigue, occupa-
tional pigeonholing, identity dilemmas, self-censorship and the drain of internalized rage,
self-deception, and stereotyping or guilt by association. Emus COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVI-
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Aspects of privilege have also gained legal status, so that law plays
a significant role in shaping the identity of the privileged. Whiteness
and maleness, for example, have historically conferred a legal status
that created property rights for whites and men.143 Similarly, law con-
structs family and sexuality; the law confers on heterosexuals the right
to marry one's life partner but denies this right to homosexuals. Con-
sequently, homosexuals lose the corresponding economic advantages
that legal marriage bestows upon heterosexuals. 44 Family relation-
ships confer derivative privilege. For example, access to the benefits
of another with privilege through marriage or kinship relations oper-
ates together with intraracial marriage patterns to advantage dispro-
portionately white women over men and women of color because
white women are more likely to enjoy access to the primary sources of
economic privilege: white men who are their fathers, brothers, or
husbands. 145
Finally, law constructs work in part according to the gender and
racial identity of those who perform it. The law considers unpaid
household labor primarily affective in nature, and hence not work.146
The law does not define those who perform it (predominantly wo-
men) as workers; their work is devalued in marital contracts, treated
as a mere aspect of marital relations under the social security system,
not taxed, undervalued in tort damage calculations, undercompen-
sated in calculations of their contribution to family property rights
upon divorce, and ignored under welfare reform and workfare
laws. 147 The law similarly devalues paid domestic labor, and those
LEGED CLASS 55-68 (1993); see also Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Per-
sonal Account of Coming To See Correspondences Through Work in Women's Studies, in RACE,
CLASS, AND GENDER: AN ANTHOLOGY 70, 73-75 (Margaret L. Andersen & Patricia Hill Collins
eds., 1992) (listing the ways in which racial privilege operates).
143 See Harris, supra note 125, at 1725-26; see also Lipsrrz, supra note 142, at 41 (describ-
ing how construction workers' apprenticeship programs disproportionately benefit the
sons of white union plumbers, enabling working class white men to pass the value of their
trade membership on to their sons as a form of property).
144 See generally Eric Heinze, Gay and Poor, 38 How. L.J. 433, 435, 442 (1995) (observing
that the lack of legal recognition afforded to gays' relationships with their partners and
children aggravates gays' financial burdens). Heinze notes that gay women face the
double or triple burdens of economic disadvantage based on their sex, their sexual orien-
tation, and their race, in combination with their legal inability to marry their partners and
gain meaningful economic rights. See id. at 443-44. But see Baehr v. Miike, 910 F.2d 112
(9th Cir. 1996) (finding that state failed to show the compelling state interest necessary to
justify prohibition on same-sex marriage, and striking down Hawaii's prohibition on same-
sex marriage as unconstitutional).
145 See Aida Hurtado, Relating to Privilege: Seduction and Rejection in the Subordination of
White Women and Women of Color, 14 SIGNS:J. WOMEN CULTURE & Soc'y 833, 843-44 (1989).
146 See Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L.
Rxv. 1, 4 (1996).
147 See id. at 27-72.
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who do it (disproportionately women of color) often find themselves
outside the protective umbrella of labor and employment law.148
B. Privilege Conferred by Union Organization
The U.S. labor market includes two distinct internal markets: a
primary sector featuring high wages, full-time, stable employment,
and union protections; and a secondary market featuring low wages,
unstable, temporary or part-time employment, dead-end jobs with few
prospects for upward mobility, and no union protections. 149 Workers
in the secondary market serve as the "shock absorbers" in a changing
economy, picking up the slack when production pace increases and
suffering layoffs when business cycles slow down. Whites and men dis-
proportionately populate the primary market, while women, immi-
grants, and people of color crowd together in the secondary
market.150 Several commentators have recognized that labor unions
have functioned as an elite force within the working class by redistrib-
uting wealth not only from capital to labor, but from unorganized la-
bor to organized labor,151 and within organized labor, from less-
148 See id. at 72-79 (examining the exclusion of paid domestic workers from coverage
under the NLRA, OSHA, and workers' compensation laws).
149 See RICHARD EDWARDS, CONTESTED TERRAIN: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORK-
PLACE IN THE TWENTrEH CENTURY 167-68 (1979). See generally MicHAELJ. PIoRE, BEYOND
INDIVIDUAUSM 86 (1995) (describing the dual labor market).
150 See Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Inflic-
tion of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. Ruv. 1, 42 (1988). Women constitute two-thirds of all
part-time and temporary workers (compared to 45% of the labor force as a whole), and
African Americans comprise 10% of temporary workers and 16% of involuntary part-time
workers (compared to 10% of the labor force as a whole). See FrancoiseJ. Carrh, Temporary
Employment in the Eighties, in NEW PoucIS FOR THE PART-TIME AND CONTINGENT WORutORCE
45, 50 (Virginia L. duRivage ed., 1992) [hereinafter NEw Poucizs]; Chris Tilly, Short Hours,
Short Shrift: The Causes and Consequences of Part-Time Employment, in NEW Poucim, supra, at
15, 42; see also Toward a Disposable Work Force: The Increasing Use of "Contingent"Labor:. Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 103d Cong. 27
(1993) (statement of Delores Crockett) (reporting that in 1992, 13,664,000 part-time work-
ers-two-thirds of all part-time workers-were women); Kathleen Barker & Kathleen Chris-
tensen, Charting Future Research, in CONTINGENT WoRK: AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
IN TRANSION 306, 308-09 (Kathleen Barker & Kathleen Christensen eds., 1998) (explain-
ing that, while estimates vary depending upon the definitions used, blacks, Hispanics, and
women are disproportionately over-represented in the contingent workforce and in non-
standard work arrangements); Arne L. Kalleberg, Part-Time Work and Workers in the United
States: Correlates and Policy Issues, 52 WASH. & LEE L. Rv. 771, 775 (1995) (observing that
black and Hispanic men and women are more likely to be involuntarily employed as part-
time workers than white men and women); Patricia Schroeder, Does the Growth in the Contin-
gent Work Force Demand a Change in Federal Policy 2, 52 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 731, 733 (1995)
(noting that "the percentage of African Americans in the temporary workforce is double
that of the whole workforce," that "two out of every three temporary workers are women,"
and that "the female rate of involuntary part-time work is 44% greater than that of men").
151 See STANLE.ARONOWrrz, FALSE PROMISES: THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN WORUNG CLASS
CONSCIOUSNESS 254-55 (1973) (arguing that over the past 50 years of industrial unionism,
labor unions have been most successful at redistributing income within the working class);
Schatzki, supra note 70, at 932 (arguing that "the most certain impact unions have had in
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privileged labor to more-privileged labor.'5 2 As Justice Holmes ob-
served almost 100 years ago: "Organization and strikes may get a
larger share for the members of an organization, but, if they do, they
get it at the expense of the less organized and less powerful portion of
the laboring mass. They do not create something out of nothing. 15 3
Historically, labor unions have worked against the interests of the un-
organized underclass in order to protect the job security and enhance
the wages of the organized working class; conversely, the underclass
our society's distribution of wealth has been to give to the organized worker and to take
away from the unorganized").
We do not imply that the unorganized would be better off if unions did not exist.
Clearly, unions have reduced income inequality between the capital-owning and laboring
classes. However, so far as society as a whole is concerned, unionization has resulted in a
modest decrease in income inequality. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN &JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT
Do UNIONS Do? 92-93 (1983) (contending that, on balance, unionism in America has re-
duced income inequality by about three percent). Further, the labor movement's political
support and campaign contributions have been important factors in shaping the social and
economic policies of the Democratic party which, we believe, are advantageous to the
working class as a whole. See THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL, THE NEW PoLrIcs OF INEQUALrrY 145
(1984). Finally, unions have been vocal advocates of specific legislation-such as the Fam-
ly and Medical Leave Act-that, in our view, benefits the entire working class, unorgan-
ized as well as organized. SeeJudith L. Lichtman et al., Testimony of 9 to 5, the National
Association of Working Women et al. 8 (Apr. 6, 1994) (unpublished testimony submitted
to the Comm'n on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, on file with the Cornell
Law Review). Unions have been particularly helpful to women and people of color in this
regard. See Examining a Fundamental Change in Soc'y That Retards Progress and Opportunity in
Our Nation-the Decline of Labor Union Membership, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Employment
and Productivity of the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 102d Cong. (1992) (statement
of Marion Crain); Crain, Confronting the Structural Character; supra note 6, at 30; see also AFL-
CIO Urges Affiliates To Spend More, Recruit Women for New Organizing Campaigns, 1997 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at C-i (Feb. 19, 1997) (reporting that female union members
earn 38% more and have 35% higher benefits than similarly employed nonunion female
workers).
152 Large differences in pay persist between union men and women, and union whites
and people of color. Women remain the majority of low-wage workers: in 1992, 70% of all
women workers earned less than $20,000 per year; 40% earned less than $10,000 per year.
See BuREAu OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ser. P60-184, CuRRENT POPULATION RE-
PORTS: MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES, AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1992-
98 (1992). Blacks and Hispanics continue to comprise a significant percentage of the low-
income workers in the U.S. See Celine-Marie Pascale, Normalizing Poverty, Z MAG., June
1995, at 38, 39-40 (reporting that in 1991, 42.4% of blacks and 32.8% of Hispanics had
household incomes under $15,000; 60.6% of Blacks and 54.4% of Hispanics had house-
hold incomes under $25,000, compared with 39.2% of whites; and 47.1% of female-headed
households with minor children lived below the federal poverty line); AFL-CIO DEP'T OF
ECON. RESEARCH, AMERICA NEEDS A RAISE 3 (1996) (documenting gender, African Ameri-
can, and Hispanic wage gaps).
Unions appear to have raised wages overall without substantially altering societal struc-
tures of racial and gender inequality. While unions may not have created these pay ine-
qualities, historically they have perpetuated them. See David Slavin, Jobs with Justice, Z
MAG., Nov. 1995, at 17-18; Rhonda M. Williams & Peggie R. Smith, What Else Do Unions
Do?: Race and Gender in Local 35, REv. BLACK POL. ECON., Winter 1990, at 59, 63-71 (docu-
menting wage inequalities by race and sex resulting from occupational segregation rein-
forced by the union contract).
153 Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011, 1016 (Mass. 1900) (Hoimes, CJ., dissenting).
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has provided scab labor for capitalists during strikes and suppressed
the wages of organized workers by its willingness to work for minimal
wages. 154 Consequently, a schism developed between the organized
working class and the unorganized poor.155 More recently, the imple-
mentation of workfare programs reveals the ongoing tension between
organized labor and the unorganized poor. Workfare programs have
"create [d] a pool of contingent workers" who compete with unionized
employees but will work "for a fraction of their pay" and with no
benefits.'5 6
Worse, workfare workers "will be channeled into low-waged ser-
vice occupations" which employ the most economically vulnerable
and politically marginalized workers. 157 Thus far, rather than embrac-
ing them and organizing them as allies in the struggle against the cap-
ital-owning class, "some public sector unions have watched with fear
and loathing as [workfare workers] have begun to fill slots once occu-
pied by [union members] ."158
154 See ERIK OLIN WRIGHT, INTERROGATING INEQUALrr. ESSAYS ON C.ASS ANALYSIS, SO-
CI .LSM AND MARxISM 254 (1994).
155 See WiLuIAM PFAFF, CONDEMNED TO FREEDOM 105-06 (1971) (observing that estab-
lished unions are barely interested in the unorganized poor, but view them instead as
"troublesome recruits" and threats to organized labor).
156 Annette Fuentes, Slaves of New York, IN THESE TIMES, Dec. 23, 1996-Jan. 5, 1997, at
14. The threat to union jobs posed by the growth of workfare programs is undeniable.
Fuentes reports that since workfare was instituted in New York City, Hospital Workers Lo-
cal 420 lost 2000 union jobs, and AFSCME District Council 37 lost 11,000 members. See id.
at 15-16.
157 Katherine Sciacchitano, Divide and Conquer, IN THESE TIMES, Feb. 3-16, 1997, at 21.
158 Fuentes, supra note 156, at 15; see also Frances Fox Piven, The New Reserve Army of
Labor, in AuDAcIous DEMocRAcyv LABOR, INTELLEGrUALS, AND THE SOcAL RECONSTRUCTION
OF AMERICA 106, 115-16 (Steven Fraser & Joshua B. Freeman eds., 1997) (describing the
reaction of New York City unions to the implementation of workfare, and concluding that
"New York unions are trading in the prospects of the poor... for short-term protections
for current workers and, by extension, incumbent union leadership," thereby participating
in the demise of unionism and deterioration in workers' condition). Exceptions exist.
CWA Local 1180 has assumed a relatively progressive stance with regard to workfare work-
ers, backing their efforts to organize themselves, and assisting them in raising workplace
health and safety standards. See Fuentes, supra note 156, at 17. Andy Stem, President of
the SEIU, warns that labor and welfare recipients must see themselves as allies in order to
avoid a "two-tiered workforce." Sciacchitano, supra note 157, at 23. The Massachusetts Job
Project, a group dedicated to organizing contingent workers, and the Massachusetts Wel-
fare Network are attempting to build alliances among contingent workers, welfare recipi-
ents, and immigrant workers. See id.
At its 1997 annual meeting, the AFL-CIO considered the issue and decided that its
affiliate unions should seek not only to protect existing union members from displace-
ment, but also to extend the benefits of union representation to workfare recipients by
organizing them. See Statements Related to Welfare Reform Adopted by AFL-CIO Executive Counci
Feb. 17, 1996 [sic], 1997 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at E-20 (Feb. 19, 1997) (title date
incorrect in original). Whether affiliate unions will heed the AFL-CIO's charge and organ-
ize workfare workers remains to be seen.
1999] 1573
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
C. What Responsibility Does Organized Labor Bear for the
Perpetuation of Market Privilege?
Two competing theories attempt to explain the roles that employ-
ers and organized labor play in creating and maintaining the dual la-
bor market and its corresponding hierarchy of gender and racial
privilege: "dual labor market theory" and "split labor market theory."
1. Dual Labor Market Theory
Dual labor market theory (or labor market segmentation theory)
posits that because working class fragmentation primarily benefits em-
ployers, employers deliberately promote racial and gender divisions
within the working class in order to blunt opposition, to suppress
workers' wages, and to weaken their bargaining power.159 According
to this theory, the capital-owning class supports and encourages preju-
dice and discrimination in the job, housing, and educational systems,
thereby establishing a privileged economic and social position for
white male workers and undermining class solidarity.' 60 The racist
and sexist tendencies of the white working class enable employers to
pay white male workers lower wages in exchange for occupational seg-
regation by race and sex. In effect, white male workers willingly
forego compensation in order to avoid working with black workers or
alongside women. 161 Employers then pay blacks and women even
less. Thus capital receives enhanced profits by disadvantaging all la-
bor.162 This fragmentation also creates a reserve army of marginalized
workers whom employers can exploit to produce a higher surplus
than is possible from white male workers alone, and whom employers
159 See WILLIAMJuLIUS WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE 4-5 (1980); Edna
Bonacich, The Class Question in Global Capitalism: The Case of the Los Angeles Garment Industy,
in MAPPING MULTICULTURALISM 317, 318-19 (Avery F. Gordon & Christopher Newfield eds.,
1996). See generally EDWARDS, supra note 149, at 163-99 (discussing the theory of labor mar-
ket segmentation, and arguing that sex and race divisions in labor's ranks benefit employ-
ers because they introduce different lines of identification and so blur the lines between
employer and employee).
160 See WISON, supra note 159, at 5.
161 See MARTIN CARNOY, FADED DREAMS: THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF RACE IN
AMERICA 40 (1994) (summarizing argument of economist Michael Reich); see also, e.g.,
NLRB v. Bush Hog, Inc., 405 F.2d 755, 757 n.2 (5th Cir. 1968) (finding that the employer's
statement that a union election victory would result in racial integration of the plant and
the corresponding implication that employer would preserve plant segregation if the
union did not win were a promise of what amounted to a benefit: continued plant segrega-
tion); Key Corp. Holiday Inn, 209 N.L.R.B. 11, 11 (1974) (finding that company had un-
lawfully threatened employees by insinuating that it would replace white employees with
blacks or require them to work alongside blacks if the union prevailed in the election-"a
condition which certain employees might consider unpleasant").
162 See CARNOY, supra note 161, at 40.
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can use to dampen business cycles and fluctuations in the labor mar-
ket and to counteract higher wage demands by white male workers.163
Dual labor market theory postulates that employers manipulate
the white male working class's participation in this process, either by
duping the working class or by bribing it:
The "duped" perspective sees [white labor] as having been sold a
bill of goods by capital, including an ideology of racism, so that they
deflect their hostility from the real enemy, capital, on to
subordinate racial minorities. By this clever ruse, capital succeeds
in a "divide and rule" game. The "bribed" viewpoint sees white la-
bor, especially its leadership, as having been bought off by capital
from continuing the class struggle.' 64
2. Split Labor Market Theory
In contrast to dual market theory, split labor market theory posits
that employers neutrally favor free competition among workers, but
yield under pressure from organized labor to create a labor aristoc-
racy or privileged position for white male workers. 65 Under this the-
ory, white male labor, as opposed to employers, is more overtly
antagonistic to blacks and women.166 White male labor benefits most
directly and immediately from racial and gender stratification of the
workforce; hence, it perpetuates the divisions in the working class.' 67
A split labor market exists when two or more groups of workers,
whose price of labor for the same work differs, compete; one group
works for less because its resources are fewer and its goals differ from
those of the more expensive group. The differences between the
groups result from historical forces and cultural conditioning (rather
than because of the prejudices of employers). Consequently, capital
163 See Media Mailers, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 251, 251-52 (1971) (describing company presi-
dent's statements to male employees that if the union won the election, "work previously
done by men would be done by women, and that there would not be enough work for
everybody," and statements to female employees on layoff status that the union's failure to
admit women to membership would block their employment through the union hiring
hall); WILSON, supra note 159, at 5; Edna Bonacich, The Past, Present, and Future of Split Labor
Market Theory, in 1 RESEARCH IN RACE ANI) ETHNIC RELATIONS 17, 38-39 (Cora Bagley Marrett
& Cheryl Leggon eds., 1979).
164 Bonacich, supra note 163, at 40.
165 See WILSON, supra note 159, at 5; Edna Bonacich, A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The
Split Labor Market; in THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS: PROSPECTS FOR THE 1980s, at 73, 87-88
(Irving Louis Horowitz et al. eds., 1979).
166 See Edna Bonacich, Abolition, the Extension of Slavery, and the Position of Free Blacks: A
Study of Split Labor Markets in the United States, 1830-1863, 81 AM. J. Soc. 601, 602 (1975).
167 See Bonacich, supra note 165, at 87-88. Bonacich does not suggest that the racist
and sexist policies that privileged white male labor employs are necessarily exploitative; she
contends that they are simply a defensive reaction to the threat of displacement by cheap
labor. See Edna Bonacich, Capitalism and Race Relations in South Africa: A Split Labor Market
Analysis, in 2 POLICAL POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY. A RESEARCH ANNuAL 239, 242 (Maurice
Zeitlin ed., 1981) [hereinafter POLITICAL POWER].
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can exploit one group more easily than the other.168 In this explana-
tion of the divided labor market, the state, law, and culture all contrib-
ute to the exploitability of a particular group. The African American
experience of slavery and Jim Crow laws, white women's restriction to
the home and unpaid domestic labor, protectionist restrictions on
when women may work and on jobs at which they may work, exclu-
sions of certain groups from coverage under labor and employment
statutes, the implementation of workfare for those on welfare, and
anti-immigration policies all have contributed to the exploitability of
women and people of color.169
The split labor market theory does not deny that the fundamen-
tal conflict lies between employers and higher-priced labor; it simply
emphasizes that a further conflict of interest exists between the more
privileged workers and those who are less privileged. Thus, the less
privileged unwittingly serve capital as a tool to undermine the wages
of the more privileged, and ultimately become the chief victim in the
struggle between employers and labor.170 The employers' profit-maxi-
mizing preference for lower-paid labor threatens the interests of
higher-paid labor; the weakness of lower-paid labor, its inability to re-
sist an unreasonable offer, and managerial coercion make the threat
credible. 171 The two classes of workers express their conflicts as racial
antagonism or gender hostility, when in reality, class conflict lies at
the root of their differences. 172
3. A Comparison of the Two Theories
Thus, the two theories disagree over which group bears primary
responsibility for creating and maintaining the dual labor market and
the divided working class-employers or organized labor. Both expla-
nations, however, may correctly explain the labor market because, like
the working class, the capital-owning class is not monolithic. Individ-
ual employers' interests may differ from those of the capital-owning
class as a whole. For example, some employers depend on cheap la-
bor more than others.' 73 The dual labor market theory concerns it-
168 See Bonacich, supra note 165, at 80-81.
169 See Michael Burawoy, The Capitalist State in South Africa: Marxist and Sociological Per-
spectives on Race and Class, in 2 PotarricA POWER, supra note 167, at 279, 285.
170 See Bonacich, supra note 166, at 607.
171 See Bonacich, supra note 165, at 81-84. Under this theory, employers do not insti-
gate the dual labor market, but they certainly profit from it by utilizing the lower-waged
class to undermine the position of higher-waged labor. See id. at 83.
172 See WILSON, supra note 159, at 6, 44-45; Bonacich, supra note 165, at 82.
173 See Burawoy, supra note 169, at 285; see alsoJoel Rogers, Divide and Conquer Further
"Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws", 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1, 37-40
(explaining how individual capital-owners' attitudes toward unionization may vary with the
density and centralization of unionization because of differential impacts on their competi-
tive positions in the industry).
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self primarily with the efforts of the capital-owning class to protect
itself on the terrain of class struggle. Under this theory, the interest of
the capital-owning class favors fragmenting the working class. The
split labor market theory, on the other hand, focuses on the interests
of individual employers in maximizing profit; these employers may
well benefit more if the occupational hierarchy is not differentiated
between white or male labor on the one hand and black or female
labor on the other. In this case, employers may in fact replace more
expensive labor with cheaper labor.174
4. Employer Strategies and Organized Labor's Response
Regardless of who created it, employers can exploit the price dif-
ferential between the two groups of workers in various ways. First, em-
ployers may displace high-priced labor with cheap labor (e.g., by
hiring strikebreakers from the lower-priced groul).175 Though direct
displacement of one group by another rarely occurs, the threat of
such displacement is powerful. Alternatively, employers may exploit
the price differential between groups of workers by diluting or deskil-
ling a job-breaking a job into simpler component activities-and
then substituting cheaper labor for the higher-priced labor which per-
formed the original jobs. 76 Employers use occupation or sector seg-
regation as a third avenue to exploit the wage differential between
groups of workers. In sector segregation, cheap labor occupies the
jobs or sectors where pay and conditions of work are most de-
graded. 177 Finally, employers may exploit the price differential be-
tween lower-priced labor and higher-priced labor by exporting
production processes to countries where labor is cheap, either by im-
porting cheap products for resale or by moving production operations
overseas.
178
In each of the strategies outlined above, employers move from
the higher-priced to the lower-priced source, and undermine any
gains achieved by higher-priced (organized) labor. Higher-priced la-
bor might respond with one of three strategies: (1) exclusion-it
could seek to exclude lower-paid labor from high wage territories alto-
174 See RUTH MIu mAN, GENDER AT WORK: THE DYNAMICS OF JOB SEGREGATION BY SEX
DURING WORMD WAR II, at 5-7 (1987); Burawoy, supra note 169, at 283.
175 See Bonacich, supra note 159, at 25-26.
176 See id at 26.
177 See id. at 27. Government policy and programs may support the ability of relatively
high-priced labor to refuse these undesirable jobs. For example, public assistance pro-
grams available to U.S. citizens have historically provided an alternative-albeit an unat-
tractive one-to some jobs or sectors, so that classes of immigrants with precarious legal
status who are ineligible for these social programs, fear deportation, and whose recent
historical experience of abject poverty and oppression in other countries makes them
more exploitable fill these jobs. See id. at 28.
178 See id. at 29.
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gether; (2) caste-where the group is essential to the market's func-
tioning (as in the case of American slaves or women in Western
countries), it could resort to a caste system institutionalizing ethnic,
racial, or gender stratification; or (3) inclusion-it could organize
and incorporate the lower-paid workers. 179 Historically, labor has pur-
sued the exclusion and caste strategies, but signs emanating from the
AFL-CIO's new leadership indicate that unions may be ready to
change course and pursue the inclusion strategy instead.
a. Exclusion
When attempting to prevent employers from accessing cheap la-
bor markets, organized American labor usually lobbies Congress for
protection from the international labor markets. This type of protec-
tionism usually takes shape as statutory immigration controls and
trade barriers prohibiting employers from importing competing labor
and products. Although protectionist propaganda, such as the "buy
American" slogan, obscures the racial and gender dynamics of mod-
em protectionism, women workers in Third World countries create
the predominant displacement threat. In other words, race and gen-
der still stand at the heart of the conflict. 180
b. Caste
In the caste strategy, the higher-paid group controls certain jobs
and receives pay at a higher wage scale, while relegating the cheaper
workers to a set ofjobs that have a lower wage attached to them (occu-
pational segregation by sex and race).181 The higher-paid group cre-
ates this stratification by weakening the cheaper group further until it
is no longer useful to employers. The higher-paid group obtains this
result either by preventing such workers from receiving an education
or developing the skills necessary to compete effectively, or by denying
them the political resources necessary to undercut higher-waged labor
179 See Bonacich, supra note 165, at 73-74; Bonacich, supra note 166, at 607.
180 See Bonacich, supra note 163, at 32.
181 See Bonacich, supra note 165, at 84-85. The National Committee on Pay Equity
reports that in 1990, women were disproportionately overrepresented as secretaries (99.1%
female), registered nurses (94.5% female), child-care workers (97% female), telephone
operators (89% female), data-entry keyers (87.2% female), and primary- and secondary-
school teachers (73.7% female). Black women were disproportionately represented as pri-
vate household workers, cooks, housekeepers, and welfare aides. Hispanic women were
disproportionately represented as graders and agricultural workers, housekeepers, electri-
cal assemblers, and sewing machine operators. Asian women were disproportionately rep-
resented as marine life workers, electrical assemblers, dressmakers, and launderers. Native
American women were disproportionately represented as welfare aides, child-care workers,
teacher's aides, and foresters (other than logging). These occupations consistently corre-
lated with low wages. See National Comm. on Pay Equity, The Wage Gap: Myths and Facts, in
RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER IN THE UNITED STATES: AN INTEGRATED STUDY 129, 129-31 (Paula
S. Rothenberg ed., 1992).
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through governmental regulations. Typically, excluding lower-paid
workers from labor unions or refusing to organize the sectors in which
they work will ensure that they do not gain sufficient political re-
sources to protect themselves. 182 Thus, as split labor market theory
predicts, employers become allied in a paternalistic fashion with the
less powerful underclass. The relatively privileged sector of the work-
ing class then pressures employers to reach a compromise in which
employers exchange the right to completely displace white male labor
for labor's concession to allow people of color and white women to
remain in the workforce, albeit at the bottom of a rigid occupational
hierarchy.183
Labor leaders often adopt the dual labor market theory's expla-
nation of race or sex discrimination in employment and deny respon-
sibility for its effects, blaming the employer for creating divisions
along race and sex lines. By adopting the dual labor market theory,
labor leaders ignore the fact that the labor movement historically has
helped to create and preserve the caste hierarchy of occupations
within the workplace by restricting entry into those occupations, bar-
gaining for wage rates that institutionalize occupationally segregated
workforces, and failing to remedy untenable working conditions cre-
ated by privileged members in cases of racial or sexual harassment. 84
Alternatively, international labor unions sometimes blame their local
unions for antediluvian attitudes on race and sex, reserving the moral
high ground for themselves (as in Mitsubishi). Ample evidence exists,
however, that the local unions, while often more aggressive in their
182 See WILSON, supra note 159, at 7; Bonacich, supra note 165, at 86; Bonacich, supra
note 163, at 31-32.
183 See CARNoy, supra note 161, at 51; WILSON, supra note 159, at 8; Bonacich, supra
note 166, at 607.
184 See PHILP S. FONER, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE BLACKWORKER 1619-1981, at 430-31
(International Publishers ed., 1981) (1974) (describing union collaboration in maintain-
ing separate lines of promotion and seniority for black and white workers, and in segregat-
ing blacks into menial, low-paying, dead-end jobs); GouLD, supra note 6, at 15-16, 18-19
(listing practices utilized by unions to retain a racial caste system, including restricting
admissions to apprenticeship programsjointy administered by employers and unions, de-
nying journeymen cards to qualified black nonunionists, refusing blacks union admission,
creating segregated auxiliary locals for blacks, maintaining separate lines of seniority and
promotion, and excluding blacks from leadership positions in unions); Union Local Agrees
to $75,000 Settlement of Suit Based on Representative's Conduc4 1998 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
139, at A-5 (July 21, 1998) (describing settlement of suit filed by the EEOC against Local 25
of the United Autoworkers Union on ground that "it failed to take prompt and appropri-
ate action" to halt union official's racial and sexual harassment of three GM supervisors).
But see New Suit Filed Against Publix Claiming Sex Discrimination, 1996 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 61, at A-7 (Mar. 29, 1996) (describing class-action sex-discrimination suit alleging that
Publix Supermarkets discriminated against female workers by channeling them into jobs
with lower pay and fewer opportunities for advancement than those available to males,
filed with the assistance of the United Food and Commercial Union, which is waging a
corporate organizing campaign against Publix).
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perpetuation of these views, take their cues from the international
leadership.' 85
c. Inclusion
Ironically, when high-priced labor deploys the exclusion and
caste strategies, its short-term effort to prevent its own displacement
limits the economic development of cheaper labor groups, reinforces
the dual labor market, and consequently preserves the threat of dis-
placement. 8 6 Preferably, high-priced labor would institute an equal-
izing strategy that focused on raising the price of cheap labor. High-
priced labor could accomplish this by pressuring the government to
establish and support minimum standards legislation applicable both
nationally and extraterritorially to U.S. companies employing labor
abroad, and by organizing both the domestic and international lower-
priced labor groups. 187 This is the strategy toward which organized
labor is now turning. Whether such a strategy will succeed against the
backdrop of a working class divided along race and gender lines de-
pends in large part upon the nature of intraclass dynamics: Will the
white, male, organized working class gain more than it loses from an
alliance with historically unorganized (and disproportionately female
and racial minority) labor?
IV
LABOR'S DIVIDED HOUSE: GENDER AND EXPLOITATION
In order to answer this question, we must understand exactly
what white or male workers gain by virtue of their race- and gender-
privileged positions in the labor hierarchy. Subordinated and ex-
ploited by employers, organized race- and sex-privileged workers nev-
ertheless occupy a position of power relative to those beneath them in
the occupational hierarchy. Thus, the opportunity for intraclass ex-
ploitation exists.
A. What Is Exploitation?
Exploitation refers to a social relation that allows "one group of
people to appropriate the fruits of labor of another group." 88 More
185 See GouLD, supra note 6, at 20-21 (describing the AFL-CIO's resistance to the imple-
mentation of Title VII as it affected the seniority rights of existing race-privileged
members).
186 See Bonacich, supra note 163, at 32, 34.
187 See id. at 33.
188 W~iGHT, supra note 154, at 27. Relying heavily on the work of Marxist economist
John Roemer, Wright reconstructs an exploitation-centered theory of class that identifies
four axes of exploitation: labor power, control over the means of production, differential
skill levels, and organizational exploitation. See Erik Olin Wright, A General Framework for
the Analysis of Class Structure in THE DEBATE ON CLAssEs 3, 7-19 (Erik Olin Wright et al. eds.,
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than simple income inequality, exploitation exists only when a causal
relationship obtains between the incomes of individuals or groups.
For true exploitation to occur, the income of the exploiting group
must depend causally on the efforts of the exploited group.'8 9 We can
thus distinguish exploitation from mere economic oppression, or
1989) [hereinafter Wright, A GeneralFramework]. Exploitation of each of these assets de-
pends upon the capacity of the asset holder to deprive others of that asset. See id. at 12
n.22. Multidimensional exploitation is possible. See Erik Olin Wright, The Conceptual Status
of Class Structure in Class Analysis, in BRINGING CLASS BACK IN: CONTEMPORARY & HiSroRcAIL.
PERSPECTIVEs 17, 26 (Scott G. McNall et al. eds., 1991).
Labor power is exploited through market exchanges: "[W] orkers are paid a wage that
covers the costs of production of their labor power; capitalists receive an income from the
sale of the commodities produced by workers. The difference in these quantities consti-
tutes the exploitative surplus appropriated by capitalists." Wright, A General Framework
supra, at 18. Employers use market changes to exploit differential ownership and control
over the means of production: here, exploitation arises from property relations. See id.
Skill exploitation refers to the ability of owners of scarce skills to extract a rent compo-
nent in their wages, an amount "above and beyond the costs of producing and reproduc-
ing the skills themselves." WRGrrr, supra note 154, at 251. Wright explains:
[Skill exploitation] implies that people with high levels of skills... receive
high income not simply because they have high skills, but because of the
differentials in skill levels across actors. The highly skilled would become
worse off if the unskilled obtained skills; they thus have an interest in main-
taining skill differentials, and this is what underpins the claim that their
income reflects exploitation. If a skilled person's income reflected no
more than the amount of time and resources it takes to obtain the skill,
then there would be no skill-based exploitation. The higher incomes would
simply be reimbursement for real costs incurred.
Wright, A General Framework, supra, at 12 (footnotes omitted). Thus, for a skill to serve as
the basis for exploitation, it must be scarce, and skill owners must be able to translate
scarcity into higher incomes. This can occur in three ways: "[First, skills] may require
special talents that are naturally scarce in a population; second, access to the training nec-
essary to develop the skill may be restricted... ; third, a certification system may be estab-
lished" to limit the use of the skill. Id. at 21.
Similarly, the organization of the production process generates productivity independ-
ent of "labor power, the use of the means of production, or the skills of the producer." Id.
at 16. For example, apparel manufacturers concerned with reducing production costs
have restructured work organization to enhance the productivity of the existing labor force
when technological changes and mechanization are not feasible. See Ian M. Taplin, Recent
Manufacturing Changes in the U.S. Apparel Industry: The Case of North Carolina, in GLOBAL
PRODUCTION: THE APPAREL INDUSTRY IN THE PACIFIC RIM 328, 333 (Edna Bonacich et al.
eds., 1994). In exploiting organization, managers appropriate surplus through the power
that they command in a bureaucratic structure:
The asset is organization. The activity of using that asset is coordinated
decision making over a complex technical division of labor. When that as-
set is distributed unequally, so some positions have effective control over
much more of the asset than others, then the social relation with respect to
that asset takes the form of hierarchical authority. Authority, however, is
not the asset as such; organization is the asset and is controlled through a
hierarchy of authority.
Wright, A General Framework, supra, at 17.
189 See ERIK OLIN WRIGHT, CLAssEs 36 (1985); WRIGHr, supra note 154, at 40;. To put it
more positively, the poor are "'not the bottom[,] . . . [but] the foundation.'" Edna
Bonacich, Racism in Advanced Capitalist Society: Comments on William j Wilson's The Truly
Disadvantaged, J. Soc. & Soc. WELFARE, Dec. 1998, at 41, 44 (quoting Rev. JesseJackson).
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domination. Economic oppression occurs when one group deprives
another of access to productive resources.190 But economic oppres-
sion does not necessarily connect the material deprivation of one
group with the material benefit another group enjoys. 191 We can also
distinguish sexual or racial domination from class exploitation be-
cause sexual and racial domination does not necessarily imply antago-
nistic material interests.' 92
190 See WiuGr, supra note 154, at 43.
191 Wright explains:
In exploitation, the material well-being of exploiters causally depends upon their
ability to appropriate the fruits of labor of the exploited. The welfare of the exploi-
ter therefore depends on the effort of the exploited, not merely on the dep-
rivations of the exploited. In non-exploitative economic oppression there
is no transfer of the fruits of labor from the oppressed to the oppressor, the
welfare of the oppressor depends on the exclusion of the oppressed from
access to certain resources, but not on their effort....
The crucial difference between exploitation and non-exploitative op-
pression is that in an exploitative relation, the exploiter needs the exploited
since the exploiter depends upon the effort of the exploited. In the case of
non-exploitative oppression, the oppressors would be happy if the op-
pressed simply disappeared.
Id. at 40.
192 Although a few Marxist theorists have suggested that race and sex should be ana-
lyzed as separate axes of exploitation, seePhilippe Van Parijs, A Revolution in Class Theory, in
THE DEBATE ON CLASSES, supra note 188, at 213, 222-26, Wright adheres to the view of the
majority of Marxist theorists that focusing on race or sex will detract from the explanatory
power and clarity of class theory, see Wright, A General Framework, supra note 188, at 4-6
(criticizing domination-centered concepts of class such as feminism or critical race theory
on the ground that they further a relativistic understanding of "multiple oppressions"
which lacks explanatory power and clarity). The Marxist assumption is that although race
and sex have some impact on social inequality, they do not materially shape the experience
of class exploitation, either for women and people of color or for the white, male, working
class. See Erik Olin Wright, Race, Class and Income Inequality, 83 AM. J. Soc. 1368, 1369
(1978) [hereinafter Wright, Race); Erik Olin Wright, Women in Class Structure 17 ECON. &
Soc. 35, 61-63 & n.1 (1989) [hereinafter Wright, Women].
For example, although Wright does not claim that all race discrimination is really
disguised class oppression, and acknowledges that racism has an independent impact on
income inequality, he concludes that class differences in income are greater than race
differences, and that therefore class relations are central to understanding social inequal-
ity. See Wright, Race, supra, at 1389, 1395 ("[T)he common position of black and white
workers within the social relations of production generates'a basic unity of economic situa-
tion."). Nevertheless, Wright does note that black workers are exploited at a higher rate
than white workers, and he acknowledges the existence of real, material divisions between
races in the working class. See id. at 1393. Like other Marxist theorists, he glosses over the
import of these divisions with the statement that the underlying fundamental class interests
of blacks and whites across modes of production supersede their immediate differing inter-
ests within a given mode of production. See id. at 1394 & n.17.
Similarly, Wright rejects the relevance of gender to his theory of class, restricting its
importance to the more narrow realm of "understanding and explaining the concrete lived
experiences of people." Erik Olin Wright, Rethinking Once Again, the Concept of Class Struc-
tur in THE DEBATE ON CLAssEs, supra note 188, at 269, 290-91. Accordingly, Wright at-
tempts to explain the role of gender in class theory as "mediating" class location. Wright,
Women, supra, at 40-42. Although Wright purports to reject the conventional view that
women's class identity is derivative of their husbands', see id. at 37-40, he substitutes an
equally derivative analysis of families as mechanisms linking married women-though ap-
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Thus, the privileged affirmatively exploit their privilege when
they gain an economic advantage at the expense of the labor of the
less privileged. Wright gives the following example of exploitation: "If
I kick the peasants off the land and let them fend for themselves in
the bush, then I have merely oppressed them materially; if I use my
ownership of the land as a basis for hiring them back to work the
fields, then I exploit them."193
B. Gender Privilege and Economic Exploitation
We next consider the gender-specific history which has made wo-
men vulnerable to economic exploitation by both employers and gen-
der-privileged members of the working class.194 In doing so, we hope
to strip away the false veneer of gender neutrality associated with class
exploitation and to show why the gender divisions within labor's
house have persisted despite labor law's united front strategy.195 In
parently not married men-to the class structure through their husbands, parents, and
children, see WRIuGT, supra note 154, at 252; Wright, Women, supra, at 40-41, 62. This is
particularly jarring when juxtaposed against the empirical data on which Wright relies,
which indicate that in 1980 a full 20% of women were working at jobs whose social class
status was higher than that of their husbands. See Wright, Women, supra, at 36. More cur-
rent data suggest that the percentage of married women in the waged labor force who
provide half of their families' income has grown significantly. A 1995 study found that
55% of all employed women and 48% of employed married women contributed at this
level. 1 FAMILIES AND WORK INST., WOMEN: THE Nmv PROVIDERS 33 (1995). Finally, Wright
dismisses in a footnote the radical- and socialist-feminist argument that women's unpaid
labor within the household creates a direct class relation to domestic production, which is
structured by both class and gender exploitation, thus placing women in a distinct class
relation to both their husbands and capitalists. See Wright, Women, supra, at63 n.1.
193 WRIGHT, supra note 154, at 43-44.
194 Exploitation along the axes of race and sex within the working class has taken his-
torically different forms and deserves independent analyses. Although systems of racial
and sexual exploitation intersect with one another (most obviously in the lives of women of
color), only separate analysis can avoid unwittingly minimizing the impact of either. See
generally Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implica-
tions of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other Isms), in PRIVILEGE REVEALED,
supra note 124, at 85. On the other hand, separate analyses implicitly assume that the
experience of women of color is synonymous with that of either black men or white wo-
men. See Deborah K. King, Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness: The Context of a Black
Feminist Ideology, 14 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & Soc'Y 42, 44-45 (1988). In an effort to
chart a course between these twin dilemmas, we focus here on sex as a system of exploita-
tion, but explicitly take up the position of women of color as well.
195 We take much of our inspiration in this regard from a provocative article by Karen
Brodkin Sacks, Toward a Unified Theory of Class, Race, and Gender, 16 Am. ETHNOLOGIST 534
(1989). Sacks discusses the significance of comprehending class, race and gender oppres-
sion as parts of a unitary system, rather than analyzing the separate systems of capitalism,
white supremacy, and patriarchy. See id. In particular, by unmasking the race and gender
specificity of class consciousness, we hope to draw attention to the wide range of ways in
which class consciousness and class protest are experienced and to highlight the likelihood
that these more concrete understandings will create new possibilities for mobilization. See
id. at 542 (citing empirical research suggesting that working class consciousness is racially
specific, gender specific, kinship specific, and historically specific); see also ROBIN D.G. KEL-
LEY, RACE REBELS: CULTURE, POITICS, AND THE BLACK WORKING CLASS 18-22 (1994) (cata-
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this subsection, we identify the sexually-specific forms that class ex-
ploitation has assumed, and show how this exploitation-both "in-
traclass" (worker-worker) and "interclass" (employer-labor)-has
divided labor against itself.
1. Home and Market
Any analysis of gender and class centers on the dynamics of the
relation between women's unpaid labor in the home and women's
paid labor in the market; the intersection between production and
reproduction constructs.196 Women's unpaid labor has been ignored
and devalued, primarily by defining child-bearing and -rearing, house-
keeping, and meal preparation as non-work.197 The unpaid work that
women perform has been defined instead as a precondition to pro-
duction, rather than production itself, and as an expression of affec-
tion, rather than a market exchange; those who do it are viewed as
nonproductive, superfluous appendages rather than workers. 198 The
loging the many forms that black working class resistance has taken in the workplace, and
pointing out how day-to-day strategies like foot dragging, absenteeism, pilferage, slow-
downs, and work sabotage have been erased in historians' accounts of the working class
because they were not recognized as forms of class resistance); JOHN C. LEGGETT, CLASS,
RACE, AND LABOR: WORKING-CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS IN DETROIT 82-83, 145, 149-52 (1968)
(arguing that traditional union-organizing strategies, which focus on the worksite, are inef-
fective in reaching the black working class, many of whom are unemployed or tenuously
employed, and suggesting that community-based unionism would be far more likely to
mobilize black workers).
196 See Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Reproduction and Class Divisions Among Women, in
CLASS, RACE, AND SEx: THE DYNAMICS OF CONTROL 221, 221 (Amy Swerdlow & Hanna Les-
singer eds., 1983).
197 Ursula Leguin explains this eloquently:
In our culture [the art of making order where people live] is not even con-
sidered to be work. 'Do you work?' and having stopped mopping the
kitchen and picked up the baby to come to answer the door she says, 'No, I
don't work.' People who make order where people live are by doing so
stigmatized as unfit for 'higher' pursuits; so women mostly do it, and
among women poor, uneducated, or old women more often than rich, edu-
cated, and young ones.
Ursula K. Leguin, Talk for Bryn Mawr Convocation (May 17, 1986) (transcript, on file with
authors); see also HOLLY SKLAR, CHAOS OR COMMUNrIY?: SEEKING SOLUTIONS NOT SCAPE-
GOATS FOR BAD ECONOMICS 61-63 (1995) (describing how U.S. Department of Labor under-
estimated unemployment among women by asking questions that assumed that those who
did housework rather than work in the waged labor market were voluntarily unemployed);
Ruth Hubbard, Social Effects of Some Contemporary Myths About Women, in RACE, CLASS, AND
GENDER IN THE UNITED STATES: AN INTEGRATED STUDY, supra note 181, at 45, 47 (noting that
the term "work" has increasingly come to be defined as meaning what men do, and ex-
plaining how women's work has been trivialized, ignored, and undervalued in economic
and in political terms).
198 See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE AND CLASS 234-35 (1981). The devaluation of
housework is most directly a byproduct of the Industrial Revolution, which necessitated a
"generalized revaluation of production." Id. at 228. As the exchange value of a commodity
became paramount, domestic labor was devalued as an inferior form of work because it did
not generate profit. At the same time, women were "ideologically redefined as the guardi-
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failure to recognize as workers those who perform domestic labor or
who work in the home extends to women who labor in the home of
another for pay, as well as to those who do piecework for employers in
their own homes for pay.199
The perceived dichotomy between work done in the home and
work done in the market significantly influences our understanding of
how employers exploit women in waged work. As historically unpaid
household laborers, women enter the waged labor market from an
economically backward position, more vulnerable to exploitation than
men. Isolated in the household setting, women are less likely to de-
velop class consciousness as a proletariat-particularly a sense of the
collectivism more easily perceived by workers in a factory or on an
ans of a devalued domestic life." Id. Angela Davis explains how this operated across racial
boundaries:
The reality of women's place in nineteenth-century U.S. society involved
white women, whose days were spent operating factory machines for wages
that were a pittance, as surely as it involved Black women, who labored
under the coercion of slavery ....
... Since popular propaganda represented the vocation of all women
as a function of their roles in the home, women compelled to work for
wages came to be treated as alien visitors within the masculine world of the
public economy. Having outstepped their "natural" sphere, women were
not to be treated as full-fledged wage workers.
Id at 229. See generally Reva B. Siegal, Home As Work. The irst Woman's Rights Claims Concern-
ing Wives'Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1092 (1994) (noting that in post-
agrarian economies a woman's household work became an indistinguishable and invisible
part of "family life" and that census measures of the post-Civil War economy characterized
women's household work as "unproductive," excluding women who performed income-
producing work in the home from the tallies of those "gainfully employed" (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)); Silbaugh, supra note 146, at 81 (discussing the vision of housework
as an expression of affection rather than a market exchange and consequent devaluation
of housework); Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEo. LJ. 1571, 1572-74 (1996) (list-
ing assumptions underlying the market-oriented approach to ending women's economic
subordination, and arguing that the failure to value and tax women's nonmarket work
contributes to the false and gendered distinction between women's paid work in the mar-
ket and women's unpaid work in the home).
199 "The paid domestic worker is the victim of association with the unpaid domestic
worker." Silbaugh, supra note 146, at 79. But see Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiritual and Menial
Housework, 9 YALEJ.L. & FEMNNSM 51 (1997) (arguing that domestic work is segregated into
its spiritual and menial aspects, with spiritual work more highly valued and performed
primarily by privileged white women, and menial work devalued and performed by minor-
ity, immigrant, and working class women). Paid domestic workers are excluded from cov-
erage under section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994),
and under a Occupational Safety and Health Act regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1975.6 (1998).
Moreover, the vast majority of state workers' compensation statutes excludes domestic
workers. See Silbaugh, supra note 146, at 78. Similarly, the paid worker who does piece-
work for an employer in her home is typically viewed as an independent contractor beyond
the reach of employment and labor laws. See Eileen Boris, Organization or Prohibition?: A
Historical Perspective on Trade Unions and Homework, in WOMEN AND UNIONs: FORGING A PART-
NERSmp 207, 224 (Dorothy Sue Cobble ed., 1993). See generally HoMEWoRKu HisTOtUcAL
AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECrIVES ON PAID LABOR AT HOME (Eileen Boris & Cynthia R. Dan-
ieis eds., 1989).
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assembly line.20 0 As women have moved into the waged labor market
in increasing numbers, individual males have sought to keep women
tied to the household performing the necessary work of keeping a
home: preparing meals, cleaning, and raising children. These pres-
sures have further hindered women's economic development by limit-
ing their occupational choices to those that are compatible with the
continued performance of unpaid homemaking duties201 and by lim-
iting the leisure time that women have available to invest in organiz-
ing activities. Finally, the failure to define women's work as work itself
inhibits women's class consciousness and impairs opportunities for or-
ganizing around work as women experience it.202
One can deconstruct the division between family and market
work further by examining slave women's work. As Jacqueline Jones
has observed, "[i]f work is any activity that leads either directly or indi-
rectly to the production of marketable goods, then slave women did
200 See Bonacich, supra note 163, at 52-53.
201 See Lucinda Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the
Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1118, 1125-26 (1986); MaryJo Frug, SecuringJob Equality
for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REv. 55, 57-58 (1979). De-
bate rages about whether women employed in part-time jobs voluntarily select these jobs
because the jobs are compatible with homemaking and child care obligations, or they are
forced into them because these are the majority ofjobs available. Compare Edward A. Lenz,
"Contingent Work'--Dispelling the Myth, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 755, 762-63 (1995), with Ann
Bookman, Flexibility at What Price? The Costs of Part-Time Work for Women Workers, 52 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 799, 800-02 (1995), andArne Kalleberg, Part-Time Work and Workers in the United
States: Correlates and Policy Issues, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 771, 776-79 (1995). Whichever it
is, a disproportionate number of women work part-time atjobs in which they earn 60% of
the average hourly wage of a full-time worker and are statistically likely to lack important
fringe benefits such as pension and health insurance. See CHIS TxtLY, SHORT HOURS,
SHORT SHRIFr: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF PART-TIME WORK 1, 10 (1990).
202 See PAULINE HUNT, GENDER AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS 155 (1980). Hunt explains
how women come to perceive their work in our dualistic economic system:
[W]ork as a housewife isn't work-it's 'being at home' (the place of lei-
sure), work in the office or factory isn't work-it's 'getting out of the house
for a bit.' . . . . There is no possibility here of comradeship or unity in
struggle .... [Women's] exploitation is invisible behind an ideology that
masks the fact that they work at all-their work appears inessential.
Id. (quotingJuuET MITCHELL, WOMAN'S ESTATE 139 (1971)).
Similarly, paid labor-market jobs disproportionately likely to be filled by women are
sometimes regarded by workers themselves as so low in the occupational hierarchy as to be
outside the meaning of "labor." See RICHARD SENN=r & JONATHAN COBB, THE HIDDEN
INJURIES OF CLASS 236 (1972) (noting the reduced autonomy and control over time that
most service jobs involve, and hypothesizing that service workers view themselves as lower
in status than nonservice workers in part because they are forced to define their own func-
tion in terms of the shifting demands of others and thus feel more dependent upon, and at
the mercy of, their employers). Feminist researchers have argued that jobs traditionally
held by women are typically associated with "female" character traits, such as passivity and
docility, and involve job duties which are similar to those that women did in the home for
no wage. See ROBERTA GOLDBERG, ORGANIZING WOMEN OFFICE WORKERS: DISSATISFACTION,
CONSCIOUSNESS, AND ACTION 26 (1983). The strong association of service-sector jobs with
women and their traditional (unpaid) labor in the home goes a long way toward explain-
ing the undervaluation of paid service-sector jobs. See Silbaugh, supra note 146, at 79.
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nothing but work"; not only did their work in the fields and in the
white slaveholder's household produce value, but even their labors in
caring for themselves and their families contributed to the value of
the master's property because slaves were both productive workers
and marketable commodities in themselves. 20 3 Yet as slaves, society
perceived them as property rather than workers, so that the full mea-
sure of their exploitation went untheorized. The legacy of slavery and
the continuing disproportionate allocation of menial household labor
to black women reinforce both white supremacy and patriarchy, effec-
tively rendering black female domestics a permanent service caste.20 4
2. Women's Social Class Identity
Because conventional class analysis ignored women's unpaid do-
mestic work and devalued much of women's paid market work, it
struggled both to define women's class status and to explain their role
in the capitalist system. Women derived their class affiliations from
their husbands' or fathers' occupational positions.205 Assuming that
families pool their resources, conventional class analysis viewed all
family members as benefitting equally from the income-generating ca-
pacity of any single member. From this perspective, family wealth
maximization strategies rationally privileged the husband's job and
class imperatives because the husband typically earned the higher
wage.206
Analysis of women's class affiliations as derivative reflects the cul-
tural perception of women as "secondary" wage earners who work for
"pin money."207 Viewing women's class fortunes as linked to those of
their husbands in turn justifies lower relative wages for women and
203 Jacqueline Jones, Black Women, Work, and the Family Under Slavery, in FAMIuas AND
WORK 84, 85 (Naomi Gerstel & Harriet Engel Gross eds., 1987).
204 See BONNIE THORNTON DiLL, ACROSS THE BOuNDARIES OF RACE AND CLASS: AN Ex-
PLORATION OF WORK AND FAMILY AMONG BrACK FEMALE DoMESTIc SERVANTS 12-13 (1994).
Blacks are more than three times, and Latinos more than twice, as likely as whites to be
employed as domestic service workers in private households. See Edna Bonacich, Inequality
in America: The Failure of the American System for People of Color, in RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER:
AN ANTHOLOGY, supra note 142, at 96, 101.
205 See REEvE VANNEMAN & LYNN WEBER CANNON, THE AMERICAN PERCEPTION OF CLASS
181 (1987); Zillah Eisenstein, Constructing a Theory of Capitalist Patriarchy and Socialist Femi-
nism, in WOMEN, CLASS, AND THE FEMINlsT IMAGINATION 114, 138 (Karen V. Hanson & Ilene
J. Philipson eds., 1990); Wright, Women, supra note 192, at 37.
Studies of women's class perceptions show that it is only men who view women's class
position as derivative. Women adopt a maximizing strategy, identifying by their individual
occupational status if they are themselves managerial (regardless of their husband's occu-
pation), or by affiliation with their husbands' class status if their husbands are managerial
(regardless of their own occupation). Men, by contrast, tend to ignore their wives' jobs,
identifying their class status solely by reference to their own occupations. See VANNEMAN &
CANNON, supra, at 190.
206 See Wright, Women, supra note 192, at 38.
207 VANNEMAN & CANNON, supra note 205, at 181.
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ties family benefits, such as health insurance and pensions, to male-
dominated jobs.20  Thus, this analysis justifies underpayment for wo-
men's waged labor while obscuring their nonwaged contributions to
the wages earned by the head-of-household (male) worker.20 9
Black women challenge traditional models of class analysis. Since
black women so often provide the sole or primary income for their
families, models of social class that privilege the husband's occupation
in ascertaining social class are particularly inappropriate for them.210
Employment patterns for black men and women ensure black wo-
men's continuing attachment to the paid labor force. While black
men's work in low-skilled manufacturing pays better than black wo-
men's work, it tends to be less secure and less plentiful than the lower-
waged, but more secure domestic-service work often performed by
black women.21' Further, more black women than black men occupy
professional and managerial positions. Consequently, black heter-
osexuals experience difficulty with intraracial assortative mating.21 2
Accordingly, a larger percentage of black women head their house-
holds at all economic levels.213
Black women's disproportionate location in domestic service and
agricultural labor, however, placed them outside the protection of the
labor laws and contributed to their isolation from the labor move-
ment, reinforcing the absence of black women's paid work in class-
conflict theory.214 When black women were employed in the indus-
trial sector, they entered the bottom rungs of the hierarchy and found
themselves engaged in physically demanding, intellectually deadening
208 See Marion Grain, Between Feminism and Unionism: Working Class Women, Sex Equality,
and Labor Speech, 82 GEO. L.J. 1903, 1915-19 (1994).
209 See HuNT, supra note 202, at 182; Karen Brodkin Sacks, Generations of Working-Class
Families, in My TROUBLES ARE GOING To HAVE TROUBLE wrrH ME: EVERYDAY TRIALS AND
TRIUMPHS OF WOMEN WORKERS 15, 18 (Karen Brodkin Sacks & Dorothy Remy eds., 1984)
[hereinafter My TROUBLES].
210 See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMuNIsr THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS,
AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 45 (Routledge Perspectives on Gender vol. 2, 1990).
211 See id. at 59. Racial discrimination means that even families who elevate themselves
to middle-class status are economically less secure than white middle-class families. See id.
at 60.
212 See id. at 61. Assortative mating refers to the tendency of men and women to marry
others of a similar economic status. See MICKEY KAus, THE END OF EQuALrIY 31-32 (1992);
CHRISTOPHER LAsCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES AND THE BETRAYAL OF DEMOCRACY 33
(1995).
213 See COLLINS, supra note 210, at 61. bell hooks observes that these employment pat-
terns simultaneously contribute to the tendency of black women to support patriarchy, and
divide the black community. Bitter about the paid labor they must perform to help their
families survive, black women sometimes direct their hostility and rage toward black men.
Black women, who equate masculinity with the ability to be a primary or sole breadwinner,
feel cheated and betrayed by black men who cannot or will not assume these roles, and
their perception of black men as emasculated and contemptible reflects this. See BELL
HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 92-93 (1981).
214 See CoLLrNs, supra note 210, at 45;Jones, supra note 203; King, supra note 194, at 65.
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work.215 Black women held some of the dirtiest and most degrading
jobs in tobacco factories, cotton mills, and flour manufacturing; yet,
class theorists and union organizers continued to ignore them.216
3. Employer Interests in Exploitation by Sex
Restricting women to the home historically served two purposes
for employers: first, it prevented the disruption of the social order in
the factories (and consequent interference with production) that
would have prevailed if women had taken "men's" jobs in a time of
mass unemployment;217 second, preserving the home and family as a
sanctuary for repair of body and soul ameliorated the trauma male
industrial workers suffered from the fragmentation and degradation
of factory labor.218 Women not only physically reproduced the next
generation of workers, but also socially reproduced existing workers,
re-creating them each day so that they might go back into the plants
and factories.219 Hence, women's unpaid domestic labor indirectly
supported capitalism, through women's contribution to family life.
New feminist research reveals other ways in which women's un-
paid labor benefits employers. 220 Employers appropriate women's la-
bor without their entering the waged-employment relation by shifting
work to the consumer that was once paid work.22' Thus, female con-
sumers bag their own groceries, locate and collect their own merchan-
dise in retail stores, serve themselves and their children at buffets or
soft drink machines, bus their own tables in quick-order restaurants,
pump their own gasoline, select and order merchandise from cata-
logues by telephone, and otherwise serve themselves rather than rely-
ing upon paid clerks to serve them.22 2 This analysis provides an
additional explanation for the low wage attached to the service occu-
pations in which waged women are disproportionately located. As em-
ployers transfer retail service work to women consumers, they require
fewer service workers, and they expect no special skill or knowledge of
215 See COLLINS, supra note 210, at 43, 48.
216 See KELLEY, supra note 195, at 27, 57.
217 See ARONOWrrz, supra note 151, at 201.
218 See id
219 See id. at 202.
220 See Nona Y. Glazer, Servants to Capita" Unpaid Domestic Labor and Paid Work, in FANn-
LiES AND WoRK 236, 236 (Naomi Gerstel & Harriet Engel Gross eds., 1987). See generally
NONA Y. GLAZER, WOMEN'S PAID AND UNPAID LABOR THE Woax TRANSFER IN HEALTH CARE
AND RETAIUNG (1993).
221 See Glazer, supra note 220, at 237. Women are more likely to be consumers because
of their role in family caretaking, which typically includes purchasing groceries, meals, and
clothing for their families. See id. at 241-44.
222 See id. Glazer notes the class specificity of this work transfer, pointing out that the
upper class has been less willing to tolerate work transfer reorganizations by capitalists, so
that retailers must continue to provide clerk service in high-priced establishments catering
to the wealthy. See id. at 244.
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the product being sold of those who remain. Consequently, the wages
of the remaining service workers inevitably decline. 223
When women enter the waged-labor market, employers benefit
by maintaining an occupationally segregated workforce in which the
vast majority of women are restricted to low-paying, dead-end, mini-
mal-benefitjobs. 224 Employers have a classwide interest in maintain-
ing a labor force in which workers are occupationally segregated by
sex, so that they can exploit the gender divisions to undermine the
class solidarity of workers.225 Sexism in the male working class allows
employers to pay male workers lower wages in exchange for maintain-
ing the gendered division of labor between the workplace (male) and
the home (female)226 In addition, employers can blunt women's
resistance to managerial control by fragmenting their class and gen-
der identities. Employers seek to control women's resistance on class
grounds by forcing women to focus on their gender identity through
sexual harassment and by segregating women in jobs with perceived
feminine characteristics. Alternatively, employers will deny women's
demands for gender-specific treatment, such as maternity leave, by
stressing women's generic class identity.22 7
223 See id. at 239, 247.
224 See MiLKMAN, supra note 174, at 5-6 (describing labor-market segmentation theory
and its flaws); Heidi Hartmann, Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Job Segregation by Sex; in WOMEN,
CLASS, AND THE FEMINIST IMAGINATION, supra note 205, at 146, 167 (describing labor-market
segmentation theory's understanding of occupational segregation by sex as a capitalist
structure which dilutes class unity by obfuscating the basic two-class nature of capitalism).
225 See id.
226 See CARNoy, supra note 161, at 51.
227 See KarenJ. Hossfeld, "Their Logic Against Them": Contradictions in Sex, Race, and Class
in Silicon Valley, in WOMEN WoRKERs AND GLOBAL REsTRUCrumiNG 149, 149-50 (Kathryn
Ward ed., 1990). Hossfeld has documented how this fragmentation occurs in the Silicon
Valley microelectronics production industry. See id. Although working class women have
long done factory and wage work, the cultural ideology that such a role is unfeminine
persists, based on an upper-class norm that women did not need and were not permitted to
work outside the home. See id. at 158-59. Thus, women factory workers attempt to com-
pensate for the perceived undermining of their femininity that results from their role as
manual laborers, just as they attempt to compensate within their marriages for the per-
ceived undermining of the male breadwinner identity that their waged-labor-force partici-
pation may entail. See id. at 164-65; see also AR.E HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT:
WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 222, 271-79 (1989) (observing that wo-
men who earned more than their husbands often performed the bulk of the housework in
an effort to reinforce traditional gender roles that their usurpation of the breadwinner
role undermined). By calling attention to women's gender identity through strategies
such as sexual harassment, occupational segregation, hiring discrimination, color-coding
uniforms by sex, and running columns in the company newsletter dealing with cooking
and fashion tips, management reminds women workers that they are women first and en-
courages them to place this identity above their identity as workers. See Hossfeld, supra, at
160. None of the women in Hossfeld's study viewed their jobs as a primary part of their
identity or as a source of self-esteem; their primary identities were wrapped up in family
roles, with their waged work seen only as an economically necessary extension of their roles
as family caretakers. See id. at 165. Yet when women workers seek work-related benefits
resulting from their traditional family roles as child caretakers, they are told that such
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Thus, by employing women at low wages, employers benefit from
exploiting the prevalent gender ideology that home and family define
women's primary identity, that family-related concerns are separate
from work-related concerns, and that women's waged-labor-market
work is less valuable than men's.228 At the same time, however, em-
ployers sometimes benefit from treating male and female labor as in-
terchangeable. For example, an employer can increase profits by
substituting cheap female labor for more expensive male labor. More-
over, the presence of low-paid, part-time workers (who are dispropor-
tionately women vulnerable to exploitation because they are
attempting to accommodate their paid-labor-market work to their un-
paid homework) depresses the wages and benefits of full-time workers
in related jobs.229
4. Male Workers' Interest in Exploiting Women Workers
The question still remains why male workers and the male-domi-
nated labor movement previously have not pursued a more vigorous
strategy of inclusion. In an argument parallel to the split labor market
theory, "dual systems" socialist feminists have shown how male workers
profit by exploiting the paid and unpaid labor of female workers. In
their view, patriarchy and capitalism, as dual systems, form a partner-
ship to exploit women 30 Dual systems analysis posits that male work-
ers have a material interest in perpetuating a gendered division of
labor because it enforces low wages for women and keeps them de-
pendent on, and subordinate to, men at work and at home. Heidi
Hartmann explains:
Low wages keep women dependent on men because they encourage
women to marry. Married women must perform domestic chores
for their husbands. Men benefit, then, from both higher wages and
the domestic division of labor. This domestic division of labor, in
turn, acts to weaken women's position in the labor market.23'
issues are not the employer's problem, or that they distract from women's focus on waged
work and so legitimate the employer's devaluation of women's productivity. See id. at 162,
168.
228 See Hossfeld, supra note 227, at 167-68.
229 Full-time workers employed in labor market sectors where part-time workers consti-
tute one-third of the workforce receive an average of $1.21 less per hour than identical full-
timers employed inindustries where there are no part-time workers. See TiuLY, supra note
201, at 12. Because employers can substitute part-time workers for ful-time workers in
related jobs, the larger the percentage of part-time workers in an industry, the lower the
wages and benefits paid to the workers in that industry, even those who are employed full-
time. See id.
230 See, e.g., Hartmann, supra note 224. Dual systems theory analyzes patriarchy and
capital as separate systems of oppression and then assesses their dialectical relation to one
another. Hartmann is perhaps the most well-known dual systems socialist-feminist theorist.
See ROSEMARIE TONG, FEMINIST THOUGHT: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 179 (1989).
231 Hartmann, supra note 224, at 147-48.
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In Hartmann's view, patriarchy precedes capitalism, and job segrega-
tion by sex simply extends the traditional sexual division of labor in
the home.232 Thus, patriarchy "shapes the form that modem capital-
ism takes. '233
This gendered division of labor more than merely dominates or
oppresses women solely for gender power; it exploits women. Men
appropriate the value of women's unpaid services in the home, while
they also profit from the higher wages paid in occupations from which
women are excluded by virtue of their unpaid care-taking duties. 234
Thus, if working class women and men intend to mount a unified
class struggle against capitalist exploitation, men must relinquish their
privileged positions in the labor market and forfeit the traditional di-
vision of labor at home.2 35
In an argument parallel to dual labor market theory, the socialist-
feminist "unified systems" theory examines capitalism and patriarchy
at their intersection rather than considering each separately.236 This
theory, promoted most strongly by Iris Young, posits that the
marginalization of women and their function as a secondary labor
force is an essential and fundamental characteristic of capitalism. 237
Capitalism was founded on a gender hierarchy that defined men as
primary and women as secondary.238 This arrangement serves capital
owners' interests: women function as a reserve army of labor, available
to absorb the slack in the economy in either direction as circum-
stances change. 239 Further, capital owners can use sexism to divide
the workforce, thereby undermining class solidarity and suppressing
the wages of higher-paid workers (men).24o
232 See id.
233 Id.
234 Traditional family law principles in mostjurisdictions reinforce male appropriation
of women's unpaid domestic labor, allocating disproportionate control over marital prop-
erty to the wage-earner and clinging to remnants of the common law tide system in the
division of property at divorce. See Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and
the Romance of Economics, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 989, 998 (1995); see alsoJoyce Davis, En-
hanced Earning Capacity/Human Capital: The Reluctance To Call It Property, 17 WOMEN's RTs.
L. REP. 109, 116, 120 (1996) (discussing family law's reluctance to recognize the contribu-
tion made by homemaker spouses to the acquisition of new forms of property by the wage-
earner spouse).
235 See Hartmann, supra note 224, at 168-69.
236 See Ius M. YOUNG, Socialist Feminism and the Limits of Dual Systems Theory, in THROW-
ING LIKE A GIRL AND OTHER ESSAYS IN FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND SocIAL THEORY 21, 32-35
(1990) [hereinafter YOUNG, Socialist Feminism]; Iris Young, Beyond the Unhappy Marriage: A
Critique of the Dual Systems Theory, in WOMEN AND REVOLUTION: A DISCUSSION OF THE UN-
HAPPY MARRIAGE OF MARXISM AND FEMINISM 43,50-56 (Lydia Sargent ed., 1981) [hereinafter
Young, Beyond the Unhappy Marriage].
237 See Young, Beyond the Unhappy Marriage, supra note 236, at 58.
238 See id.
239 See id. at 59-61.
240 See id.
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Unified systems theory goes beyond the dual labor market theory
by observing the ways in which male workers as well as capital owners
benefit from the gendered division of labor.241 Male workers obtain a
particular privilege, or heightened status, in this hierarchical arrange-
ment. Thus, they rationally attempt to retain that privilege.242 For
example, one can understand sexual harassment as a systematic tool
by which male workers replicate the gender hierarchy inside the labor
market, a hierarchy reinforced by the capital owners' marketing of
women's bodies as symbols of sexuality. 243
C. Prospects for Solidarity Across the Gender Divide
1. The Labor Movement's Role in Women's Exploitation
Historically, the labor movement supported the vision of women
as the physical and social reproducers of the next generation of
(male) workers. 244 Through the family wage ideology, the labor
movement proclaimed "the social right of the working class to the
ideal of family and gender roles": female domesticity and male bread-
winning.245 Although this ideology did connect class issues of subsis-
tence and justice to gender by asserting the right of the working class
family to a living wage, it did so by advocating the male workers' privi-
241 See id. at 61.
242 See id.
243 The relationship between these two phenomena-sexual harassment and the mar-
keting of women's sexuality-is evidenced by the widespread use of pornography in hostile
work environment sexual harassment. SeeYouNG, Socialist Feminism, supra note 236, at 29;
see also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1495, 1497 (M.D. Fla.
1991) (finding that a hostile work environment existed in violation of Title VII, relying
partly upon evidence of pictures and posters prevalent in the workplace that demeaned
and sexualized women and their bodies, including: pornography hanging on the walls,
advertising calendars featuring pin-up girls, a dart board depicting a woman's breast with
the nipple serving as the bull's eye, and a picture of a woman's pubic area with a meat
spatula pressed against it). The prevalence of sexual harassment in workplaces where the
employer emphasizes women's sexuality in its marketing strategy, as in Hooter's and
Stroh's beer, further evidences this relationship. See Morrison Torrey, We Get the Message-
Pornography in the Workplace, 22 Sw. U. L. REv. 53, 126-27 n.296 (1992).
244 See Marion Grain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage Labor,
89 MICH. L. REv. 1155, 1162-66 (1990).
245 Martha May, Bread Before Roses: American Workingmen, Labor Unions and the Family
Wage, in WOMEN, WoRK AND PRoTEsT 1, 5 (Ruth Milkman ed., 1985) [hereinafter May,
Bread Before Roses]; see also AuCE KEssLER-HARms, Our To WoRK 153 (1982); Martha May,
The Historical Problem of the Family Wage: The Ford Motor Company and the Five Dollar Day, in
FAMiiujs AND WoRK, supra note 220, at 111, 122 [hereinafter May, Family Wage]. In May's
view, the family wage was a concession which employers made to unionists who sought
higher wages; for Ford Motor Company, the wage was tied to the family structure because
the company believed that the presence of a dependent female domestic worker was a
stabilizing force for the male worker-breadwinner, and thus ultimately profitable for the
company. See id. at 122-25. It produced lower turnover rates and stifled demands for
unionization at a key juncture. See id. at 120-23. It also legitimated low female wages,
providing still another advantage for employers. See id. at 125.
1999] 1593
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
lege to enjoy wives who were not burdened by duties outside the
home and were instead available to fulfill their maternal obligations to
their children.2 46 Although the family wage ideology linked women's
work in the home to capitalist productivity through the wage paid to
the male breadwinner,247 it ultimately reinforced gender distinctions
in work roles and divided the spheres of home and market along gen-
der lines even further, attaching value only to work done in the
market.
2 4 8
The labor movement also embraced the depiction of women as
secondary wage earners. The movement viewed men as breadwinners,
while it viewed women as oriented "primarily toward marriage, home-
making, and the rearing of children."249 Further, the labor move-
ment saw family and job as dichotomous, conflicting with one another
and competing for women's time and commitment.2 50 For women,
family came first.25 1 From this perspective, assumptions arose about
the permanence of work or lack thereof for women; the paid-labor
experience was thought to be "merely an interlude between school
and marriage," so that the union meeting became "a poor competitor
with 'dates' for her free time."252 The movement considered married
women's paid work supplementary to the family income, often re-
served for "extras" or "luxuries," while men's income met basic living
expenses. 253 Ultimately, industrial relations scholars and union or-
ganizers asserted that women were difficult to organize or even unor-
ganizable, docile once organized, and questioned women's
commitment to class struggle.2 54
246 See May, Bread Before Roses, supra note 245, at 8-9.
247 See May, Family Wage, supra note 245, at 124.
248 See id. at 124-25; see also Glazer, supra note 220, at 250.
249 JOEL SEIDMAN ET AL., THE WORKER VIEWS HIS UNION 9 (1958); see also ARONOwrrz,
supra note 151, at 297. Aronowitz notes that the Department of Labor gave women's sup-
posed role as secondary wage earners "the status of a statute" by classifying "married wo-
men as 'secondary wage earners.'" Id. at 208-09.
250 See Crain, supra note 244, at 1178-79.
251 See Myra Marx Ferree, Sacrifice, Satisfaction, and Social Change: Employment and the
Family, in My TROUBLES, supra note 209, at 61, 62. By contrast, "sociologists ... see the
relationship, for men, between family and job as one of mutual support and complemen-
tarity." Id. at 62. While it is certainly true that employment in the United States is struc-
tured in such a way that it conflicts with women's performance of family care obligations,
this conflict is a byproduct of the structure of full-time employment and the expectations
surrounding it-expectations created around a model of a male head of household with
dependent spouse-homemaker-rather than existing in women's heads or their psyches.
See id. at 63.
252 SEIDMAN Er AL., supra note 249, at 9.
253 See HuNT, supra note 202, at 150-51, 182; Ferree, supra note 251, at 71.
254 As Aronowitz explained:
[W] omen are believed by union leaders to be the group most resistant to
labor organization. Their alleged temporary tenure on theirjobs, the wide-
spread beliefs that they are "secondary" wage earners who enter the labor
market for extra money and can leave it at any time, that they tend to be
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From the unions' perspective, women were "a serious competitive
menace," affecting men's livelihood and job security as well as their
very masculinity (a large part of men's gender role depended on
breadwinning).255 Where women assumed historically male work
roles associated with heavy industrial work, they particularly imperiled
masculinity.2 56 In these jobs, women threatened both male gender
identity and male social and economic dominance.257 Class-conscious
unionists responded to the competitive menace that women posed in
three stages. First, they supported protective legislation limiting the
more dependent upon and loyal to the company than men, and that inter-
necine warfare constantly rages among them are some of the notions that
make male-dominated unions reluctant to recruit women.
ARONowrrZ, supra note 151, at 297. Vanneman and Cannon assert that
[t]he traditional stereotype has questioned women's commitment to class
struggle; it has regarded their employment as a source of "pin money" and
concluded that their grievances are either borne patiently (because tempo-
rary) or avoided by withdrawal. Women have long been reputed to be poor
candidates for union organization and, once organized, to have dubious
staying power during strikes.
VANNEMAN & CANNON, supra note 205, at 181. See generally Crain, supra note 244, at 1171-84
(detailing and deconstructing stereotypes about women's "unorganizability").
Nevertheless, many scholars have documented the fierce solidarity and class con-
sciousness-albeit often displayed in a different form than that typical of male unionists-
of which women workers are capable. See, e.g., DILL, supra note 204, at 90-96 (cataloguing
'stories of resistance" of black female domestic workers who set limits through chicanery,
pilfering, and detachment from the job, and resisted ever more invasive employer de-
mands in an effort to maintain self-respect); KAREN BRODRIN SACKS, CARING BY THE HOUR:
WOMEN, WORK, AND ORGANIZING AT DUKE MEDICAL CENTER (1988) (describing sustained
organizing drive in which the predominantly black female workforce mobilized internal
structures of women's work groups and community and family networks); Rum SIDEL,
WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAST: THE PLIGHT OF POOR WOMEN IN AFFLUENT AMERICA 62-66
(1986) (describing experience of Local 34 of the Federation of University Employees, an
affiliate of the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International at Yale University,
which successfully organized and bargained on behalf of a large and diverse unit of clerical
and technical workers, 82% of whom were women); Cynthia B. Costello, Women Workers and
Collective Action: A Case Study from the Insurance Industy, in WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF
EMPOWERMENT 116 (Ann Bookman & Sandra Morgen eds., 1988) (describing the capacity
of clerical workers in a small Wisconsin insurance firm to respond to authoritarian man-
agement policies with militant collective action); Hossfeld, supra note 227, at 171-73
(describing how women workers in the Silicon Valley deliberately used management's gen-
der logic against it, playing on white male managers' cultural misconceptions about gender
by exploiting their stereotypical ideas about hormonal shifts, arm strength, and the impor-
tance of manicures to women); Louise Lamphere, On the Shop Foor. Multi-Ethnic Unity
Against the Conglomerate, in My TROUBLES, supra note 209, at 247 (describing daily resistance
strategies employed by female piece-rate garment workers); Nina Shapiro-Perl, Resistance
Strategies: The Routine Struggle for Bread and Roses, in My TROUBLES, supra note 209, at 193
(describing nontraditional shop floor resistance strategies utilized by female costume jew-
elry workers, and arguing that they reflect a silent, militant struggle by workers for control
over the production process).
255 SIDNEY M. PECK, THE RANK-AND-FILE LEADER 181, 185-91- (1963).
256 See id. at 181.
257 See id, at 182; see also Crain, supra note 42, at 19-20 (describing how sexual harass-
ment is in part a response to the threat that women entering historically male occupations
pose to male gender identity and to male social dominance).
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work that women could do.2 58 Later, they used their superior organi-
zational power through unionism to maintain and perpetuate sex-seg-
regated job structures.25 9 Finally, they advocated equal pay for women
in an effort to prevent employers from using female labor to undercut
the male wage structure.2 60
Organized labor's approach to the economic exploitation of
black women offered even less hope that labor unionism would signifi-
cantly improve their lives.261 Samuel Gompers advocated the return
of women to the home and the exclusion of blacks from unions, or at
least from the most economically rewarding positions in the crafts. 262
Thus, organized labor denied black males a family wage (adequate to
support their families), doubly disadvantaging black women.263 Even
when unions began organizing black male and female workers, they
continued to reproduce white supremacy and male privilege within
the workforces that they represented. 264
2. The Gendered Character of Class Consciousness
For decades, women unionists have asked whether society can
transform the unionism culture to accommodate the female work ex-
perience. 265 The masculine culture of unionism arises from the labor
movement's history and construction of class consciousness as well as
from our male-as-worker, male-as-breadwinner understanding of
work.2 6 6 Incubated in bars and taverns, and permeated with language
258 See Bonacich, supra note 163, at 53.
259 See Hartmann, supra note 224, at 168.
260 See PECK, supra note 255, at 204-05, 208; Bonacich, supra note 163, at 53. However,
class-conscious unionism failed to respond to the male workers' gender-dominance con-
cerns; indeed, the issue was never addressed inside the labor movement, as no one saw the
"woman question" as raising issues about the role of gender in employers' exploitation of
workers. See PECK, supra note 255, at 208.
261 See King, supra note 194, at 63.
262 See FONER, supra note 184, at 430-31; King, supra note 194, at 64.
263 See King, supra note 194, at 64.
264 See Williams & Smith, supra note 152, at 71-72 (evaluating occupational segregation
by race and sex and its impact on job grading and wage determination in Local 35, the
service and maintenance union atYale University, and finding that whiteness and maleness
correlate with higher salary grades and wages).
265 See THERESA WOLFSON, THE WOMAN WORKER AND THE TRADE UNIONS 24-25 (1926).
See generally ROCKING THE BOAT: UNION WOMEN'S VOICES, 1915-1975 (Brigid O'Farrell &
Joyce L. Kombluh eds., 1996) (describing union women's struggles to organize and em-
power themselves through the labor movement); ANNELISE ORLuCK, COMMON SENSE & A
LrrLE FIRE: WOMEN AND WORKING CLASS PoLrIcS IN THE UNrrED STATES, 1900-1965 (1995)
(describing the careers of four women union organizers and activists-Rose Schneider-
man, Pauline Newman, Fannia Cohn, and Clara Lemlich Shavelson-who fought for inclu-
sion of women and women's interests in the labor movement).
266 See WOLFSON, supra note 265, at 55 ("The business of making a living, as we under-
stand it, is still fundamentally a man's business. Small wonder, therefore, that the rules of
game are men's rules, and that those rules when applied to women cause friction, to say
the least.").
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such as "brothers" and "brotherhood," male labor did not construct
unionism as either accessible to or comfortable for women.2 67 On ac-
count of the masculine nature of unionism and its preoccupation with
job-based identity, unions visualize workers as unisex and assume that
men and women form their class consciousness in the same way, that
they perceive the significance of workplace issues similarly, and that
they resist managerial control through the same means.268 Conse-
quently, union organizing occurs at the workplace rather than in the
community,269 union organizers disproportionately target industrial
workers rather than service-sector workers, and unions mobilize work-
ers primarily around job-based issues like wages, hours, and overtime
pay rather than around family-based or gendered concerns such as
child care benefits, family care leave, sexual harassment, and unequal
pay.2 70
267 See HuTrr, supra note 202, at 160-61; see also ELIZABETH FAuE, COMMUNITY oF SuFFER-
ING & STRUGGLE: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE LABOR MoVmEMr IN MINEAPOLIS, 1915-1945, at 6
(1991). Unfortunately, this masculine culture is not solely a matter of historical signifi-
cance. Last year, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters considered changing its
name to reflect the growing numbers of women in the Teamsters' ranks. The name-
change proposal was voted down two-to-one, with one union member explaining that "em-
ployers would think we're a bunch of [wimps]." Paulette Thomas, A Special News Report
About Life on the Job and Trends Taking Shape Therm WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 1996, at Al (altera-
tion in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Frank Swoboda, Teamsters Vote:
It Ain't Heavy, It's Their Brotherhood, WASH. PosT, July 18, 1996, at D10. But seelLWUConven-
tion Votes Name Change, 1997 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 87, atA-9 (Apr. 6, 1997) (reporting
that the International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union has adopted a gender-
neutral name, the International Longshore & Warehouse Union, in recognition of its sig-
nificant female membership).
268 See HUNT, supra note 202, at 2; Marion Crain, Gender and Union Organizing 47 IN-
DUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 227, 245 (1994).
269 See HUNT, supra note 202, at 159. Several writers have suggested that the assump-
tion that the workplace is the primary site of class conflict is both gendered and raced,
preventing a more radical mobilization strategy which would utilize community-based or-
ganizing and reach out to the unemployed as well as the employed. See FAUE, supra note
267, at 4; LEON FINK, IN SEARCH OF THE WORKING CLASS: EssmAs IN AMERICAN LABOR HISTORY
AND POLIrICAL CULTURE 242-43 (1994); LEGGETT, supra note 195, at 145, 151-52.
270 See HUNT, supra note 202, at 160-62. Just as racism does not shape whites' daily
experience and sense of self, so that whites can look upon racism as an issue faced by
people of color, antiracist work by whites becomes an "optional, extra project, but not one
intimately and organically linked to our own lives." RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHrrE WOMEN,
RACE MATTERS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS 6 (1993). Sexual harassment and
conflicts between work and family responsibilities are not part of men's daily life experi-
ence and thus do not shape their identity, so that men categorize these issues as "women's
issues" that are external to them. See KELLEY, supra note 195, at 27 (noting that union
leaders have failed to see problems of sexual harassment as important collective bargaining
issues, particularly when it is racialized or occurs between workers); Stan Gray, Sharing the
Shop Floor, in RACE, CLASS AND GENDER AN ANTHOLOGY, supra note 142, at 462 (arguing that
.many men pay lip service to women's rights," but do not confront the sexism of their
brothers on the shop floor because they do not see that sexism is harmful to their long-
term interests and ultimately undermines class solidarity).
The gendered nature of issue definition by working class men and women, however, is
sometimes even more subtle. For example, the ways in which male-dominated unions and
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Further, mobilization around class interests has sometimes taken
explicitly gendered forms. All-male work groups frequently bond
around sexual entendre, sports, and horseplay; some researchers have
characterized such gender-conscious bonding as class conscious-
ness.271 Some female unionists have asserted that organizing women
will require either some parallel form of gender-conscious bonding
or, at the very least, an understanding of women's life experience, lan-
guage, and culture.272 Similarly, ample evidence illustrates that
worker resistance to employer exploitation sometimes assumes gen-
der-specific forms.273 Women workers disproportionately employ
resistance strategies that are less overtly confrontational and therefore
women-centered unions have perceived and responded to the introduction of technology
into the workplace differ significantly. Feminist research suggests that the introduction of
new technology into the workplace becomes the vehicle through which both class and
gender struggles rage: historically, technology has been used to deskill and degrade wo-
men's work, to further entrench the sexual division of labor, to cement job segregation,
and tojustify] low wages for women. See Helen Marchant, Women and Technology, Soc. DEv.
IssuES, Winter 1987, at 54, 62, 67. For workers on the bottom of the occupational hierar-
chy, high-tech culture carries with it the risk of ever more extreme marginalization. See
DONNA J. HARAWAY, SIMrANs, CyBoRGs, AND WOMEN: THE REmN ION OF NATURE 169
(1991).
Thus, while most male-dominated American unions have presented little opposition
to management's use of technology to deskill, ceding the right to control the work process
to management as long as the fruits of enhanced productivity are shared with the remain-
ing workers through higher wages or other economic benefits, unions with a significant
complement of women members have not been as complacent. Some have made challeng-
ing the technological restructuring of work a central part of their struggle. Compare Robert
Howard, High Tech Control of Workers, in THE RESHAPING OF AMERICA: SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
OF THE CHANGING ECONOMY 109, 119-20 (D. Stanley Eitzen & Maxine Baca Zinn eds., 1989)
(describing historical passivity of American unions), with HARAWAY, supra, at 172 (noting
SEIU District 925's emphasis on technical restructuring of work), and Howard, supra at
120-21 (describing shift toward attempting to gain more control for workers manifested in
CWA policy).
271 See RICK FANTASIA, CULTURES OF SOLIDARIY. CONSCIOUSNESS, ACTION, AND CONTEM-
PORARY AMERICAN WoRRs 79-80 (1988); Michael Yarrow, The Gender-Specific Class Con-
sciousness of Appalachian Coal Miners: Structure and Change, in BRINGING CLASS BACK IN:
CoNmEMPoRARYAND HISTORICAL PERSPECrVES, supra note 188, at 285, 304-06 (documenting
the gendered nature of class consciousness in Appalachian coal miners, and finding that
"[m]iners' gender consciousness reinforces their class consciousness by stiffening their
class militance with masculine toughness and cementing their solidarity with male bond-
ing" and spawning a sense of indignation at the unmanly subordination they experience at
work); cf Gray, supra note 270, at 470-71 (describing how male bonding around masculine
workplace cultures functions as a form of rebellion against the perceived civilizing disci-
pline imposed by women in the family sphere, and operates to exclude women workers
and undermine class unity); Yarrow, supra at 303-04 (noting that male bonding can be an
obstacle to class solidarity when it occurs across managerial lines, resulting in a "shared
hostility of foreman and male miners to the introduction of women into the mines," and
describing how this hostility takes the form of intraclass sexual harassment aimed at wo-
men who seek to enter the mines, or when the masculine character with which hard, dan-
gerous work is endowed obscures the reality of class exploitation).
272 See WOLFSON, supra note 265, at 130, 133-34; Cramin, supra note 268, at 245-46.
273 See Hossfeld, supra note 227, at 170-71; see also supra note 254 and accompanying
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less risky for vulnerable workers than work stoppages and filing griev-
ances.2 74 For example, work sabotage, pacing, slowdowns, and pilfer-
age abound among the most vulnerable workers, yet they are rarely
recognized as evidence of class militance. 75
Thus, in order to be truly effective in organizing and represent-
ing women, the labor movement cannot simply pull women into the
fold; unionism must undergo a fundamental transformation to be rel-
evant to the many women clustered in the service sector. The labor
movement must rethink at least the following class and gender issues:
(1) the ways in which service sector employment differs from indus-
trial sector work (including the interjection of the customer or patient
into the employer-worker dyad, the personal and collaborative rela-
tionships that characterize service sector employer-employee interac-
tions, and the semi-autonomous nature of some service sector jobs);
(2) the growth of contingent employment (including part-time, tem-
porary, leased, and off-site workers); (3) the shift of worksites to "vir-
tual offices" and, increasingly, to the home; and (4) the breakdown of
the historical separation between home and work in workers' lives that
occurs when a full-time caretaker-homemaker spouse does not exist to
support the wage-earner spouse.2 76
Many feminists believe that class struggle will liberate women only
if women form separate organizations and unite with men from a sep-
arate base of power because "[m]en have more to lose than their
chains" in an alliance with women workers. 277 Otherwise, men's im-
mediate self-interest in exploiting women may predispose them to the
status quo or some less egalitarian economic system than the one wo-
men demand s278
274 See Hossfeld, supra note 227, at 170-71.
275 See id.
276 See Dorothy Sue Cobble, The Prospects for Unionism in a Service Society, in WORKING IN
THE SERVICE SOCIETY, supra note 132, at 333, 336-40; see also Susan C. Eaton, "The Customerls
Always Interesting". Unionized Harvard Clericals Renegotiate Work Relationships, in WORKING IN
THE SERVICE SocIETY, supra note 132, at 291, 320-21 (explaining that, although control over
work has been a primary issue for industrial sector employees, it is "too simplistic a cate-
gory of analysis in the clerical context," because "the product of much [clerical] work is a,
relational interaction, not a commodity").
277 Heidi Hartmann, The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards A More
Progressive Union, in WOMEN AND REVOLUTION: A DISCUSSION OF THE UNHAPPY MARRIAGE OF
MARXISM AND FEMINISM, supra note 236, at 1, 32-33.
278 See id. Scholars have made parallel arguments with regard to aspects of racial and
heterosexual privilege. See, e.g., Gloria Joseph, The Incompatible Menage A Trois: Marxism,
Feminism, and Racism, in WOMEN AND REVOLUTION: A DISCUSSION OF THE UNHAPPY MARRIAGE
OF MARXISM AND FEMINISM, supra note 236, at 91; Christine Riddiough, Socialism, Feminism
and Gay/Lesbian Liberation, in WOMEN AND REVOLurrION: A DISCUSSION OF THE UNHAPPY MAR-
RIAGE OF MARXISM AND FEMINISM, supra note 236, at 71. Just as women cannot trust men to
give up their gender privilege, black women cannot trust white women to give up racial
privilege, nor can lesbian and gay workers trust heterosexuals to examine heterosexual
privilege. SeeJoseph, supra, at 104-05; Riddiough, supra, at 73-34. These analyses also sug-
1999] 1599
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
We agree that only separately organized women's unions will en-
sure that women's exploitation within capitalism becomes a central
aspect of the struggle against capitalism.2 79 The alternative-allowing
the labor movement to marginalize women's interests by channeling
women's issues into the feminist movement-hurts both women and
unions. While internal reform of labor unions in more liberatory di-
rections280 is a positive step, it does not go far enough toward overrid-
ing the compelling forces militating towards maintaining the status
9 uo.
2 8 1
gest that separate bases of organization may be necessary in order for each group to be
heard. SeeJoseph, supra, at 105.
For example, the fact that lesbians as a group are permanently denied access to shar-
ing in a male wage and benefits associated therewith through marriage makes their class
position different from that of gay men or heterosexual women. See Petchesky, supra note
196, at 229. Low female wages also reinforce compulsory heterosexuality because hetero-
sexual marriage becomes a matter of economic necessity for women who cannot subsist ori
their own incomes, or even the combined incomes of two women. Thus, lesbian women
have a stronger stake in class struggle than heterosexual women do; raising women's wages
and making it possible for women to exist economically outside heterosexual marriage has
obvious liberatory implications for those wishing to form life partnerships with other wo-
men as an alternative to heterosexual marriage. See Lisa Duggan, The Social Enforcement of
Heterosexuality and Lesbian Resistance in the 1920s, in CLAss, RAcE, AND SEx: THE DYNAMICS OF
CONTROL, supra note 196, at 75, 76-77.
279 Possible directions include adding women's departments, promoting women to po-
sitions of power within unions, beginning a dialogue about difference, and hiring more
female and union organizers.
280 See YOUNG, Socialist Feminism, supra note 236, at 30-31; Young, Beyond the Unhappy
Marriage, supra note 236, at 62-63.
281 Although we are sympathetic to the views and proposals, that Molly McUsic and
Michael Selmi express in their essay Postmodern Unions: Identity Politics in the Workplace, see
supra note 2, we do not share their optimism about the willingness of the labor movement
to transform itself from within when it is hobbled by legal doctrines which reflect and
reinforce the principle of majority rule at every turn. McUsic and Selmi propose a cosmo-
politan renaissance-a celebration of difference within a community committed to solidar-
ity-within unions as a means of charting a course between the twin dilemmas of
fragmentation and erasure. See McUsic & Selmi, supra note 2, at 1341. They outline some
general internal union reforms and observe that empathy and an open dialogue about
difference are key to such a course. See id. at 1366, 1371-72. While we agree with these
sentiments and proposals, and have at times been advocates of them ourselves, see, e.g.,
Crain, Feminism, Labor, and Power, supra note 6, at 1868-69, we no longer view them as
sufficient. In our view, the argument itself demonstrates the barriers posed by majority
rule. For example, McUsic and Selmi suggest that unions "eschew a majoritarian perspec-
tive" and "reconsider majority rule as the principal decisionmaking technique within the
union," casting aside the goal of finding a position that can obtain majority support in
favor of an open dialogue about one which might serve the interests of all. McUsic &
Selmi, supra note 2, at 1369, 1371. While this goal is laudable and is one which we support
wholeheartediy, it seems to us to be asking too much of unions to initiate this course in the
context of a labor law which imposes upon them a legal duty to advocate on behalf of the
majority.
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V
THE RISKS OF A UNITED FRONT STRATEGY IN A CONTEXT OF
INTRACLASs EXPLOITATION
Thus far we have argued that the unidimensional vision of the
race- and sex-privileged worker promoted by unionism and labor law
has circumscribed which workers are organized, the sites where the
organizing occurs, the subjects around which organizing is done, and
the form that worker protest assumes.28 2 In short, privilege has con-
fined the agenda of the labor movement. In the context of a labor law
regime imposing a legally coerced united front, the existence and sup-
pression of intraclass conflict have also undermined labor's ability to
respond effectively to employers' divide-and-conquer strategies. La-
bor's inability to respond to these strategies makes it easier for em-
ployers to divide the workforce and creates a representation gap for
the most marginalized workers.
In this section, we argue that although common class interests
and the presence of a common enemy can unite workers, an effective
mobilization strategy must also recognize the potentially divisive na-
ture of gender and race. Although the united front ideology and the
vision of a working class unified by its common interest have intuitive
appeal as ideals, they cannot serve as methods to achieve those ideals
when exploitative intraclass relations also exist. In order to overcome
the divisions among workers, the labor movement and labor law must
first take affirmative steps to become conscious of them. Refusing to
acknowledge divisions along race and gender lines only entrenches
them, maintains the status quo, and reinforces privilege.28 3 Among
other things, this means that, rather than pretending unity, the labor
movement must recognize and confront the barriers that racial, gen-
der, heterosexual, and class privilege pose to solidarity. It must ac-
knowledge differences in interest where they exist and develop
strategies in which control is shared.28 4 We begin by returning to our
starting point: EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc.
282 See supra Part W.B.
283 See LoPEz, supra note 135, at 176-77, 179 (discussing the same problem in the con-
text of the debate between color-blindness and race-consciousness). A focus on sameness
and refusal to acknowledge the material significance of differences reinforces racism and
sexism, while race- and gender-consciousness oppose it. See FRAt.q ENBERr, supra note 270,
at 157, 162 (finding that white women who focused on sameness tended to deny the signifi-
cance of color and to strive not to notice it, while race-cognizant women demonstrated a
"new sense of self: a sharpened awareness of how racism had structured their own lives and
of the extent to which their own thinking had been, and continued to be, informed by
racism").
284 See Kline, supra note 125, at 53; see also Ln'srrz, supra note 142, at 56 (arguing that
unification across ethnic and racial divides can only be achieved if "we examine honestly
and critically the things that divide us in the present").
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A. EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc.
Did the men at Mitsubishi simply dominate their female co-work-
ers, so that the union might have represented both adequately? Or
did a relationship of exploitation exist that placed the union in an
inherently conflicted position as the representative of both groups?
Would a separate representative have better served the women?
Would it have better served the men?
1. Why Did the Harassment Occur?
Sociologists have explained that hostile work environment harass-
ers have two goals: first, they seek to maintain the individual male
worker's privileged position vis-A-vis the victim and the larger social
structure of male dominance; second, they attempt to preserve a male
monopoly over high-wage jobs.28 5 Male workers employed in tradi-
tionally male occupations tend to perpetrate the most severe harass-
ment against their female peers.286 Since the gender and class
identities of men are intertwined in masculinized jobs, the entry of
female workers into these occupations threatens male workers' gen-
der and class interests.28 7 Hostile work environment sexual harassers
seeking to preserve high-wage jobs as male turf engage in planned,
self-aware behavior designed to remind women of their "female fragil-
ity"2 88 and their status as trespassers, and to warn them that they ven-
ture into male territory at their own risk.2 89
The dynamics at Mitsubishi illustrate the turf-guarding function
of worker-on-worker sexual harassment. Analysts speculated that the
coworker harassment was a reaction by men to the unusually high
285 See MARTHAJ. LANGELAN, BACK OFF!: How To CONFRONT AND STOP SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT AND HARASSERS 41-42, 45-50 (1993). See generally Crain, supra note 42, at 18-22 (dis-
cussing research documenting motives of harassers). See also Vicki Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE LJ. 1683, 1690-91 (1998) (arguing that sexual
harassment is primarily motivated by gender-based considerations rather than sexual ones,
driven not by the desire for sexual domination, but by a desire to preserve favored lines of
work-and the wage superiority, sense of identity and manhood, and other privileges asso-
ciated therewith-as masculine territory).
286 See Crain, supra note 42, at 27.
287 See Edward Lafontaine & Leslie Tredeau, The Frequency, Sources, and Correlates of Sex-
ual Harassment Among Women in Traditional Male Occupations, 15 SEX ROLES 433, 439 (1986)
(finding that male peers who lack an institutional basis for their authority over women in
the workplace may utilize sexual harassment as one of the few avenues available to assert
power over women there); The People, Socialism Would Reduce Sexual Harassmen4 in SEXUAL
HARASsMENT 106, 107 (Carol Wekesser et al. eds., 1992) (citing a study finding that most
incidents of sexual harassment stem from efforts by male workers to retain their labor
market advantage by harassing women who attempted to enter traditionally male jobs).
288 Suzanne C. Carothers & Peggy Crull, Contrasting Sexual Harassment in Female- and
Male-Dominated Occupations, in My TROUBLES, supra note 209, at 219, 224.
289 See LANGELAN, supra note 285, at 47-48; Michael S. Kimmel, Clarence, William, Iron
Mike, Tailhook, Senator Packwood, Spur Posse, Magic .... and Us, in TRANSFORMING A RAPE
CULTURE 119, 131 (Emilie Buchwald et al. eds., 1993).
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number of women (twenty percent of the workers at the Normal, Illi-
nois plant were women) who were hired into the desirable high-waged
jobs (salaries were as high as $50,000 per year) in this relatively new
plant.2 90 Workers who served on the hamstrung UAW civil rights com-
mittee confirmed that Local 2488 union officials responded to harass-
ment complaints with the quip "'Hey, McDonald's is always
hiring.' 29'
The male unionists at Mitsubishi who perceived female entry into
their traditionally male-dominated occupations as a threat to the job
market for men and to their traditional role as breadwinners thus pos-
sessed an inherent conflict of interest with women who were in the
same bargaining unit and who were represented by the same
union.292 Although Mitsubishi exploited this division between men
and women by organizing the anti-EEOC protests in an effort to un-
dermine union solidarity, the male workers had an independent eco-
nomic interest in maintaining their gender-privileged status as high-
wage earners. Thus, while the sexual harassment at Mitsubishi super-
ficially appears to have been about sex and maintaining a gender hier-
archy, it was also about class and maintaining an economic hierarchy.
2. Why Didn't the Union Represent the Women's Interests?
The UAW explained its passive response to the women
autoworkers' claims by declaring that its primary duty was to protect
the jobs of its members and that preserving job security took prece-
dence over pursuing sexual harassment complaints; sexual harass-
ment was the employer's problem.293 This explanation placed the
union in a reactive position and created two different problems for it.
First, the union's position misunderstood and underestimated the na-
ture of sexual harassment and the harm it caused to its victims. 294 Un-
redressed hostile work environment sexual harassment poses a serious
risk of loss of employment for its victims, 295 making the women's com-
290 See Fetherston, supra note 34; MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour, supra note 9.
291 Sharpe, supra note 21, at Al (quoting Sandra Gilbert, former head of the union's
civil rights committee).
292 See Barbara Shaman, Outside Machinist, in ALONE IN A CROWD: WOMEN IN THE
TRADES TELL THEIR SToIuEs 164, 170 (Jean R. Schroedel ed., 1985). Even the union's
informal efforts to persuade harassers to stop harassing reflected gendered assumptions
about the breadwinner role: the local's president said that he told one harasser, "[If you
don't stop, y]our family is going to lose its job." Sharpe, supra note 21, at Al.
293 See Sharpe, supra note 21, at Al. Again, this response by the union is quite typical
of the way in which the majority of unions view their obligations to members in this situa-
tion. See Crain, supra note 42, at 34-35.
294 SeeJames E. Gruber& Lars Bjorn, Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment: An Analy-
sis of Socioculturai Organizationa and Personal Resource Models, 67 Soc. Sci. Q. 814, 817
(1986).
295 See Grain, supra note 42, at 28-29.
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plaints a matter ofjob security.29 6 Sexual harassment in the workplace
causes a loss of motivation, lowered job satisfaction, negative attitudes
toward coworkers and supervisors, high absenteeism and turnover,
and a lowered sense of confidence. 297 Work performance suffers, and
psychological and physical effects of emotional distress relating to the
harassment may cause victims to incur expenses associated with treat-
ment and lost work time. 29 8 Ultimately, the majority of victims quit
theirjobs or seek a transfer to avoid the harassment.299 Alternatively,
the employer fires or demotes them for poor performance or
absenteeism.300
Second, the UAW's reactive approach in this case ultimately un-
dermined its efficacy in representing its male workers' job security as
well as its female workers' job security.301 Rather than attempting to
intervene and stop the harassment before it escalated, the UAW's pas-
sive stance on harassment ultimately exposed the harassers to disci-
pline and discharge. 30 2 Further, the UAW's passivity led directly to
the female workers' appeal to external sources for assistance, like pri-
vate lawyers and the EEOC, which in turn created opportunities for
Mitsubishi to exacerbate the divisions in the workforce along gender
lines and to undermine the union's solidarity.303
Some unionists have acknowledged an active role for unions in
redressing and preventing sexual harassment. Deborah Greenfield,
associate general counsel for the AFL-CIO, recently observed that ad-
dressing member-on-member sexual harassment warrants union in-
volvement because sexual harassment is an affront to dignity on the
job, which "goes to the core of unionism. '30 4 Nevertheless, Greenfield
insists that the employer bears the primary responsibility for redress
and prevention of sexual harassment in the workplace; the grievance
and arbitration mechanism should not be a substitute for an employer
policy addressing sexual harassment.30 5 Greenfield reasons that the
grievance and arbitration machinery in a labor contract is intended
for use in vindicating employees' collective rights against the em-
ployer, while sexual harassment entails the resolution of individual
claims against individual harassers.30 6 This description of sexual har-
296 See id.
297 See id. at 22-23, 28-29.
298 See id. at 28-29.
299 See id.
300 See id. at 22-23, 28-29.
301 See Sharpe, supra note 21.
302 See id.
303 See id.
304 Advice on Prevention, Investigations Offered by Advocates at ABA Session, 1999 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 61, at C-2 (Mar. 31, 1999).
305 See id. at C-2 & C-3.
306 See id.
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assment misconstrues hostile work environment sexual harassment by
overlooking its gender and class dynamics for female workers: exclud-
ing sexual harassment claims from the grievance and arbitration pro-
cess implicitly privileges the gender and class interests of male workers
over the gender and class interests of women workers.
The problem is not simply that sexism persists within unions.30 7
Nor can the union's dilemma be captured by characterizing it as a
choice between privileging men's gender interests over women's in a
class context.308 The union's difficulties in representing both men
and women-particularly in the context of a traditionally male-domi-
nated workplace where the occupation itself has become masculin-
ized-stem from the union's gendered understanding of class, class
consciousness, and the forms that class exploitation assumes.30 9 The
union-and ultimately, the labor law-does not see the women's com-
plaints of sexual harassment as raising class issues at all. Rather, it sees
only gender issues that are not the union's (or labor law's) concern.
This case and others like it310 demonstrate that the cleavages in
the working class along gender lines exist prior to any employer ef-
forts to exacerbate them, and that if unions do not deal with them in
an effective way, employers, the courts in individual employee or class
action lawsuits, the EEOC and private lawyers, and nonlabor social
movement groups will usurp the unions' role.31' Indeed, in Mitsub-
ishi, the women's de facto unions became the EEOC and a Chicago-
based advocacy group known as "women employed. '3 12
B. Another Example: Harris v. Civil Service Commission
Haris v. Civil Service Commission313 provides another recent exam-
ple of a union caught on the horns of the dilemma posed by represen-
tation of two groups of workers whose interests divide along identity
lines. In that case, Madeline Harris applied for the position of transit
manager with the San Francisco Municipal Railway.3 14 Like other ap-
plicants, she took an employment examination which the Civil Service
307 See Brigid O'Farrell & Suzanne Moore, Unions, Hard Hats, and Women Workers, in
WOMEN AND UNIONS: FORGING A PARTNERSHIP 69 (Dorothy Sue Cobble ed., 1993).
308 See supra text accompanying notes 265-70.
309 See id.
310 See, e.g., EEOC Affirms Sexual Harassment Charges by Women at Ford Facilities in Chicago,
1999 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at A-8 (Jan. 7, 1999) (reporting that the EEOC has
issued a determination finding merit in charges of racial and sexual harassment made by
women employed at two Ford Motor Co. plants in Chicago).
311 See supra notes 42-43, 45 and accompanying text.
312 See Report Points to Progress at Mitsubishi, but Foul Language and Harassment Persis4
1999 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at A-12, A-13 (Jan. 26, 1999).
313 65 Cal. App. 4th 1356 (1998).
314 See id. at 1361.
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Commission created as part of the application process.3 15 Her score
on the examination placed her at the top of the applicant pool.3 16 In
the interim, however, the commission canceled the test and invali-
dated the eligibility lists which the test results had produced because
of the test's disparate impact on black applicants.3 17 The decision to
cancel the tests and the associated eligibility lists directly resulted from
union pressure on the commission.318
Harris argued that the commission had abused its discretion by
failing to attempt to validate the tests as sufficiently job-related, effec-
tively penalizing another protected group, white women.3 19 Cancel-
ing the tests thus adversely affected women and violated the provisions
of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act.3 20 The Califor-
nia Court of Appeals denied her claim, however, ruling that the city
commission's decision could be examined only for an administrative
abuse of discretion, which was not present under the
circumstances.3 21
In this case, the union privileged the interests of black applicants
over those of white women, leaving white women as a group without
an advocate before the commission when it determined the test's va-
lidity.3 22 The union in this case, clearly in an impossible position, was
forced to choose between the interests of its workers by assigning a
priority to race- or gender-identity concerns. The union's decision
disadvantaged white women workers by depriving them of a represen-
tative who could have argued their position before the commission in
a timely fashion, and who might have affected the commission's deci-
sion-making process.3 23 The lack of a representative forced Harris to
go outside the union to find an advocate to make her claim as an
individual.3 24 She presumably funded that representation herself,
rather than receiving the benefit of a representative funded out of
union dues, which effectively would have spread the costs across the
entire organized workforce. Moreover, the single-representative sys-
tem deprived all workers of the opportunity to fully debate the test's
efficacy and impact upon various groups of workers. A multiple-repre-
sentative system might have reached a better substantive result, or at
315 See id.
316 See id.
317 See i&
318 See Divided Court Rejects White Woman's Claim over Cancellation of Biased Employment
Test, 1998 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 154, at A-6 to A-7 (Aug. 11, 1998) [hereinafter Di-
vided Court].
319 See Harris, 65 Cal. App. 4th at 1361.
320 See id.
321 See Divided Court, supra note 318, at A-6, A-7.
322 See Harris, 65 Cal. App. 4th at 1361.
323 See id.
324 See id,
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least afforded the commission other alternatives that might have
reached a compromise between the competing interests. Ultimately,
the coerced united front scenario functioned to further entrench pre-
existing identity divisions within the workforce.
C. The United Front Ideology As a Form of Essentialism
The united front ideology in labor unionism effectively parallels
the problem of essentialism identified in feminist theory. Essentialism
in feminism refers to the assumption that a universal woman's experi-
ence of oppression exists that is stable across political and personal
contexts.3 25 Race- and class-privileged feminist theorists have failed to
recognize fully the differences that exist between and among women,
and have not incorporated into their theory the implications of wo-
men's different experiences of oppression, both out of strategic con-
cerns about fragmentation and because of the strong lure of simplicity
in clearly defined categories.3 26 Similarly, the united front ideology in
unionism assumes that a single, universal experience of class oppres-
sion common to all workers exists regardless of gender, race, or other
relevant aspects of identity.3 27 Labor unionists have resisted acknowl-
edging differences among workers, fearing fragmentation of the labor
movement,3 28 and labor law has supported this strategy.3 29
Some unionists and progressive intellectuals have gone further,
blaming identity politics for the demise of the labor movement and
suggesting that internecine battles and divisions within the Left are
the fault of feminism, the civil rights movement, or the gay and les-
bian movement.330 These critics of identity politics have succumbed
to essentialism, assuming a universal experience of class in the face of
325 See Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools To Dismantle the Master's
House 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 16, 19 (1995). See generally ELIzABETH V. SPELMAN, INES-
SENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINISr THOUGHT 75 (1988).
326 See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv.
581, 586 (1990); Marlee Kline, Race, Racism, and Feminist Legal Theory, 12 HAxv. WOMEN'S
L.J. 115, 116-18 (1989). This has been an especially intractable problem in feminist legal
theory because the law encourages and reinforces simple, unitary categories. See Harris,
supra, at 585; Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: GettingIt and LosingI1 38J. LEGAL EDUC. 47,
47-48 (1988). For example, white feminists who dominate contemporary feminist thought
may assume and work from a "woman's standpoint" based upon assumptions about a com-
mon experience of oppression that is in fact limited to the forms of oppression exper-
ienced by white women. See Kline, supra note 125 (critiquing the work of feminist
standpoint theorist Nancy Hartsock); Mahoney, supra note 125 (critiquing the theory of
feminist Catharine MacKinnon because of its focus on privileged white women in analyzing
the "shared sexual exploitation" of all women).
327 See supra notes 195, 265-75 and accompanying text.
328 See id.; see also supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
329 See supra notes 59-69, 81-93 and accompanying text.
330 See Michael Eric Dyson, The Labor of Whiteness, the Whiteness of Labor, and the Perils of
Whitewashing, in AUDACIOUS DEMOCRACY. LABOR, INTELLECTUALS, AND THE SOCIAL RECON-
STRUCON OF AMERICA 164-68 (Steven Fraser &Joshua B. Freeman eds., 1997); Todd Git-
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overwhelming evidence that class exploitation is gendered and
raced.3 31 Their race- and gender-privileged status affords them the
luxury of ignoring the fact that a white, male identity politics has dom-
inated the labor movement for decades.33 2 Proposals for labor move-
ment reform predicated on such essentialist assumptions minimize
the valid concerns of historically marginalized groups, and risk re-en-
acting past errors and entrenching lingering barriers to inclusion.333
Moreover, maintaining the fiction of uniformity about the experi-
ence of class exploitation risks undermining the labor movement's
strength. These risks include exclusion of a rapidly expanding seg-
ment of the workforce (white women, people of color, and immigrant
workers), internal fragmentation of the movement, and an impover-
ished understanding of the gender and racial mechanics of class ex-
ploitation.334 Feminist Marlee Kline might have been speaking to
labor unionists when she wrote:
[While] fully confronting the differences that exist among women
may appear to fragment and weaken the solidarity and strength of
feminists[,] ... I believe we have little choice but to follow the path
of recognizing difference.... While we should work toward build-
ing solidarity, we cannot pretend union when it does not exist.
Rather, we must acknowledge we are divided and develop strategies
to overcome our fears and prejudices. .... 335
1. How the Labor Movement Loses Under the United Front
Race and sex divisions within the working class negatively impact
union organizing efforts and contract negotiations in the United
States.336 Recent empirical studies of union win rates establish that
lin, Beyond Identity Politics: A Modest Precedent in AUDACIOUS DEMOCRACY. LABOR,
INTELLECTUALS, AND THE SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA, supra at 152, 156.
331 See supra notes 195, 265-75.
332 See Dyson, supra note 330, at 170.
333 See id. at 171; Patricia Lippold & Bob Kirkman, Blocking Bridges: Class-Based Politics
and the Labor Movement, in A NEw LABOR MOVEMENT FOR THE NEw CENTURY 219, 223, 227
(Gregory Mantsios ed., 1998) (advocating a focus on class-based issues common to all work-
ing people, such as the "America Needs a Raise" campaign); cf. Mae M. Ngai, Who Is an
American Worker?: Asian Immigrants, Race, and the National Boundaries of Class, in AUDACIOUS
DEMOCRACY- LABOR, INTELLECTUALS, AND THE SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA, supra
note 330, at 173-77 (detailing the racist. origins of the labor movement's "look for the
union label" slogan, observing that appeals to solidarity are relative, and suggesting that we
ask "solidarity among whom-and against whom?").
334 See supra notes 79, 81-96, 338-45 and accompanying text.
335 Kline, supra note 326, at 146-47.
336 See, e.g., SEIU Names Northern California Official To Oversee Troubled Los Angeles Local,
1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 180, at A-15 (Sept. 18, 1995) (describing racial conflict in
SEIU Local 399 (whose building-service division led the highly successful "Justice forJani-
tors" organizing campaign), which disrupted first contract negotiations and enabled em-
ployers to exploit the divisions to delay negotiations, ultimately necessitating the creation
of a trusteeship by the international); Susan Carey, Contract Negotiations Divided United's
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unions are more likely to win elections when the work unit is homoge-
neous by race and by sex.3 3 7
Worse, the refusal to recognize divisions within the working class
has eclipsed insights into the larger picture of capitalist exploitation
of allworkers. One cannot predict the future global expansion of cap-
italism without understanding the interactive dynamics of race, sex,
and class in exploitative relations between employers and workers,
and among groups of workers. The patterns of capitalist expansion
and the strategies of exploitation which employers utilize reveal that
race and gender occupy a central role in the restructuring of capitalist
relations: labor is becoming ethnicized and feminized, both in the
United States and worldwide.338
Workers, WALL ST.J., Aug. 28, 1996, at BI (discussing split between United Airlines's flight
attendants and the rest of United's workforce over perceived threat to flight attendants'
job security posed by United's plan to hire lower-paid foreign flight attendants to staff its
international flights and unions' failure to challenge this in buyout negotiations); Stanley
Ziemba, Uniting United First Task for Worker-Owners, CHI. TRIB., July 13, 1994, § 1, at 1
(describing division between United Airlines's predominantly male pilots and machinists,
and its predominantly female flight attendants over the relative burdens imposed by pay
and benefit cuts required to finance the employee buyout imposed).
337 A study by the AFL-CIO Department of Organization and Field Services covering
189 elections in units of over 50 workers between July 1986 and April 1987 found that
where women made up more than 75% of the unit, the union's win rate was 57%, as
compared to a 33% success rate when women made up less than half of the workforce.
AFL-CIO DEP'T OF ORG. & FIELD SERvs., AFL-CIO ORGANIZING SURVEY. 1986-87 NLRB ELEc-
TONS 1, 6 (1989). The win rate rose steadily as the female percentage of the workforce
rose, with unions displaying a spectacular win rate of 90% in units where the workforce was
95% female, more than "double the rate for the sample as a whole (43 percent)." Ruth
Milkman, Union Responses to Workforce Feminization in the United States, in THE CHALLENGE OF
RESTRUCTURING: NORTH AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENTS REsPoND 226, 237-38 (JaneJenson &
Rianne Mahon eds., 1993). Win rates for units with an overwhelmingly male workforce
were also higher than for those with gender-mixed workforces (though not as high as those
for overwhelmingly female units, a phenomenon that Milkman attributes in part to the
greater propensity toward unionization among women than men). See id. Similarly, where
the unit was racially homogeneous, the win rate was higher: if the work unit was greater
than 75% African American, Hispanic, or Asian, the win rate was 65%, compared to a 35%
win rate where less than three-quarters of the workers were African American, Hispanic, or
Asian. See id. at 239.
338 Some use the phrase "'feminization' of the workforce" literally to refer to the grow-
ing numbers of women entering the global labor market, occupying jobs that once would
have gone to male workers in America and undercutting male wages because of their lower
pay. Richard P. Appelbaum, Multiculturalism and Flexibility: Some New Directions in Global
Capitalism, in MAPPING MULTICULTURAUSM, supra note 159, at 297, 298; RichardJ. Barnet,
The End ofJobs, HARPER'S MAG., Sept. 1993, at 47, 49.
The feminization of work has an additional, more substantive meaning. Some have
observed that the burgeoning secondary labor market, threatening now to engulf the pri-
mary labor market, actually represents the "feminization" of work-the restructuring of
work to resemble more closely the jobs that women have performed in the past:
Work is being redefined as both literally female and feminized, whether
performed by men or women. To be feminized means to be made ex-
tremely vulnerable; able to be disassembled, reassembled, exploited as a
reserve labour force; seen less as workers than as servers; subjected to time
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Immigrants and women of color disproportionately occupy the
bottom rungs on the economic ladder wherever U.S. capitalism has
reached precisely because they are the most vulnerable to exploita-
tion.33 9 Employment and labor legislation usually does not regulate
their labor, particularly labor they perform in the informal sector
(homework, or work subcontracted to semi-clandestine enterprises),
and they suffer legal disabilities (such as illegal immigrant status for
those in the United States) which in turn make them willing to work
for lower wages and less likely to unionize in response to poor working
conditions. 340 American employers utilize enhanced technology and
mobility to expand into global markets unregulated by American law,
seeking out the point of least resistance and fostering a standard of
exploitation based on the lowest common denominator.3 41 Ulti-
mately, this triggers a "race to the bottom" in which all workers
lose.3
4 2
Lack of legal protection, however, does not fully explain why peo-
ple of color and women are more exploitable. By drawing on "preex-
isting patriarchal and racist ideologies" that workers themselves have
internalized, employers can fragment workers' identities into their
class-based, gender-based, and race- or ethnic-based aspects, splinter-
ing their consciousness and blunting class identification.3 43 At the
arrangements on and off the paid job that make a mockery of a limited
work day ....
HARAWAY, supra note 270, at 166. This phenomenon of an overall shift toward work, wages,
and working conditions historically typical of jobs in the secondary labor market is alter-
nately referred to as the "immiseration" of work. See FREDERIC JAMESON, PosmrODERISM,
OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF CAPrrAuSM 348 (1992) (referring to the "immiseration" of
marginalized groups).
339 See Laura Ho et al., (Dis)Assembling Rights of Women Workers Along the Global Assembly
Line: Human Rights and the Garment Industry, 31 HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 383, 384-86 (1996).
For example, women of color comprise some 75-100% of the low-paid high-tech produc-
tion industry labor force in the United States: the lower the pay and level of skill which the
job requires, the higher the percentage of women of color employed in it. See Hossfeld,
supra note 227, at 155. The minority groups that are employed in the lowest-paid and
lowest-skilled job categories vary by region (in the Silicon Valley, Third World immigrant
women predominate; in the southeast, blacks predominate; in the southwest, Hispanics
predominate), but the job categories in which they are employed and their status in the
occupational hierarchy do not differ by region. See id. at 156 n.4.
340 See Kathryn Ward, Introduction and Overview to WOMEN WORKERS AND GLOBAL RE-
STRUCTURING, supra note 227, at 1, 2.
341 See Appelbaum, supra note 338, at 314.
342 See id. at 306-13.
343 Hossfeld, supra note 227, at 149-50, 157. For example, through the vehicles of oc-
cupational segregation by gender and ethnicity or race, sexual and racial harassment,
stressing women workers' feminine characteristics through requirements that they wear
particular uniforms, and encouraging flirting and dating with supervisors so as to distract
women from their poor working conditions and divide them from one another, manage-
ment in many Silicon Valley microelectronics production shops emphasizes the tension
between women's identity as waged workers and their cultural identity as women. See id. at
159-61.
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same time, employers can undermine labors collective resistance by
using labor's internal divisions to pit groups of workers against one
another.344 The alienated white male worker, who sees himself as su-
perior to blacks and women, can align himself psychologically with a
more powerful white elite-the capitalist boss-with whom he may
share only the common characteristic of a privileged racial identity.
The worker's racial and gender privilege, in combination with the
American dream of social mobility, thus encourages his acquiescence
and participation in the economic hierarchy.3 45 In order to mount a
fundamental challenge to the existing structure, white male workers
must question not simply their own class status, but the racial and gen-
der privilege that justifies the status quo.3 46
2. Prospects for the Future: Inclusion
Unionism must now confront squarely the divisions that exist
within the working class along race and gender lines and pursue a
strategy of inclusion, rather than the strategies of exclusion and caste
which it has favored in the past. Only by eliminating price differen-
tials between groups of workers can labor prevent employers from pit-
ting one group against the other.3 47 Some hopeful signs indicate that
the labor movement has started down this path. Under John Swee-
ney's leadership, labor has explicitly changed its agenda to one of in-
clusion.3 48 With the help of worker centers that focus on a broad
array of needs in a particular ethnic community, unions and worker-
advocacy groups have begun to experiment with inclusive organizing
strategies that reach across ethnic barriers inside the U.S. and form
joint labor movements that stretch across international boundaries
(especially into Mexico) to prevent capital relocation in response to
344 See Bonacich, supra note 159, at 319-28 (offering an analysis of the Los Angeles
garment industry as an illustration of how capitalists exploit class, race, and ethnic divisions
among workers, and concluding that both class-based and race- or ethnicity-based strate-
gies will be necessary for workers to combat such exploitation effectively).
345 See KimberlE Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 IARV. L. REV. 1331, 1380-81 (1988).
346 See id. at 1380.
347 See Bonacich, supra note 163, at 30.
348 See Glenn Burkins, AFL-CIO Plans Campaign for a Rebound, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18,
1997, at A24 (reporting that PresidentJohnJ. Sweeney has announced plans for the AFL,
CIO to begin a major recruiting drive aimed at women and has shifted the AFL-CIO's focus
to organizing low-waged workers). See generally A NEw LABOR MOVEMENT FOR THE NEv
CENruRv, supra note 333 (collecting essays recommending reforms oriented toward a strat-
egy of inclusion);John Sweeney, Aftenuord to id. at 333 (embracing the inclusion strategy).
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worker pressure.3 49 At present, these efforts are only in an embryonic
stage.350
So far, the ways in which the capitalist class uses race and gender
to exploit labor remain unstudied by both labor and the new social
movements (identity politics) .351 If gender and race are viewed as loci
349 See Ho et al., supra note 339, at 405-06; see generally Frances Lee Ansley, U.S.-Mexico
Free Trade from the Bottom: A Postcard from the Border, 1 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 193 (1992)
(describing initiation of cross-border relations between U.S. women workers whose jobs
deindustrialization has eliminated or threatened, and women working in the Mexican ma-
quiladoras, to which some of the U.S. women workers' jobs have been relocated).
350 See Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America's Eroding
Industrial Base; 81 GEO. LJ. 1757, 1891-92 (1993) (describing new challenges that labor
organizers seeking to forge bonds across international boundaries face); Bob Davis et al.,
Unions Threatened by GlobalEconomy, WALL ST.J., Mar. 25, 1996, at All (describing problems
that labor unions seeking to organize internationally face, and tendency of unionists to see
foreign workers as competitors rather than potential allies). While transnational feminist
and cross-racial or ethnic organizing seems to have a stronger foothold, it has not focused
on economic rights, tending to privilege civil and political rights instead. See Margaret
Etienne, Addressing Gender-Based Violence in an International Contex4 18 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ.
139 (1995) (discussing efforts of international women's groups and human rights activists
to obtain recognition of gender-based violence and discrimination as violations of basic
human rights); Ho et al., supra note 339, at 410-13; Lynn Norment, How African-Americans
Helped Free South Africa, EBONY, Aug. 1, 1994, at 52-56 (crediting efforts of an alliance of
African American groups including the NAACP, TransAfrica, and the Rainbow Coalition
for the end of apartheid in South Africa).
351 An excellent example of the real-world consequences of this theoretical gap is of-
fered by David Harvey, Class Relations, SocialJustice and the Politics of Difference, in PLACE AND
THE PoLrIcs OF IDENrFr 41 (Michael Keith & Steve Pile eds., 1993). Harvey blames the
weakening of working class politics in part on the rise of new social movements, which he
believes have fragmented the working class. See id. at 47. He argues that the antiracist and
feminist movements have not been adequately responsive to or concerned with issues of
class exploitation, even when gender and race have intersected with it. See id. As evidence,
Harvey points to the failure of the feminist and antiracist movements to engage politically
with the disastrous chicken processing plant fire at Imperial Foods in Hamlet, North Caro-
lina in the fall of 1991. See id. The case revealed harsh truths about the low pay and
working conditions at the plant, as well as management's attitude toward the workers
(locked doors to the plant, which blocked the workers' escape during the fire, were said to
have been necessary to prevent pilferage by workers). See id. at 41-42. Noting that of the 25
people who died in the fire, 18 were women and 12 were African American, Harvey sug-
gests that the seeming paralysis of progressive politics in the face of class oppression indi-
cates classist tendencies in both movements. See id. at 44. He contrasts the apparent
passivity of the antiracist and feminist movements in that context with their efforts at polit-
ical agitation in the same time frame around the issue of the nomination of Clarence
Thomas to the United States Supreme Court. See id. at 44, 47. Harvey concludes that a
traditional form of class politics could have provided better protection for the interests of
the Hamlet workers despite their race and ethnicity, and despite the fact that "working-
class politics regrettably makes no explicit acknowledgement of the importance of race and
gender," because in this situation the commonality of class exploitation was primary. Id. at
59-60.
Harvey's analysis overlooks the fact that no union had organized the Hamlet plant and
that this fact is due in part to labor's weakness in the South-which in turn is traceable to
the historical impact of slavery and the racial tensions that linger between white and black
workers-as well as its historical failure to target and organize women of color. See ALAN
DRAPER, CONFLICT OF INTERESTS: ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN
THE SOUTH, 1954-1968, at 6, 39-40 (1994) (explaining that Southern unionists who sup-
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of exploitation that intertwine with class exploitation, however, one
can more clearly see how employers use gender, race, and class to
structure relations between themselves and labor, and can imagine an
alliance among labor and identity politics movements that might offer
a more radical and effective challenge to capitalistic systems of
exploitation. 52
D. The Role of Law in Fragmenting Gender, Race, and Class
Under the current legal regime, the message that women and
people of color receive from the law is that civil rights laws, rather
than labor law, protect their work interests. 353 In short, labor law and
labor unions exist for white men. Workers hear this message from
union organizers, implicitly 354 or explicitly. 55 Law professors hear it
from their students.35 6
ported racial segregation often resigned from the union to protest the AFL-CIO's policy of
racial integration); FoNER, supra note 184, at 7-8 (describing how slavery functioned as a
deterrent to trade unionism, particularly in the South); King, supra note 194, at 64 (point-
ing to the intersection of racist and sexist union policies, and its impact on black women).
As we have argued, the failure of the labor movement to overcome these divisions in prac-
tice is in large part a result of deficiencies in class theory-in particular, the exclusion of
intraclass race and gender exploitation-which are reflected in union practice and in the
law. See supra Parts l-IV; see also Louis Uchitelle, Black Labor Leaders Want Greater Voice, S.F.
CHRON., July 17, 1995, at A5 (noting comments by black labor leaders at the Coalition of
Black Trade Unionists, who pointed out that if organized labor's leadership had been
more responsive to the demands of black unionists, the debate on issues like the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFIA) might have been deeper and broader (e.g.,
had racial concerns been part of the dialogue, labor's campaign against NAFTA might
have stressed the impact of the diversion of corporate investment from urban communities
where unemployed blacks predominate)).
352 See supra notes 175-79; see also May Chen& Kent Wong, The Challenge ofDiversity and
Inclusion in the AFL-CO, in A NEw LABOR MOVEMENT FOR THE NEW CENTURY, supra note 333,
at 185, 191-92, 201 (describing the bridge-building function of identity constituency
groups within the AFL-CIO, and the potential for alliances between labor and people of
color); Ngai, supra note 333, at 173, 177-79, 182-85 (describing marginalization of Chinese
immigrants within organized labor, the impact of global competition on American jobs,
and the need for labor to confront immigration "at the level of policy").
353 See Iglesias, supra note 94, at 491; supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
354 See STANLEY ARONOWrrZ, WORKING CLASS HERO: A NEW STRATEGY FOR LABOR 143
(1983) (observing that "when trade unionism loses its character as a social movement and
reduces its activities to sectoral economic action, workers outside the labor movement get
the signal that unions are not for them").
355 See NLRB v. Eurodrive, 724 F.2d 556, 557 (6th Cir. 1984) (reciting facts involving a
union organizer who pointed to the company's sole black employee, stated that the white
employees needed the union to protect their jobs just as the black employee enjoyed the
protection of antidiscrimination laws, and promised that the union, if elected, would rein-
state an" employee who had been fired for racially harassing the black employee).
356 See Crain, supra note 208, at 1903 n.1 (relating the question asked by a student in a
labor law class, "What do women have to do with labor law?"); Donna E. Young, Two Steps
Remove& The Paradox of Diversity Discourse for Women of Color in Law Teaching, 11 BERxELE"
WOMEN's LJ. 270, 280 (1996) (describing exchange with student in which the student told
his black female law professor that he would consider taking a class from her in civil rights
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American labor law poses significant hurdles to an inclusive strat-
egy.3 57 We must rethink the united front ideology and its doctrinal
underpinnings: majority rule and exclusivity. The united front strat-
egy is inherently flawed because gender-, race-, and ethnicity-neutral
experiences of class oppression simply do not exist. The united front
strategy has denied difference and submerged the voices of the disad-
vantaged inside the movement, ultimately forcing them to cast their
lot with employers, to look to nonlabor groups for a voice on issues of
great economic and personal significance to them, or more fre-
quently, to suffer silently outside the labor movement.8 58 This strat-
egy, codified in the majority-rule and exclusivity doctrines, hamstrings
labor's ability to respond to workers' demands and undermines its
support base with a rapidly growing sector of the working class. Be-
cause women and people of color now constitute a significant percent-
age of the workforce available to capital as a reserve army to undercut
higher-priced labor, the united front ideology and the legal doctrines
it spawned require reexamination.
1. Majority Rule Is the Minority Rule
Majority rule, exclusivity, and the united front ideology are
unique to American and Canadian labor law regimes; other forms of
worker organization and collective representation prevail in most eco-
nomically advanced democracies.35 9 Only in the United States and
Canada must an individual worker join the organization that com-
mands the support of a majority of workers to obtain the rights of
collective organization, participation, and a voice on workplace issues.
Relative to other systems of collective labor relations, majority-rule
and exclusivity systems accord a low value to the rights of workers to
participate in workplace governance;3 60 majority rule deprives workers
of a voice in workplace governance if the union cannot command a
law, but not in labor law, because "civil rights is where you live." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
357 See supra notes 59-93 and accompanying text.
358 See supra notes 40-44, 149-54 and accompanying text; see also Chen & Wong, supra
note 352, at 187-92 (describing historical policies of exclusion pursued by the AFL-CIO
with regard to women and people of color and their lingerizig impact).
359 See generally COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUsTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIAI-
IZED MARKET ECONOMmS (R. Blanpain & C. Engels eds., 5th ed. 1993) (collecting essays
describing forms of worker representation in Belgium, Australia, France, the United King-
dom, Switzerland, Hungary, Germany, Italy, Israel, the Netherlands, and the United
States). Japanese law requires employers to bargain with any union representing at least
two people; multiple unionism is common. See Karl J. Duff, Japanese and American Labor
Law: Structural Similarities and Substantive Differences, 9 EMP. REL. L.J. 629, 633 (1984); see also
Hajime Matsuzaki, Enterprise Unionism in Japan, 34J. INDus. REL. 617, 618 (1992) (reviewing
HiRosuKE KAwANISHI, ENTERPRISE UNIONISM IN JAPAN (Ross E. Mover trans., 1992)).
360 See David Beatty, Constitutionalizing a Labour Code: Creative Uses of Comparative Law, 8
COMP. LAB. L.J. 211, 215-17 (1987).
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majority, and exclusivity silences the voices of those who comprise the
minority if the union does command a majority.3 61
Many other countries have demonstrated the viability of alterna-
tive means of employee representation and collective bargaining that
show more respect for employees' freedom of association and simulta-
neously produce greater union density and effectuation of worker
voice than are experienced in the United States.3 62 Some compara-
tive labor law scholars have observed that the adherence to principles
of majority rule and exclusivity is responsible in part for the low union
density in the United States and Canada relative to other industrial-
ized countries. 363 In 1980, for example, over eighty percent of the
German workforce benefitted from participation in workplace deci-
sion-making processes. 36 As of 1987, the Canadian system offered
protection to thirty-five to forty-five percent of its workforce.365 By
contrast, the American system offers protection to only fourteen per-
cent of the workforce.366
2. Situating Our Critique of Majority Rule
We certainly do not present the first criticism of majority rule and
exclusivity. Previous critics have focused primarily upon the role the
doctrines play in denying a voice to large numbers of workers.3 67 The
race and sex of the unrepresented workers are irrelevant in these anal-
361 See id.
362 See M. Biagi, Forms of Employee Representational Participatio, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR
LAw AND INDuSTRiAL RELAT1ONS IN INDUSTRIAuIZED MARKET ECONOMIES, supra note 359, at
315. Two general categories of alternative industrial relations systems exist: those which
recognize multiple representations among a limited group of competing organizations des-
ignated by a governmental organization as "most representative" within a workplace
(Belgium, France, Ireland, Norway, and Switzerland), and those which recognize purely
consensual representation by giving every worker an equal right of participation in collec-
tive bargaining regardless of union affiliation (Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, and Ger-
many). See id. at 328-35.
363 See id. at 315, 318.
364 See Clyde W. Summers, Worker Participation in the U.S. and West Germany: A Compara-
tive Study from an American Perspective, 28 AM.J. COMP. L. 367, 377 (1980).
365 See Beatty, supra note 360, at 236.
366 See Burkins, supra note 348, at A24 (reporting that overall union membership in
the United States declined from 14.9% of the workforce in 1995 to 14.5% in 1996).
367 See, e.g., Richard R. Carlson, The Origin and Future of Exclusive Representation in Ameri-
can Labor Law, 30 DuQ. L. REv. 779 (1992); Matthew Finkin, The Road Not Taken: Some
Thoughts on Nonmajority Employee Representation, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 195 (1993); Schatzki,
supra note 70; George Strauss, Is the New Deal Collapsing? With What Might It Be Replaced?, 34
INDus. REL. 329, 33941 (1995); see also Workplace Democracy Goal Largely Unmet Under NLRA,
Speakers Tell Conference, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 196, at C-1, C-2 (Oct. 11, 1995)
(reporting Professor Clyde Summers's challenge to the majority-rule principle, and his
proposal that the law be amended "to require employers to recognize and bargain with
'any substantial group' of employees that seeks recognition").
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yses.3 68 Some who have criticized the doctrine have done so, however,
in an explicit effort to address the problem of the underrepresenta-
tion of women and minorities within the union structure. 369 Most
commentators have focused on intra-union reforms or reforms ad-
dressed to the duty of fair representation, rather than advocating ab-
rogation of the majority-rule and exclusivity doctrines.370
We advance a combination of these two rationales, one that rec-
ognizes the historical role of racial and gender privilege in union or-
ganizing and bargaining. Those at the bottom of the occupational
hierarchy are least likely to be the targets of union-organizing drives
and to enjoy the advantages of collective bargaining in a majority-rule
system: not only are unions less likely to target them for organizing
because of the sectors in which they are located, but the employer can
368 Sometimes, even though the commentator's analysis does not hinge on the race or
sex of the workers, the groups of underrepresented workers which the commentator gives
as illustrations of those who lose under the majority-rule doctrine are statistically more
likely to be women or minority workers. See, e.g., Finkin, supra note 367, at 217 (noting that
nonmajority representation would better serve the interests of contingent workers).
369 See, e.g., Iglesias, supra note 94; Eileen Silverstein, Union Decisions on Collective Bar-
gaining Goals: A Proposal for Interest Group Participation, 77 MicH. L. REv. 1485 (1979).
370 See supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text. These critiques can be seen as sup-
porting majority rule and exclusivity by proposing structural changes that would accommo-
date competing interests within majority unions. For example, Silverstein has proposed
that groups within unions who have common concerns adverse to the majority union's
could form interest groups, and unions would be required to deal in good faith with these
interest groups. See Silverstein, supra note 369, at 1519. More recently, Cobble has argued
that unions could be redesigned to promote intra-union bargaining interest groups. She
believes that "such formalized intraunion bargaining structures would ensure that the class
needs of employees are met along with the needs that flow from their different racial,
ethnic, and gender identities." Dorothy Sue Cobble, Making Post Industrial Unionism Possi-
ble, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 285, 302 (Sheldon Friedman et al.
eds., 1994). In addition, these interest groups might have "a limited right to veto decisions
of the majority, to assure that union leadership will heed their concerns." Silverstein, supra
note 369, at 1519.
Such interest-group bargaining would be a major advance over the status quo. How-
ever, we agree with Iglesias that a more transformative rethinking of the ideology that
drives the majority-rule and exclusivity doctrines is necessary. See Iglesias, supra note 94, at
499 (noting that the structures of majority rule and exclusivity are "fmdamental obstacles
to the creation of institutional arrangements that would invite increased participation by
the new social movements" in labor organizing and representation of the most disadvan-
taged workers). So long as the law provides for majority rule, unions necessarily will be
institutions that cannot represent effectively the interests of minorities without running the
risk of alienating the majority. Giving minority interest groups a veto weapon would not
significantly change this situation. In many (probably most) instances, the majority will be
large enough to override an interest group's veto. In those workplaces where the need is
greatest-where there is a small minority with interests adverse to the majority's-a veto
threat will be of no help. Finally, these proposals for intra-union reform do not address
the problem of workforces where no union exists at all, and where, traditional unions are
unlikely to target the workforce for organizing. Cf Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Insti-
tution in the Emerging System of Employment Law, 69 Cnm.-KENr L. REv. 149, 159-62 (1993)
(discussing the legal status of employee caucuses-including identity caucuses-in the
nonunion workplace).
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more easily destroy the union's majority because of the high turnover
and ready supply of alternative labor which characterizes these un-
skilled service-sector workers.37' Further, once organized, the eco-
nomic interests of this group will probably diverge from, or in some
cases stand at odds with, those of the predominantly white and male
majority of union members.
E. The Alternative: Multiple Representatives
If labor abandoned the united front ideology, nonlabor groups
with an interest in supporting workers could engage and represent
workers, either separately or in cooperation with an established labor
union. Such organizations already exist;372 denouncing majority rule
would formally authorize them to speak for workers during contract
negotiations and to represent workers in grievance arbitration con-
ducted pursuant to the labor contract, which would in turn enhance
these organizations' ability to organize and mobilize workers. Many of
these groups organize themselves around identities, such as race or
gender, and work against the economic exploitation of their
constituencies.373
While some groups work from within the labor movement,374
others work from outside it, supporting traditional labor unions in
371 See Beatty, supra note 360, at 236-37.
372 For examples of such organizations, see those listed in the Resource Directory of
ARTHUR B. SHOSrAK, ROBUST UNIoNIsM: INNOVATIONS IN THE LABOR MOVEMNT 296-314
(1991) (listing organizations supporting workers). We have argued elsewhere that the def-
inition of labor organization in section 2(5) of the NLRA is broad enough to permit civil
rights organizations and feminist organizations to represent workers who choose them as
representatives without the need for amendment. See Grain & Matheny, supra note 5.
373 For example, the group Pride at Work seeks to win domestic partner health bene-
fits and extended family benefits, such as leave rights for family care and bereavement
purposes. See MIRIAM FRANK & DEsMA HOLCOMB, PIDE AT WORK: ORGANIZING FOR LESBIAN
AND GAY RIGHTS IN UNIONS (Lesbian & Gay Labor Network 1990).
374 The AFL-CIO has granted affiliation status to a handful of groups to serve as labor
support organizations; these groups are interested in working together with labor to build
organizing networks designed to raise class consciousness among their constituencies and
to educate labor about their constituencies' work-related concerns. Groups currently affili-
ated or seeking affiliation with the AFL-CIO include the Coalition of Labor Union Women
(CLUW), the Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance (APALA), the Coalition of Black
Trade Unionists, Frontlash, and Pride at Work. See DIANE BALSER, SISTERHOOD & SOLIDAR-
m'I. FEMINISM AND LABOR IN MODERN TIMES 151-213 (1987) (describing CLUW's origins,
activities, and ideological outlook); COALITION OF BLACK TRADE UNIONISTS PAMPHLET
(describing goals and objectives of the Coalition) (on file with authors); COALITION OF
LABOR UNION WOMEN, STATEMENT OF PURPOSE: STRUCTURE AND GUIDELINES (1974)
(describing CLUW's goals of unifying union women and bringing their concerns to the
attention of labor leaders, and summarizing its past efforts in the areas of affirmative ac-
tion, family and child leave, and anti-sexual harassment policies, among others); FRON-
TLASH, DEFINING FRONTLASH (describing Frontlash, the AFL-CIO's affiliated youth support
arm, which strives to get students involved in community and labor movements and to help
them see and care about labor issues) (on fie with authors); see also Kent Wong, Building
Unions in Asian Pacfic Communities, 18 AMERAsIAJ. 149, 153-54 (1992) (describing APALa's
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their organizing and economic-pressure activities.3 75 Nine to Five, the
National Association for Working Women is probably the best known
of these groups. It runs a hotline designed to answer working wo-
men's questions about workplace issues ranging from sexual harass-
ment to pregnancy discrimination to issues of worker dignity. The
group works to educate and mobilize women around issues of con-
cern to them, including child care, family leave, pay equity, rights of
part-time and temporary workers, and health and safety issues sur-
rounding video display terminals. 376 New union structures called
"workers' centers" link workplaces and communities, organizing from
a community base. Often these structures focus on immigrant work-
ers with a strong ethnic identity and a range of needs stemming from
language barriers, unfamiliarity with the U.S. legal system, and illegal
status. 377  Finally, some groups merge occupational and identity
role in coordinating the organization of Asian American workers inside the labor move-
ment through a community-based organizing model); Arnold Beichman, Durable Vehicle for
Racial Equality, WASH. TIMEs, Aug. 14, 1994, at B3 (describing how the A. Philip Randolph
Institute seeks racial equality through unionism); Amy Carroll, Gay/Lesbian Activists Talk
AFL-CIO Affiliation, LAB. NoTEs, Aug. 1996, at 6 (describing efforts of Pride at Work to
obtain AFL-CIO affiliation); Philip Dine, Black Unionists Share Worries About NAFTA, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 5, 1993, at IF (describing activities of the Coalition of Black
Trade Unionists in calling attention to the economic burdens borne disproportionately by
blacks); Nancy Feigenbaum, Labor Leader Tries To Organize Hispanics, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Feb. 7, 1994, at 25 (describing activities of the Labor Council for Latin American Advance-
ment, which targets Hispanic workers for union organization); Students Accuse Four Law
Firms of Union Busting, N.Y. TIMEs CAMPus LFE, Dec. 16, 1990, at 60 (describing law student
group organized by Frontlash which mobilized protests against law firms that do union-
busting and antilabor legal work).
375 See Carroll, supra note 374 (describing the role of San Francisco Bay Area's Pride at
Work chapter in supporting a UFCW strike in a grocery store located in the heart of the
gay community).
Some of these organizations are regional in character and work to increase labor's
presence in particular parts of the country. See Mary Hollens, Workers Centers: Organizing in
Both the Workplace and Community, LAB. NoTEs, Sept. 1994, at 8, 9 (describing community
and workplace organizing done by the Carolina Alliance for Fair Employment, a South
Carolina-based organization); Peter Rachleff, A Page from History: Seeds of a Labor Resurgency,
258 NATION 226 (1994) (describing activities of North Carolina-based Black Workers for
Justice, which does community and workplace organizing in the South).
376 See 9 TO 5, NAT'L ASS'N FOR. WORKING WOMEN, "BusINESS As UsurALf: STORIES FROM
THE 9 TO 5 JOB SuRvIvAL HOTUNE (1991) (on file with authors); 9 TO 5, NAT'L ASS'N OF
WORKING WOMEN, ON THE JOB wITH 9 TO 5 (on file with authors).
377 See Hollens, supra note 375, at 8 (describing the role of workers' centers for South-
Asian women in New York City, for Chinese workers in Boston, and for Mexican workers in
Texas); see also Ruth Needleman, Building Relationships for the LongHauk Unions and Commu-
niy-Based Groups Working Together To Organize Low-Wage Workers, in ORGANIZING To WIN:
NmW RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES 71 (Kate Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998) (describ-
ing three cooperative arrangements between community-based organizations and labor
unions); Steven A. Chin, Former Garment WorkerEmerges As Labor Leader, S.F. EXAMINER, May
5, 1994, at A21 (describing Katie Quan's efforts in establishing both the Asian Pacific
American Labor Alliance and San Francisco Bay area workers' centers).
It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore these organizations and their potential
at further length. We do so, however, in a companion article to this one, showing how race
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issues. 3 78
Ifwejettison the united front mandate and make room in the law
for nonmajority organizing, we will create enhanced opportunities for
new experiments in worker representation. Both labor and nonlabor
groups-as well as workers themselves-should gain from these exper-
iments. Under the current majority-rule and exclusivity regime, un-
ions face an all-or-nothing situation; labor's existence depends on
winning elections.379 In the absence of majority rule, unions would
not need to expend precious resources in a life-or-death struggle to
win elections. Further, because workers' organizations will represent
only their members, they could avoid time-consuming, costly unit-de-
termination battles and duty-of-fair-representation suits.3 80 Workers
would select the organization that they felt would represent their in-
terests, and organizations that have historically been estranged from
labor would gain members by demonstrating their ability to represent
their constituents with respect to matters of great practical concern:
fair wages, elimination of discrimination and harassment, day-care fa-
cilities, family leave, flexible hours, and so on.
Community- and identity-based organizing and structures would
also produce a more nuanced understanding of the form and strate-
gies of economic exploitation, and of the worker mobilization strate-
gies needed to overcome them. Organization around multiple
sources of identity facilitates the development of a sense of self and
feelings of respect for one's own race, gender, or sexual orientation,
and fosters a sense of community.38' Further, such race-, gender-, and
ethnic-specific structures work against the tendency to ignore or gloss
over conflicts, and to wax overly romantic about commonalities of in-
terest among the disadvantaged; they ensure a mechanism for the
voice of the most oppressed groups in the decision-making process. 3 82
and gender have been and continue to be intertwined with class issues in organizing work-
ers. See Grain & Matheny, supra note 5.
378 See Female Coal-Miner Organization Fights Extinction, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 1996, at Al
(describing the Coal Employment Project, a network of support groups for female coal
miners).
379 See Clyde Summers, Unions Without Majority-A Black Hole, 66 CHI.-KNrTr L. Rnv.
531, 533-34 (1990). In recent years, sophisticated anti-union tactics by employers have
made it quite difficult for unions to win NLRB elections. See, e.g., Finkin, supra note 367, at
202 n.32 (pointing out that in recent years unions have been losing more elections than
they have been winning).
380 See Hyde et al., supra note 57, at 651 n.42; Schatzki, supra note 70, at 924 (sug-
gesting that eliminating majority rule removes the doctrinal underpinnings of the duty of
fair representation).
381 See Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism: Address-
ing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multiracial Society, 81 CA.L. L.
REv. 863, 901 (1993).
382 See id. at 912; see also Dyson, supra note 330, at 171 (observing that we will transcend
internecine conflicts within the labor movement only by explicitly taking race and identity
politics into account).
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This inclusion is absolutely essential because the position of the more
privileged, even within a social movement, both prevents the privi-
leged from understanding the interests of the less privileged and
tends to self-perpetuate (since the position of the privileged depends
upon the continued subordination of others).383 Through coalition
organizing, common oppressions play only one role in a larger
story.38 4
F. Objections
Critics could make two objections to eliminating exclusive repre-
sentation: First, organizations representing less than a majority will
not be strong enough to deal effectively with employers; second, deal-
ing with a multiplicity of groups representing workers will be ineffi-
cient and costly for employers. As to the first objection, defenders of
majority rule and exclusivity maintain that a united front strategy is
necessary to create solidarity within a group of workers that lacks co-
hesion and faces virulent opposition from employers.385 Only
through a united front can workers attain sufficient economic lever-
age through their unions in dealing with the employer. One cannot,
however, create solidarity by imposing it from above; illusory and su-
383 See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 184-85 (1990).
384 See Mary Coombs, Interrogating Identity, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 222, 247 & n.138
(1996) (book review). Iris Young best describes the vision of coalition underlying this
analysis, likening it to Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition:
In traditional coalitions diverse groups work together for specific ends
which they agree interest or affect them all in a similar way, and they gener-
ally agree that the differences of perspective, interests, or opinion among
them will not surface in the public statements and actions of the coalition
.... In a Rainbow Coalition, by contrast, each of the constituent groups
affirms the presence of the others as well as the specificity of their experi-
ence and perspective on social issues .... Ideally, a Rainbow Coalition
affirms the presence and supports the claims of each of the oppressed
groups or political movements constituting it, and arrives at a political pro-
gram not by voicing some 'principles of unity' that hide difference, but
rather by allowing each constituency to analyze economic and social issues
from the perspective of its experience.
YOUNG, supra note 383, at 188-89.
Here, perhaps, is where our fundamental disagreement lies with our colleagues
McUsic and Selmi. They characterize arguments for separate representation on the basis
of identity, such as those made by Iris Young, as reflecting a "fear of coalition-building," or
a fear "of any attempt to find or forge common interests among different groups." McUsic
& Selmi, supra note 2, at 1340. We disagree. Arguments for separate representation and
analysis of identity issues by constituent groups which are part of a larger movement seek-
ing to build a coalition-such as the argument we advance in this Article, as well as the
argument Young articulates-are simply a different means of arriving at the same ends:
educating one another about our differences and furthering coalition-building in the
struggle for progressive change.
385 See Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84
HARv. L. REV. 1394, 1401-04, 1409-11 (1971); Finkin, supra note 367, at 200.
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perficial at best, such solidarity will .dissolve quickly when the em-
ployer attempts to undermine it.386
Further, we must reexamine the assumption that coerced solidar-
ity confers economic clout. As Professor Finkin has demonstrated, ad-
vocates of the united front exaggerate its benefits in invoking
economic pressure.3 87 Majority unions do not always succeed in put-
ting effective economic pressure on an employer. One need only con-
sider the great difficulty that majority unions have had recently in
winning strikes.388 Indeed, one experienced labor lawyer wrote that
the odds against a union are so great that it is "insane" to go on
strike.3 89 While this may be an exaggeration, the crushing defeat of
unions in well-publicized strikes against Phelps Dodge, Hormel, Cater-
pillar, and others grimly illustrates the trouble that even strong unions
have winning strikes.390 Enhanced capital mobility, the ability of em-
ployers to rely on technology to continue operation during a strike,
and employers' increased willingness to hire permanent replacement
workers raise the distinct possibility that the strike is becoming obso-
lete. 391 Moreover, strikes divide workers, ripping families and com-
munities apart.392 Finally and most importantly, reliance on the strike
386 See Finkin, supra note 367, at 200; see also Schatzki, supra note 70, at 926-29 (point-
ing out that many members of a typical bargaining unit do not support the majority union,
and observing that solidarity under majority rule is a "myth").
387 See, e.g., Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike 1990
U. ILL. L. REv. 540, 547 (noting that a minority union's position "would not be signifi-
candy different from that of a union which had a majority in a bargaining unit encompass-
ing only a minority of the employer's work force"); Finkin, supra note 367, at 201
(observing that the legal limits on the union's ability to command the financial support of
bargaining unit members, and the law's emphasis on the individual's right to cross the
strike picket line and the employer's privilege to attempt to induce her to do so, signifi-
cantly undermine the practical significance of the united front).
388 The literature on the growing ineffectiveness of the strike weapon is vast. See gener-
ally Finkin, supra note 387; Roger Keeran & Greg Tarpinian, Public Policy and the Recent
Decline of Strikers, 18 LAB. STUD. J. 481 (1989-1990); John Hoerr, Is the Strike Dead', AM.
PROSPECT, Summer 1992, at 106.
389 GEOGHEGAN, supra note 6, at 5.
390 For poignant illustrations of this point, see, for example, DAVE HAGE & PAUL
KLAUDA, No RETREAT, No SURRNDER: LABOR's WAR AT HoRMEL (1989) (detailing the bitter
strike involving Local P-9 of the UFCW against Hormel Corporation in Austin, Minnesota),
and JONATHAN D. ROSENBLUM, COPPER CRUCIBLE: How THE ARIzONA MINERs' STRIKE OF
1983 REcAST LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONs IN AMERICA (1995) (describing the USWA's
failed strike against Phelps Dodge Corporation).
391 See CHARLEs C. HECSCHER, THE Nv UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN THE
CHANGING CORPORATION 60-61 (ILR Press 1996) (1988) (discussing how management's
ability to anticipate strikes, to shift production, and to use technology to operate during
strikes compromises a strike's effectiveness). Heckscher writes, "It has become so easy to
break strikes that companies sometimes encourage them." Id. at 61. Heckscher points out
that strikes impose heavy financial burdens on members and that a failed strike can devas-
tate a labor union. He writes, "A strike for a union is like a sting for a bee-painful for the
enemy, but often more damaging to the attacker in the end." Id. at 30.
392 See supra note 390.
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means that only a relatively small number of privileged workers in se-
lect (usually oligopolistic) industries can enjoy the advantages of col-
lective bargaining because less-privileged workers, especially in the
service sector, undergo great difficulty in mounting effective strikes.393
393 See Christopher Bavis, Labor Arbitration As an Industrial Relations Dispute Settlement
Procedure in World Labor Markets, 45 LAB. L.J. 147, 147-49 (1994) (pointing out that a labor
law system that relies on strikes does not provide the same opportunities for all employees
to enjoy collective bargaining).
A plausible argument can be made that it is time to cast aside labor's historic reliance
on strikes to resolve disputes and to replace it with interest arbitration. Such a shift would
make collective bargaining available to economically weak workers while redistributing in-
come in more fundamentally radical ways. See id. at 149. William Gould has raised the
further suggestion that the quest for labor-management cooperation might create interest
in more peaceful ways of resolving conflict, possibly resulting in "attempts to apply the
experience gained in grievance arbitration to interest disputes about new contract terms."
WnjiAm B. GouLD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAw 214 (Sd ed. 1993). Gould also
speculates that the use of interest arbitration in the public sector might "have substantial
impact on the private sector." Id.; see also Roger G. Howlett, Interest Arbitration in the Public
Sector, 60 CHI.-KrNT L. REv. 815, 836-37 (1984) (arguing that interest arbitration should be
the means for resolving all labor disputes and that interest disputes should be resolved in a
civilized manner rather than "through trial by combat"); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Federal
Regulation of the Workplace in the Next Half Centuiy, 61 CH.-KINT L. REv. 631, 652-53 (1985)
(stating that in certain industries, such as transportation, communications, and public utili-
ties, compulsory interest arbitration is preferable to strikes). Furthermore, it has been
argued that the United States should adopt the Canadian practice of using interest arbitra-
tion in first contract disputes. See Errol Black & Craig Hosea, First Contract Legislation in
Manitoba: A Model for the United States?, 45 LtB. LJ. 33, 38 (1994).
The main objection to private-sector interest arbitration is that it involves an unaccept-
able intrusion of the government into the workplace. Labor law is based on the notion
that what goes on at the workplace is a private matter between the employer and the em-
ployees and that, in general, the public has no interest in the substantive terms of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement. See Kare, supra note 49, at 295. Labor law conceives of the
organized workplace as an autonomous realm privately governed by labor and manage-
ment, with the government's role limited to ensuring that the process of collective bargain-
ing is observed, but not with establishing the terms of the agreement. See Katherine Van
Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE LJ. 1509, 1513 (1981)
(pointing out that the NLRA has been interpreted to confer only procedural, not substan-
tive, rights on labor); see also Karl E. Kare, The Public/Private Distinction in LaborLaw, 130 U.
PA. L. REv. 1358, 1417 (1982) (arguing that the public-private dichotomy is an attempt to
conceive of economic life apart from government and law).
This public-private dichotomy leads to a simplistic belief that we must choose between
two distinct models of workplace governance: either free collective bargaining and private
ordering of the workplace, or governmental dictation of the terms of employment. See
Karl E. Kare, Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal Reform, 38
CATH. U. L. Ray. 1, 14 (1988) ("It is conventional in American political and legal rhetoric
to treat bargaining, described as 'freedom of contract' or 'private ordering,' and adminis-
tration through law, known as 'governmental intervention' or 'regulation,' as dichoto-
mous, polar opposites."). However, an unresolved tension exists between the so-called
private ordering of the workplace and the strong public policy of eradicating sexual and
racial discrimination. For example, the public-private dichotomy influenced Justice Mar-
shall's opinion in Emporium Capwell, See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Com-
munity Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1974). Justice Marshall emphasized that the NLRA exists to
facilitate the process of collective bargaining and that, accordingly, the rights created by
the NLRA, such as the right to engage in concerted activity with one's fellow employees,
"are protected not for their own sake but as an instrument of the national labor policy of
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Furthermore, abolishing majority rule and exclusivity would
breathe new life into alternative economic weapons such as boycotts
and picketing. As new bridges are built between unions and nonlabor
groups, they might join in utilizing picketing and boycott strategies to
bring pressure on employers.3 94 Boycotts can effectively publicize la-
bor's message and mobilize public opinion, particularly if they are or-
ganized around issues perceived as having a social justice component
(far more likely if feminist or antiracist groups are involved).395 These
are also relatively low-risk economic pressure tactics that may have
more appeal and practical utility for the most disadvantaged work-
ers.396 Finally, eliminating majority rule and exclusivity would under-
mine the constitutionality of the restrictions on secondary boycotts
because of the potentially broad impact on political speech by nonla-
bor groups; ultimately, the secondary boycott provisions would proba-
bly be struck down or repealed.3 97
minimizing industrial strife 'by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bar-
gaining.'" Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994)). The public-private dichotomy holds that
the government's interest in workplace governance is limited to process, and, not surpris-
ingly, the emphasis on process over substance pervades Emporium CapwelL Indeed, the fired
black employees lost in Emporium Capwell mainly because they, according to the Court,
attempted to undermine "orderly collective bargaining process[es]" for eliminating dis-
crimination by circumventing the union in an attempt to bargain directly with the em-
ployer. Id. at 69. Such behavior cannot be tolerated because it could damage "the
bargaining process that the principle of exclusive representation is meant to lubricate." Id.
However, the public policy of eliminating workplace discrimination requires a focus on
substance, and Emporium Capwell offered the Court the opportunity to transcend the pub-
lic-private dichotomy and to rule that, at least so far as discrimination is concerned, labor
law must address substantive conditions of employment. But, unfortunately, the public
policy of combatting discrimination was subordinated to the myth of private ordering of
the workplace via the industrial government established by the union and management.
The belief that the public has no interest in the contents of collective bargaining
agreements simply does not apply to sexual and racial discrimination because of the strong
public policy against invidious discrimination. Much has changed since Congress enacted
the Wagner Act. A great deal of legislation, from Tide VII to the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994), has been enacted which undermines to a consid-
erable degree the belief that what transpires at the workplace is a purely private matter.
Furthermore, the state has not been diffident about intruding into the workplace when it
has believed that exigent circumstances require intrusion. For example, the state inter-
vened to regulate labor-management relations during both World Wars. More recently,
the state has intervened in the workplace as part of the so-called war on drugs. See Marion
Crain, Expanded Employee Drug-Detection Programs and the Public Good: Big Brother at the Bar-
gaining Tabl4 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1286, 1335-42 (1989). Thus, given the strong public policy
against discrimination evidenced by Title VII, precedent exists for government interfer-
ence in the ordering of the private relationship between employer and union.
394 SeeJames Gray Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions and Boycotts: The Old Labor Law, the
New Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 TEx. L. REv. 889 (1991) (discussing the advan-
tages of such combinations and the issues raised under both antitrust law and existing
labor laws).
395 See Crain, supra note 208, at 1985-87.
396 See id. at 1985.
397 Many scholars have criticized the secondary boycott prohibitions and have sug-
gested partial or full repeal. See, e.g., CRAvER, supra note 1, at 145-46 (arguing that Con-
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Professor Finkin has adequately answered the second criticism
raised by defenders of the majority rule-workability-and we need
not repeat at length points already eloquently made elsewhere.398 To
summarize, Finkin notes that the problem of multiple bargaining
agents already exists under current law: where the Board certifies mul-
tiple units within a workplace, the employer must bargain with each of
them.3 99 Further, separate unions may agree to form a coalition and
to bargain jointly with the employer, if the employer agrees.40 0 Fi-
nally, if a fear exists that bargaining representatives will proliferate
excessively, the statute could set a minimum level of employee support
(expressed in terms of a percentage of the relevant workforce) as a
condition of employer recognition. 40 1
In short, multiple representations could ultimately unify the
working class by encouraging discussion and a compromise-style reso-
lution of conflicts where they do exist. If differences do bring groups
into direct conflict, even to the extent of stalling decision making and
undermining the solidarity of the larger group, multiple representa-
tions would still be preferable to the situation that exists today, where
the vast majority of workers-and particularly those at the bottom of
the income scale-have no collective representations in their work-
places, and where those who do-like the women who work at Mitsub-
ishi Motors-may find their interests ignored by the majority union in
a travesty of solidarity.
CONCLUSION
This Article argues that current labor law doctrine and the labor
union practices consistent with it facilitate capitalist exploitation of
the working class along gender and racial lines as well as along class
lines. While employers undoubtedly have taken advantage of oppor-
tunities to exacerbate the divisions within the working class in order to
undermine working-class unity, the labor movement's failure to con-
gress should recognize the growing imbalance of power between workers and employers
and permit some forms of secondary boycotts); PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WOR"LACE:
THE FuTuRE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAw 272-73 (1990) (proposing that the law be
amended to allow striking workers to ask other workers not to provide services to, or han-
dle products from, the struck employer); Cobble, supra note 370, at 297 (proposing that
secondary boycotts for purpose of organizing workers be protected); Crain, supra note 208,
at 1996-99 (suggesting that secondary boycott prohibitions are unconstitutional as applied
to labor speech raising issues of race or gender, and proposing that secondary boycott
prohibitions not be applicable to pressure activities undertaken by unions in the service of
race or sex equality goals in the workplace); St. Antoine, supra note 393, at 653-54 (arguing
that restrictions on secondary boycotts should be relaxed).
398 See Finkin, supra note 367, at 202-04.
399 See id. at 202-03.
400 Finkin and Schatzki note that a coalition-forcing or accommodating provision
might be desirable to encourage this. See id. at 205; Schatzki, supra note 70, at 919.
401 See Finkin, supra note 367, at 204.
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front and recognize the divisions that exist within the working class
has contributed to the problem. One can fairly place some of the
responsibility for this problem at the labor movement's door, particu-
larly when one considers the lengthy history of feminist and antiracist
critiques showing that labor has at times actively fought for the inter-
ests of white men at the expense of those of women and people of
color.4 o
2
But the problem runs deeper than sexism and racism within the
labor movement. Labor's ambivalence about including women and
people of color in its agenda symptomatizes a much more complex
and deeper-running schism within the working class. The gendered
and racial nature of economic exploitation creates the potential for
conflicts of interest to arise within the working class on economic mat-
ters. The unidimensional vision of class consciousness spawned by
prevailing law and union practice is thus both incomplete and mis-
leading. It suggests that unions can mobilize workers around com-
mon class interests behind a united front, when in fact this may not be
possible in a diverse workforce.
The labor law doctrines of exclusivity and majority rule thus en-
sure that unions seeking to represent gender- and race-diverse
workforces will suffer role conflict. The law's strategy of suppressing
divisions within the working class to present a united front on labor's
side of the bargaining table has not proved equal to the task of or-
ganizing or representing such workforces. Unfortunately, despite
wishful thinking and emotional appeals to class unity, "divisions be-
tween men and women will not simply disappear in the magic of soli-
darity."403 Because these divisions are based upon material conflicts
of interest which lie at the heart of worker organizing and collective
bargaining under labor law, they will continue to fester and grow un-
less they are unmasked and addressed directly. In our view, this atten-
tion is unlikely to occur in a system characterized by a legally coerced
united front.
We do not argue here for a system in which differences between
workers are always accentuated; from an organizing perspective, it
may often be necessary to accentuate common economic interests
shared by workers. In other contexts, however, it may be more effec-
tive to affirm differences among groups of workers in order to high-
light gender- or race-based exploitation and raise workers'
402 See, e.g., Mich~le Barrett, Unity Is Strength? Feminism and the Labour Movement, in Wo-
MEN AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE: A CRrIQUE OF SOCIOLOGY AND POLrICS 89 (Janet Siltanen &
Michelle Stanworth eds., 1984).
403 Id. at 95.
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consciousness-a strategy which majority rule and exclusivity fore-
close. All we seek here is breathing room in the law, so that the deci-
sion whether to emphasize similarities or differences can be made in
context.
40 4
404 Cf Ruth Colker, The Anti-Subordination Principle: Applications, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J.
59, 60, 80 (1987) (making the same argument in the context of feminism and antidis-
crimination law).
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